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 Corporate acquisitions are among the biggest, most expensive, and most visible invest-
ments in the lifecycle of the firm. The primary rationale for their existence is to transfer prop-
erty rights of assets to the entity which can derive the highest economic value from them. 
M&A enable firms to grow faster than firms relying solely on organic growth, sometimes sig-
nificantly alter product market competition and reorganize industries. With substantial re-
sources committed to the takeover process, managers need to think strategically in order to 
maximize the expected value from M&A and to maximize shareholder wealth. The following 
four paragraphs outline some fundamental M&A research questions. 
DOES M&A PAY? — Hundreds of academic studies suggest that M&A does not support 
theories predicting value destruction, at least when analyzing overall combined gains of the 
involved firms (Eckbo (2009, 2014)). Event studies of abnormal stock price reactions around 
deal announcement indicate that the target receives the surplus, and that the surplus is even 
higher if the bidder is publicly listed. Acquiring firms break even on average, yet the takeover 
of a private target is associated with positive bidder announcement returns. Value creation also 
largely depends on the method of payment, and a variety of theories have been developed in 
order to explain this phenomenon (e.g., Jensen and Ruback (1983), Andrade, Mitchell, and 
Stafford (2001), and Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008)). 
WHY AND WHEN DO M&A TRANSACTIONS OCCUR? — It is well documented in the 
literature that mergers occur in waves (e.g., Martynova and Renneboog (2008)): the Great 
Merger Wave in the late 1890s, the wave towards oligopolies in the 1920s, the conglomerate 
wave in the 1950s and 1960s, the wave of hostile divestitures in the 1980s, the wave of global-
ization and technological innovations in the 1990s, and the wave of cross-border and going-
private transactions during the last two decades. Neoclassical literature (e.g., Mitchell and 
Mulherin (1996)) argues that merger waves are the reaction to shocks to an industry’s eco-
nomic, technological, and/or regulatory environment that require large-scale reallocation of 
assets. Harford (2005) adds to this literature and finds that overall capital liquidity is an 
important prerequisite and better explains the clustering compared to behavioral models. 
General Introduction Strategic Aspects in M&A Negotiations 
 
2 
DOES M&A PROMOTE CORPORATE INNOVATION? — Phillips and Zhdanov (2013) 
model and empirically test how an active M&A market and competition affect the decision to 
conduct R&D. They find that the possibility to sell out to larger firms has a positive impact 
on small firms’ incentives to innovate, and that larger firms choose to acquire successfully 
innovating targets as a substitute for in-house R&D activities. Frésard, Hoberg, and Phillips 
(2020) examine determinants of vertical acquisitions and propose that the innovation stage is 
important in explaining vertical integration. They find that R&D-intensive firms that are at 
an early stage of unrealized innovation are less likely to become targets of vertical acquisitions, 
and are more likely to initiate customer and supplier relationships outside the firm. However, 
if their innovation is realized, i.e., patented, firms are more likely to vertically integrate since 
incentives to commercialize the innovation increase relative to incentives to innovate. 
HOW ARE FIRMS SOLD? — Recent studies address the selling procedure in M&A. Ini-
tiating a firm’s sale and determining the sales mechanism are generally deliberate decisions by 
target’s management, and their analysis helps us to better understand strategic interactions of 
participating firms as well as deal outcomes. Hansen’s (2001) theoretical work suggests that in 
equilibrium, when deciding between auctions and one-to-one negotiations, targets outweigh the 
benefits of getting more bidders with the (indirect) costs of information revelation. His model 
helps to explain why we not always observe auctions in practice. In addition, Liu, Mulherin, 
and Brown (2018) find that takeover auctions have moved behind the scenes, target boards 
are more likely to initiate them, and that the time period between deal initiation and deal 
announcement has lengthened significantly over the last two decades. Masulis and Simsir 
(2018) highlight the role of deal initiation and find that target’s economic weakness, financial 
constraints, and negative economy-wide shocks are important motives to trigger transactions. 
Yet some aspects of strategic interactions between acquirers, targets, and market par-
ticipants are still not fully understood. E.g., the activism of short sellers in M&A transactions 
could not have been analyzed in full detail due to data availability. On the other hand, data-
bases are known to significantly underreport the incidence of deal protection devices, such as 
termination fees, prior to 2007. Furthermore, modern algorithms now allow us to analyze tre-
mendous amounts of data stored in credible sources, such as the SEC’s EDGAR database. The 
purpose of this thesis is to fill identified research gaps and to add to the extant literature. 
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The first chapter — “The Real Effects of Possible Stock Recalls on Acquirer Stocks: 
Empirical Evidence from M&A Premiums” — addresses the role of short sellers and their 
impact on takeover prices in M&A deals. The traditional argument motivates short sellers’ 
engagement by them bringing (hypothesized inflated) asset prices to their fundamental value. 
Chapter 1 adds a new motive that has not been analyzed before: merger arbitrageurs (as short 
sellers in M&A deals are called) can profit from an endogenous informational advantage. By 
purchasing target stocks and shorting acquirer stocks in an announced takeover, they can profit 
from private stock recall signals issued by beneficial owners of shorted stocks. Aggarwal, Saffi, 
and Sturgess (2015) show that these owners likely recall if they later vote against management 
proposals in corporate control matters. Merger arbitrageurs can then update their trading 
strategy before all other market participants can, and accept lower deal premiums compared 
to incumbent target shareholders due to their trading option. The value of this option is higher, 
the more merger arbitrageurs are positioned and the more likely a stock recall is (this likelihood 
is proxied by acquirer institutional ownership concentration). Since data about shorted stocks 
(i.e., the magnitude of merger arbitrageurs) and ownership are especially available to M&A 
advisors with high equity capital market expertise, I suggest consultation of acquirer managers 
by these advisors as the primary channel to save premiums in M&A deals. 
Another important implication of this chapter is related to acquirer wealth effects at 
offer announcement: since shorting acquirer stocks in the announced exchange ratio is part of 
merger arbitrageurs’ trading strategy, this shorting volume does not mirror short sellers’ tra-
ditional motive to bring asset prices back to fundamental values. If one analyzes acquirer 
announcement returns, one should ideally also adjust for the downward pressure on acquirer 
stocks caused by merger arbitrageurs, because their trading reflects uninformed short selling. 
The second chapter — “Entrenchment through Discretion over M&A Contractual 
Provisions” — also adds to the literature analyzing announcement returns of acquiring firms. 
By misusing a specific contract clause in M&A contracts, namely by setting bidder termination 
fees too high, managers of acquiring firms, that are under pressure of being replaced due to 
bad performance, can make it costly for their shareholders to disapprove the deal after an-
nouncement. These managers can thereby entrench themselves through the deal in the sense 
of Shleifer and Vishny (1989). Announcement reactions of acquirer’s stock are significantly 
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negative if the manager underperformed in the year preceding the announcement (i.e., my 
proxy for likely and imminent forced CEO turnover) and if the bidder termination fee is rela-
tively high. With relatively high I mean high dollar values of the fee scaled by acquiring firm’s 
market capitalization. In this way, I focus on the potential economic impact on acquirer value 
if bidder termination fees must be paid, rather than the demand by target managers to com-
pensate targets for information revelation after acquirer-induced deal cancellation, as chapter 
3 highlights. Chapter 2 concludes that excessively high bidder termination fees, misused by 
CEOs with high turnover pressure, possibly signal agency problems. Management boards 
should thus keep this entrenchment motive in mind when negotiating on this important M&A 
contract clause. 
In general, bidder termination fees exist and are included in merger contracts since the 
1980s. Research started to focus on them after their emergence in private equity deals in the 
mid-2000s, where their original motive for inclusion in merger agreements was to compensate 
targets for incurred costs if the private equity firm could not secure financing for the deal. 
Because of decreased practical interest prior to that time, databases are known to significantly 
underreport their existence and research gaps have not been closed. Today, all public firms are 
obliged to file official documents with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), where 
data about bidder termination fees and other merger information not included in traditional 
databases can be parsed by textual algorithms or hand-selection. Analyzing these contract 
devices is important to explain their size and economic rationales for inclusion in M&A deals. 
The third chapter — “Intellectual Property Protection in M&A Negotiations” — 
contributes to the literature by emphasizing the relevance of bidder termination fees as an 
incentive compatible contract component for target firms. Targets have an incentive to reveal 
sensitive private information to the acquirer if the former are compensated in case the latter 
abandon deals due to reasons under their sphere of control. In contrast to chapter 2, I scale 
the dollar amount of the bidder termination fee by target firm’s market capitalization to focus 
on the economic impact on target’s value, if deals are terminated by the acquirer and fees are 
paid. I proxy for the component of intellectual property in target firm’s market value by ap-
plying an updated capitalization model for intangible capital stocks (Ewens, Peters, and Wang 
(2020)). As hypothezised in chapter 3, I find that the size of the bidder termination fee increases 
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in the proxy of intellectual property value of the target (R&D capital stock divided by target’s 
market capitalization), suggesting that target managers can utilize their bargaining power in 
deal negotiations to convince the acquirer to provide an appropriately priced fee. The results 
suggest that, on average, for every dollar of target firm’s R&D capital stock, roughly 16 cents 
of protective share is incorporated in the bidder termination fee. I further show that the pay-
ment of the bidder termination fee has a positive impact on target’s market value if the deal 
is terminated and fees are paid. Chapter 3 hence extends extant research at the intersection of 
innovation, law, and M&A. 
The fourth and last chapter — “Measuring Competition in M&A Negotiations” — 
provides novel insights about takeover competition among bidders in the pre-announcement 
phase of the deal and its effect on offered deal premiums, bidder announcement returns, and 
post-bid dynamics. Yet despite the fact that this process is shielded from public scrutiny, recent 
research indicates that it is surprisingly active (e.g., Liu and Officer (2020), Boone and Mul-
herin (2007, 2008), Liu, Mulherin, and Brown (2018)). Based on hand-selected data obtained 
through official SEC documents describing the background of the merger/tender offer, I intro-
duce a measure for competition among bidders: the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio. This ratio relates 
the number of privately submitted bids to the target at the end of the private takeover process 
to the number of signed confidentiality agreements with the target. The higher this ratio is, 
the higher are takeover premiums and the lower are announcement returns of the winning 
bidder in auctions. The ratio is also positively related to post-bid competition, and helps to 
explain why competitive private negotiations stay competitive during the public phase of the 
takeover: if shareholders of the original acquirer react positive on deal announcement (i.e., my 
proxy for value-creation of the announced deal), I find that this increases the likelihood of 
receiving a competing offer from a different bidder. I also apply a propensity score matching 
procedure to analyze differences in takeover premiums between the two types of selling proce-
dure: auctions versus one-to-one negotiations. This has not yet been carried out in the empirical 
literature. I find that the average premium is slightly higher in auctions compared to one-to-
one negotiations, but high standard deviations of the premium in both subsamples do not 
indicate a statistically significant difference. 
I conclude this thesis with some remarks and suggestions for future research. 





The Real Effects of Possible Stock Recalls on Acquirer Stocks: 
Empirical Evidence from M&A Premiums ‡ 
 
 
I apply the idea of Strych (2020) that short sellers of acquirer stocks infer from their private observations 
of stock recalls that the deal will be more likely terminated. To profit from such an informational 
advantage through short selling, I expect that acquirers’ short sellers become merger arbitrageurs after 
deal announcement in order to obtain a trading option on possible acquirer stock recalls. The higher this 
trading option value is, the more are merger arbitrageurs willing to pay for target shares, compared to 
the premium required by incumbent target shareholders. Anticipating this, I expect that acquirers reduce 
bid premiums accordingly. Consistently, in a sample of U.S. takeover announcements from 2004 to 2017, 
I find that a one-standard deviation increase of acquirer’s short interest (i.e., magnitude of merger 
arbitrage activity) and institutional ownership concentration (i.e., likelihood of an observable recall) is 
associated with a 3.46% decrease of the one-week target share price premium. In addition, this premium 
reduction effect is accompanied with positive long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns for acquirer 
stocks and tighter arbitrage spreads. The effect is more pronounced, if targets exhibit low insider own-
ership and if acquirers have high active institutional ownership. As a channel of the information about 
this premium reduction effect, I regard advice to acquirers by investment banks with high equity capital 
market expertise. Hence, M&A advisors add value to acquirers, consistent with the findings of Dessaint, 
Eckbo, and Golubov (2019).  
Keywords: Stock Recall, Short Selling, Blockholder, Takeover Premium, Mergers and Acquisitions. 
JEL classification: G14, G23, G34 
‡ This chapter is the outcome of a joint research project in collaboration with Jan-Oliver Strych. I thank Robert C. Merton, John 
Bai, Antje Berndt, Vigdis Wangchao Boasson, Ekkehart Boehmer, Gonul Colak, B. Espen Eckbo, Joachim Grammig, Andrew 
Grant, Jian Huang, Stephan Jank, Axel Kind, Alexander Klos, Nadya Malenko, Marcel Müller, Richard Roll, Martin Ruckes, 
Micah Officer, Galla Salganik-Shoshan, Tilan Tang, Karin Thorburn, Marliese Uhrig-Homburg, Bo Wang, Joakim Westerholm, 
and participants of the Brown Bag Research Seminar in 2017 at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, the 5th HCCG PhD 
Workshop in Corporate Governance in 2017 in Helsinki, the 24th Annual Meeting of the German Finance Association (DGF) in 
2017 in Ulm, the 5th ECGC Workshop on Governance and Control in 2018 at the University of Lille, the 35th Annual Conference 
of the French Finance Association (AFFI) in 2018 in Paris, the 2nd Global PhD Colloquium in 2018 at the University of Sydney 
Business School, the 10th NCGNC in 2018 in Gothenburg, the 2018 Annual Meeting of the FMA in San Diego, the 31st AFBC in 
2018 in Sydney, the Brown Bag Research Seminar in 2018 at the University of Sydney Business School, the 68th Annual Meeting 
of the Midwest Finance Association (MFA) in 2019 in Chicago, the 58th Annual Meeting of the SWFA in 2019 in Houston, the 
23rd Annual Meeting of the FMA Europe in 2019 in Glasgow, and the 28th Annual Meeting of the European Financial Management 
Association (EFMA) − “Merton H. Miller” Doctoral Seminar in 2019 in Ponta Delgada for their valuable and very helpful comments. 
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1.1 Introduction 
 In the literature, short sellers are regarded as sophisticated investors who are better 
informed about the true value of a stock than other market participants (e.g., Asquith, Pathak, 
and Ritter (2005), Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008), Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010))1. 
Sources of their informational advantage can be illegal insider tipping (e.g., the prominent 
Boesky case of the 1980s (Schwert (1996))), or, probably more economically important, efficient 
processing of public information (Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2012), Boehmer et al. 
(2008), Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan (2001)). While these studies treat short sellers’ 
informational advantage as exogenously given, Strych (2020) suggests an endogenous informa-
tional advantage through short selling that originates from a special short selling constraint: 
recall risk.  
The term “recall risk” refers to the risk that lenders of a stock may usually recall all 
units of their lent out stock at will2. Since short sellers are informed about recalls through 
private individual notifications, Strych (2020) hypothesizes that these private observations of 
recalls lead to an informational advantage about lenders’ imminent behavior, such as selling 
the stock (e.g., D’Avolio (2002)) or voting (Aggarwal, Saffi, and Sturgess (2015))3. Since short 
sellers can make profits through such an informational advantage, it reflects a “bright side” of 
recall risk in short selling. 
 
1 One reason for this is that short selling is only profitable if short sellers’ informational advantage offsets 
its costs due to short selling constraints, such as scarce or expensive lending supply (Asquith et al. 
(2005), Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu (2006), Nagel (2005), Prado, Saffi, and Sturgess (2016), Jones 
and Lamont (2002)), high regulatory burdens (Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007), Saffi and Sigurdsson 
(2011)), search frictions (Kolasinski, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2013)), financial constraints of the short 
seller (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)), and recall risk (Chuprinin and Ruf (2017), Engelberg, Reed, and 
Ringgenberg (2018)). 
2 Due to a stock recall, short sellers might have to close out their trades prematurely and consequently 
might profit only from a fraction of an ongoing stock correction. At worst, recalls might trigger short 
squeezes that are even more detrimental to their trading profits. Some reasons for stock recalls are, that 
lenders intend or, at least, are prepared to sell the stock (e.g., D’Avolio (2002), Chuprinin and Ruf 
(2017)), or want to reclaim their voting rights on the stock (Aggarwal et al. (2015), Christoffersen, 
Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2007)). 
3 Other reasons for recalling stocks might be the intention to trade as a corporate governance activity 
which is called “voting with the feet” (the so-called “Wallstreet rule”, e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer (2009), 
Edmans (2009), and Edmans and Manso (2011)). Again, short sellers are informed early on about these 
stock price-relevant activities through their private observation of a stock recall. 
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 As a trading strategy to profit from such private signals about stock lenders’ imminent 
behavior, Strych (2020) suggests a merger arbitrage strategy (e.g., Mitchell, Pulvino, and Staf-
ford (2004)) as follows: short sellers of acquirer’s stock purchase target stocks in a recently 
announced takeover bid. As soon as they observe a recall on acquirer stocks, they update their 
private belief about takeover completion downwards, whereas other market participants do 
not. He shows that the reason for this is that stockholders recall because they intend to trade 
on the stock in order to stop the deal (“voting with the feet”, as described in, e.g., Admati and 
Pfleiderer (2009)), or to vote against  the deal (Aggarwal et al. (2015)). Both cause a more 
likely deal termination. 
Consequently, short sellers of acquirer stocks sell their target shares and even sell them 
short to profit from a possible takeover termination. They sell short, because a deal cancellation 
likely entails, on average, significantly negative abnormal returns for target’s stock (e.g., Mal-
mendier, Opp, and Saidi (2016), Davidson III, Dutia, and Cheng (1989), Fabozzi, Ferri, 
Fabozzi, and Tucker (1988)). Since they benefit in the event of a deal termination, contrary to 
incumbent target shareholders, I assume that their expected value of an announced bid is 
higher than the expected value perceived by incumbent target shareholders. 
I interpret the difference of those expected values as the value of an option that is 
offered from acquirer’s stock lenders to acquirer’s short sellers, and this option enables short 
sellers to trade on a valuable recall signal. Then, I expect that acquirers anticipate short sellers’ 
appropriation of such an option and their associated higher expected value from the deal, with 
a premium set at the incumbent target shareholders’ reservation value. Acquirers are thus able 
to set their bid price below target shareholders’ reservation value, because even in the case of 
a lower premium, short sellers are willing to purchase incumbent target shareholders’ shares at 
their higher reservation value. 
As a result, short sellers pay for their option obtained from acquirer’s stock lenders by 
paying a higher price for target shares than offered by the acquirer himself. In this way, I might 
observe a wealth transfer from short sellers to acquirer shareholders, even though only the 
lenders among acquirer shareholders have originated the option of trading on stock recalls. 
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 To conclude, short sellers as merger arbitrageurs4 presumably crowd out incumbent 
target shareholders at lower bid premiums. I expect that acquirers anticipate this and set bid 
premiums lower – what I call the “premium reduction effect” – if the following two conditions 
are met: first, short sellers must be sufficiently motivated to become merger arbitrageurs and 
to purchase target shares. This is the case if stock recalls are likely observable after deal an-
nouncement. D’Avolio (2002) states that stock recalls are rare, and therefore an informational 
advantage might occur too seldom to render a valuable option. One reason for this is that 
recalls are diversified away by lending agents through alternative stock lenders before reaching 
out to short sellers5. I expect that such an insulation from supply shocks, due to stock recalls, 
is less likely, if a priori stock supply is low and rather concentrated. Consistent with Prado, 
Saffi, and Sturgess (2016), I choose the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of acquirer institutional 
shareholdings one trading day prior to deal announcement as a proxy for its beneficial lender 
concentration. Second, the magnitude of merger arbitrage (i.e., the aggregated share of shorted 
stocks) should be sufficiently high to reach the threshold of tendered shares necessary for deal 
completion6. Since information about the percentage share of shorted stocks (i.e., short interest 
as a percentage of outstanding shares) is available to the acquirer at almost any time, and 
particularly shortly before the time of bid announcement, acquirers regard short interest one 
trading day prior to deal announcement as the expected magnitude of merger arbitrage. This 
is because pre-announcement short sellers might become very likely post-announcement merger 
arbitrageurs due to their existing lending agreements. 
 My reasoning about the option to trade on stock recalls is used to design an empirical 
strategy to explore the economic impact of the informational advantage through short selling 
on firms whose shares are sold short. I analyze a sample of takeover attempts of public U.S. 
target firms from 2004 to 2017. Thus, my central empirical prediction is the following: 
 
4 In the entire chapter, I assume that merger arbitrageurs are short in acquirer stocks and long in target 
stocks after deal announcement. Some empirical indication is given in Section 1.5. 
5 An example of such a notification can be found in the Appendix (Figure A3). Figure A1 in the Appendix 
illustrates how short selling works and which parties participate to facilitate the transaction. 
6 Once short sellers become target shareholders, they are very likely to tender their stocks to the acquirer 
of the bid because their informational advantage is linked to this original acquirer, and would render 
worthless if they considered a competing bid from another bidder. 
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The higher the value of the trading option, determined by the probability of observing      
acquirer stock recalls and the magnitude of acquirer short sellers,                                  
the lower M&A premiums. 
Main Findings 
Consistently, I find that a one-standard deviation increase from the sample mean of 
this interaction term is associated with a decrease of the one-week premium by 3.46% and by 
USD 69.264 million for the average target. I call this finding the premium reduction effect 
which reflects a significant economic impact by informational advantages through short selling 
on firms targeted by short sellers insofar, that it enables acquirers to save money in takeover 
deals. 
 Based on the premium reduction effect, I observe positive buy-and-hold abnormal re-
turns of acquirer stocks from four-month to twelve-month periods after deal announcement. 
This indicates that acquirers profit from the premium reduction effect. I interpret this finding 
as an indication that wealth is transferred from merger arbitrageurs to acquirer shareholders  
since the former lose money if acquirer stock prices rise abnormally. Hence, the value of such 
a wealth transfer might also give some idea about the lower bound of the average value of the 
option to trade on the informational advantage through short selling. 
 I regard the advice to acquirers given by investment banks with high equity capital 
market expertise as a the primary channel of the premium reduction effect. Goldman Sachs, 
for instance, might know from its trading desks and hedge fund clients about this trading 
option, and might tell their M&A clients about the real effect caused by such a trading option. 
As a result, M&A advisors add value by consulting acquirers in transactions, consistent with 
the findings in Dessaint, Eckbo, and Golubov (2019). 
 In addition, I find that the effect on short-term (i.e., over one- and three-day symmetric 
event windows) abnormal returns of acquirer stocks and their shorter than four-month period 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns are negative and positive, respectively, but statistically insig-
nificant. This finding could indicate that merger arbitrageurs’ short selling puts short-term 
price pressure on acquirer stocks (i.e., stock liquidity is too low), neutralizing aforementioned 
positive wealth transfers over the short term. 
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 Moreover, I provide several empirical indications for the expectation that short sellers 
become target shareholders. First, the arbitrage spread, measured as the relative difference of 
offer price per share and post-announcement target share price two trading days after an-
nouncement, is tighter in the case if both institutional ownership concentration and short 
interest are high. This can be explained by short sellers putting upward pressure on target 
stocks. Simultaneously, I find no such effect for deal completion itself, which helps me to rule 
out that the relation on arbitrage spread is driven by a higher likelihood of takeover completion.  
Second, I observe that the premium reduction effect is more pronounced if target stocks 
are held by less insiders. Insiders are less likely to sell their stocks to merger arbitrageurs, 
because they are more restricted from trading due to insider trading laws and their involvement 
in deal negotiations.  
Third, I document that the premium reduction effect is more pronounced if acquirer 
active institutional ownership is high. This supports the reasoning that the informational ad-
vantage through short selling is higher, if lenders are well-informed, which is more likely for 
active institutional shareholders that might trade on their presumable informational advantage. 
 In addition, I show that the premium reduction effect is less pronounced if deal con-
tracts include an acquirer termination fee provision, signaling higher incentives for the acquirer 
to close the deal, all else equal. This supports my reasoning that the informational advantage 
conveys information about takeover failure. Since Prado et al. (2016) detect that high short 
interest and high institutional ownership concentration might lead to stock overvaluation, my 
results could be driven by such overvaluation. In a subsample test, I find, contrary to this 
argument, that the premium reduction effect is more pronounced if acquirer stocks are more 
likely undervalued. 
The effect also exists if I replace institutional ownership concentration with insider 
ownership concentration. Yet my main analyses focuses on institutional ownership concentra-
tion, because I expect that insiders do not need to recall stocks for corporate governance pur-
poses. In addition, insiders have more options to intervene directly, and they face more re-
strictions in trading caused by insider trading laws. 
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Contribution to the Literature 
 This chapter contributes to the extant literature in several ways. First, I contribute to 
the short selling literature. While Chuprinin and Ruf (2017) and Engelberg et al. (2018) explore 
the “dark side” of recall risk as a short selling constraint, I explore Strych’s (2020) idea of a 
“bright side” that is caused by an informational advantage through short selling on which short 
sellers can trade on. 
Second, I append the blockholder literature that regards blockholders as monitors of 
firms that are usually well-informed, irrespective of them being member of the board of direc-
tors (Holderness (2003), Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Maug (1998), Demsetz and Lehn (1985)). 
Strych (2020) assumes that short sellers can extract information from blockholders if they lend 
out shares. My results indicate that this is the case for takeovers, by showing that it is beneficial 
to acquirer shareholders. Consequently, blockholders add value to the firm. 
Third, I add to the M&A literature which usually regards short sellers as merger arbi-
trageurs who just hedge their long position in target’s stock (Mitchell and Pulvino (2001), Liu 
and Wu (2014)). The idea of an informational advantage through short selling provides an 
alternative explanation for their engagement in shorting acquirer stocks. Consistently, I show 
that acquirers can benefit from those merger arbitrageurs by lowering bid premiums. 
Fourth, I contribute to the general question in the finance literature about real effects 
of financial markets on real investments (e.g., Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein (2012), Edmans, 
Goldstein, and Jiang (2012), Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010), Derrien and Kecskés 
(2013)). Since takeovers are real investments and short selling is just a transaction by specu-
lators in financial markets, short sellers’ impact on bid prices offered in takeovers reflect such 
real effects. 
 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes my theoret-
ical reasoning, the applied empirical strategy, as well as my main hypothesis. Section 1.3 de-
scribes the data sample and empirical models. Section 1.4 presents the baseline empirical re-
sults. Section 1.5 includes a discussion with additional analyses to support my reasoning and 
contains some robustness tests. Section 1.6 concludes. 
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1.2 Theoretical Reasoning, Empirical Strategy, and Central Hypothesis 
1.2.1 Informational Advantage through Short Selling 
 As described by D’Avolio (2002), short sellers usually borrow stocks from beneficial 
owners (i.e., stock lenders) through intermediaries, such as big custody banks, and sell them 
afterwards7. They profit when the stock price declines and they repurchase the stocks at a 
lower price. Stock lenders are often institutional investors and blockholders, such as pension 
funds, index funds, mutual funds, public retirement funds and endowments, who aim to gen-
erate additional income from lending fees8. To the contrary, short sellers are market makers, 
specialists, option traders, or hedge funds9. While market makers and specialists usually sell 
short for market liquidity reasons and option traders short to hedge risk, hedge funds and other 
speculators trade on information and must hold their short position for a longer time until the 
stock price deteriorates (D’Avolio (2002)). 
Contrary to ordinary cash loans, equity loans that short sellers obtain usually do not 
have fixed maturity dates (Financial Stability Board (2012))10. This means that lenders and 
borrowers are both allowed to unilaterally terminate the equity loan on a daily basis, without 
prior notice and without specifying the reason. If lenders recall their lent out stocks, borrowers 
incur several costs when they have to close out their trading position prematurely. For example, 
they might incur opportunity costs, because they have to find (locate) new stocks to borrow, 
which can take 23 days on average (D’Avolio (2002)), forcing them to suspend their short sale 
trade. Besides, they have to buy the stock when the stock price might be adversely high: at 
 
7 Short sales can be naked, meaning that short sellers have not borrowed and possessed the stock shortly 
before selling it short. In this case, short sellers have to deliver the stock within ordinary settlement 
periods (usually three trading days) by purchasing them before. Market makers are often such short 
sellers (Christian, Shapiro, and Whalen (2006)), which I do not expect to trade on informational ad-
vantages through short selling, and therefore I do not further address them. See Figure A1 in the Ap-
pendix for a detailed illustration how short seeling works. 
8 D’Avolio (2002) indicates that retail investors are very unlikely stock lenders because intermediaries 
are not allowed to lend from non-margin retail investors’ accounts, and refers to interviews that show 
that discount brokers are not the typical source of lending supply. 
9 In practice, prime brokers usually borrow the shares from lenders and then provide hedge funds with 
the shares, because some lenders are unwilling to lend to hedge funds (Reed (2013)). 
10 Reed (2013) states that guaranteed-term loans are rare and borrowers try to mitigate recall risk by 
borrowing from lenders with low turnover portfolios like, for instance, index funds. 
Chapter 1                                   Real Effects of Possible Stock Recalls on M&A Premiums 
14 
worst, when many lenders recall, short squeezes might occur that decimate trading profits even 
more. Chuprinin and Ruf (2017), for instance, report a negative relation of recalls with trading 
profits of short sellers in the event of negative earnings announcements. Due to these costs, the 
recall risk might deter some short sellers, reflecting a short selling constraint. 
1.2.2 Reasons for Stock Recalls 
 In the literature, several reasons for recalls are discussed. One reason lenders recall their 
stocks is because they intend to sell them. D’Avolio (2002), e.g., reports that the number and 
percentage of ownership of institutional investors who are obliged to file 13F forms decline 
subsequent to a recall event. In addition, Chuprinin and Ruf (2017) find a positive relation of 
recalls and subsequent 13F institutions’ divestments in recalled stock.  
 As another reason, Strych (2020) suggests that recalls might be credible signals to 
managers of firms whose stocks are recalled. Stock sales by stock lenders are possible at any 
time. This is done in order to put pressure on those managers in the direction these stock 
lenders prefer. The argument is based on the “voting with the feet”-idea which states that 
shareholders affect firm managers’ decisions by threatening to sell or even actually selling their 
shares (e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer (2009)). 
 Moreover, Strych (2020) analyzes that lenders intend to vote on subsequent takeover 
proposals. Consistent with this notion, Aggarwal et al. (2015) document that lenders reduce 
lending supply or recall shortly before record dates when they have to possess the stocks to be 
eligible to vote on subsequent proposals11. They report that recalls likely occur if institutional 
owners have greater monitoring incentives, firms exhibit low performance and bad corporate 
governance. Further, they find less lending supply (i.e., likely recalls12) in case lenders want to 
oppose management proposals and support shareholder proposals. Lenders recall their stocks 
to intervene through voting, which represents the most prevalent form of intervention (McCa-
hery, Sautner, and Starks (2016)). 
 
11 On the demand side, Christoffersen et al. (2007) also document that borrowers obtain the right to 
vote from stock lenders at record dates, driving utilization of lending supply even higher. They, however, 
report that the price for one vote is zero on average. 
12 Figure A2 (Appendix) illustrates lending supply, borrowing demand, and utilization in case of recalls. 
Chapter 1                                   Real Effects of Possible Stock Recalls on M&A Premiums 
15 
 In addition, lenders may try to manipulate stock prices upward by restricting stock 
lending supply through recalls. E.g., Chuprinin and Ruf (2017) find that stocks exhibit negative 
abnormal returns subsequent to their recall. Consistently, Prado et al. (2016) show that con-
centrated ownership leads to less lending supply and negative abnormal stock returns in case 
of demand shocks. This indicates such upward stock price manipulation. 
 As an alternative rationale for stock lenders’ recall, Strych (2020) outlines that lenders 
intend to trade their stocks according to the commonly known Wallstreet-rule “voting with 
the feet”: Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) explain with their model how blockholders (i.e., larger 
shareholders) mitigate agency problems with firm managers by threatening to sell their stake, 
if managers’ actions are not pleasant in their view. Similarly, Edmans (2009) presents in his 
model that a single blockholder is likely to be more effective than the firm’s manager in im-
pounding information into prices, so that the manager’s equity incentive becomes more efficient. 
 In the case of an exogenous reason for takeover deal termination, such as a regulatory 
disapproval that usually leads to a decline in acquirer’s stock price (Savor and Lu (2009)), 
lending shareholders might anticipate such disapproval and thus sell in advance of its notice. 
 The informational advantage through short selling addresses information about share-
holders’ private information regarding their expectation of stock price losses or their intention 
to exercise corporate governance activities through trading or voting. In any case, it is likely 
very valuable for short sellers to trade on this information. To conclude, following the literature 
surveyed above, I regard a stock recall as an event to exercise a corresponding option to trade 
on private information about the recalling lenders’ imminent behavior. 
1.2.3 Empirical Strategy and Central Hypothesis 
 In this chapter, I explore the informational advantage through short selling that origi-
nates from private observations of stock recalls by short sellers. Since I expect lending share-
holders of borrowed stocks to know that short sellers are able to profit from recalls, I explore 
if this anticipation has any impact on these shareholders, their firms, and their firms’ short 
sellers. As an empirical strategy, I investigate takeover attempts of publicly listed targets by 
publicly listed acquirers. This setting provides short sellers of acquirer stocks a possible trading 
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strategy to profit from the informational advantage through short selling: merger arbitrage. 
This refers to the investment strategy of buying target shares and selling short acquirer shares 
in the announced exchange ratio during a pending takeover attempt (e.g., Mitchell et al. 
(2004)). Given that takeover attempts are obviously extraordinary events, I expect that they 
possess the advantage for a feasible trading strategy because the content of the informational 
advantage through short selling can be interpreted very precisely: if short sellers observe recalls 
on acquirer stocks, they infer that a takeover termination is very likely and imminent. This is 
consistent with Aggarwal et al. (2015), who show that a decrease in lending supply prior to a 
voting event on a corporate control matter is associated with a higher likelihood of a negative 
vote by shareholders. Since acquirer shareholders vote only sometimes on a takeover13, Strych 
(2020) concludes that selling (or at least the threat of selling) the stock by blockholders is more 
likely to induce the acquirer to abandon the takeover. In both cases stock lending acquirer 
shareholders would recall their stocks and short sellers can infer a very likely deal termination 
from the recall. 
 If short sellers of acquirer stocks are also target shareholders (i.e., if they are merger 
arbitrageurs) and learn about takeover termination before all other market participants, Strych 
(2020) suggests that they can profit by selling their target shares at higher current prices (i.e., 
prior to deal termination announcement), because market prices hitherto still incorporate a 
higher likelihood of deal completion than the now better informed short sellers estimate. More-
over, these short sellers might instantaneously sell short target shares to even further profit 
from usually declining target share prices after announcement of takeover failure (e.g., Mal-
mendier et al. (2016), Davidson III et al. (1989), Fabozzi et al. (1988)). This profit in the case 
of deal termination can be likened to the payoff of an insurance against the negative outcome 
of falling target shares, originated from the informational advantage through short selling. 
Thus, given a certain bid premium, I expect that merger arbitrageurs’ expected value of the 
bid is higher than the expected value perceived by incumbent target shareholders, because the 
latter are exposed to deal termination risk and hence incorporate this negative outcome in their 
expected value of the bid. As a result, merger arbitrageurs would require a lower premium p low 
 
13 In an additional analysis I find that approximately a quarter of all takeover attempts with public 
targets requires acquirer shareholder approval. 
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for the same expected value of the bid as in the case of the higher premium p high demanded by 
incumbent target shareholders14. Nevertheless, merger arbitrageurs must pay p high  to incumbent 
target shareholders to purchase target stocks15.  
 If the magnitude of merger arbitrage is sufficiently large, enough target shares are held 
by merger arbitrageurs who are willing to tender at p low   . Otherwise acquirer managers must 
bid p high  to all target shareholders in order to succeed with the deal. Consistently, I expect that 
a lower premium is more likely if the potential magnitude of merger arbitrage is large enough 
to reach the threshold for tendering stocks. 
 I regard pre-announcement acquirer’s short interest (i.e., total number of shorted stocks 
as a percentage of all outstanding shares)16 as a proxy for the expected magnitude of merger 
arbitrage. Since post-announcement short selling is likely constrained, reflected by usually ris-
ing lending fees after deal announcement (Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2002)), pre-announcement 
short sellers might be less exposed to such constraints due to their existing borrowing agree-
ments. Thus, they might profit more from my proposed merger arbitrage strategy than short 
sellers setting up their strategy only after announcement of the deal. 
 In addition, short sellers only accept to pay a higher price including p high to incumbent 
target shareholders, if merger arbitrageurs’ informational advantage through short selling is 
sufficiently valuable. This is the case if a stock recall is more likely observable, which in turn 
is the case if lending supply is not too excessive and lender concentration is high, measured by 
high values of acquirer institutional ownership concentration. This proxy choice is motivated 
by Prado et al. (2016), who show that institutional ownership concentration is negatively re-
lated to lending supply. This assumption is, for instance, supported by D’Avolio (2002), who 
 
14 To keep it simple, I differentiate in only two groups of target shareholders who have to vote on the 
takeover proposal: short sellers of acquirer stocks (merger arbitrageurs) and incumbent target sharehold-
ers with identical reservation values that determine p high . These reservation values can incorporate all 
synergy gains by the takeover (Grossman and Hart (1980)), or only a part of it if the supply curve of 
target stocks is upward-sloping, caused by the existence of private benefits of control to the acquirer as 
the majority shareholder, as Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1998) show. 
15 I assume that the trading profits through the informational advantage are sufficiently high, so that 
their expected value including p low offered by the acquirer is larger than p high .  
16 Short interest is reported and published every two weeks, daily short sale volume is available since 
2009. 
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finds that stock lenders are often institutional investors, such as pension funds, index funds, 
mutual funds, public retirement funds, and endowments17. 
 To conclude, both conditions (i.e., high institutional ownership concentration and high 
short interest) must be met to allow a lower premium, so that merger arbitrageurs crowd out 
incumbent target shareholders. This leads to my central, testable hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: The higher acquirer institutional ownership concentration and         
the higher acquirer short interest before deal announcement,            
the lower the offered bid premium. 
 
1.3 Data Sample and Empirical Models 
1.3.1 Data Sample 
 I obtain my dataset from Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ database. The basic sample 
consists of 1,304 M&A transactions, and the sample period starts in January 2004 and ends in 
May 2017. I set the minimum total transaction value and the minimum market capitalization 
of the acquirer one trading day prior to the announcement date of the transaction to USD 1 
million. Each transaction includes only one acquirer to rule out a dilution of the informational 
advantage through short selling by other co-investors or bidder syndicates. Both the acquirer 
and the target are publicly traded and their headquarters are located in the United States. 
1.3.2 Empirical Models 
 To analyze my hypothesis if the bid premium is lower the higher acquirer institutional 
ownership concentration and the higher the acquirer short interest is, I apply the following 
linear fixed effects regression model: 
 
17 I do not directly use lending supply and lender concentration data provided by data vendors such as 
IHS Markit, because my premium reduction effect occurs more likely if all involved parties in the M&A 
game possess data about recall observability. Since Markit data are very expensive, I doubt that a lot 
of those parties access such data, and more likely rely on publicly available data, such as short interest 
and institutional ownership. In Section 1.5, I discuss my preference of institutional ownership concen-
tration over insider ownership concentration. 




1 Week / 3 Day / 1 Day = αi,t + β1 Acq Short Interesti,t–1 × Acq Instit Own Herfi,t–1 
           + β2 Acq Short Interesti,t–1 + β3 Acq Instit Own Herfi,t–1 
           + γ Acq and Tgt Ownership Characteristicsi,t–1 
           + δ Deal Characteristicsi,t  
           + ϑ Acq and Tgt Firm Characteristicsi,t–1 
           + φ Acq Industry × Year FEi,t + λ Tgt Industry FEi,t + εi,t 
 The dependent variable is the one-week premium, Premium 1 Week  , defined as the relative 
difference of the offer price on announcement and the target share price five trading days prior 
to deal announcement. I also test with the three- and one-day premium, Premium 3 Day and 
Premium 1 Day  , defined accordingly18. The index i  denotes the observation, i.e., the respective 
transaction, whereas t  denotes the day of offer announcement. β1  is the coefficient of primary 
interest. 
 My variable of interest is the interaction term, Acq Short Interest i,t–1 × Acq Instit Own 
Herf i,t–1 (abbreviated as Acq SI    × Acq Instit Herf  throughout this chapter), which consists of 
the short interest of the acquiring firm one trading day prior to deal announcement, Acq SI  , 
expressed as a percentage of the latest number of total common shares outstanding, and the 
concentration of acquirer institutional ownership one trading day prior to deal announcement, 
Acq Instit Herf  . Given that insider trading laws and regulatory burdens restrict insiders from 
strategic lending and recalling stocks, I use institutional ownership concentration as my pri-
mary proxy for the value of the trading option on the informational advantage through short 
selling: it is measured as a Hirschman-Herfindahl index, calculated as the sum of the squares 
of each individual institutional investor’s percentage share in the acquiring firm. To support 
my hypothesis, I should find a negative coefficient on Acq SI    × Acq Instit Herf  . 
 Ownership Characteristics  consist of seven variables, all obtained one trading day prior 
to deal announcement: Acq Instit Sum  is the sum of institutional ownership of the acquirer, 
 
18 I also provide estimates with the one-month premium but focus on the one-week premium and three-
day and one-day premium, because practitioners and filings for takeover attempts indicate that the final 
decision on the premium is made one week before announcement, and latest information about short 
interest and ownership structure is incorporated in the offered premium. All time indices in this chapter 
refer to trading days. 
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Acq Insider Herf  measures the concentration of acquirer insider ownership (also measured as 
a Hirschman-Herfindahl index), and Acq Insider Sum  is the sum of acquirer insider ownership. 
Tgt Instit Herf , Tgt Instit Sum , Tgt Insider Herf  , and Tgt Insider Sum , respectively, are 
defined likewise for the target firm.  
 Besides these variables I include the following control variables in my models that are 
widely used in the M&A literature (see, e.g., Eckbo’s (2009) detailed survey). Deal Character-
istics  comprise deal controls. The variable Transaction Value (TV) is the total transaction 
value net assumed liabilities and expressed in billions of USD. Stock (% of TV)  measures the 
percentage share of the total transaction value that is paid with acquirer’s stock. BTF Dummy 
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the acquirer agrees to pay a bidder (buy-side) termination 
fee to the target firm in specific breakup events as negotiated in the merger agreements, and 0 
otherwise. The similar definition applies to TTF Dummy, which is set to 1 if a target (sell-
side) termination fee exists, and 0 if not (e.g., Bates and Lemmon (2003), Bodnaruk, Massa, 
and Simonov (2009)). Friendly  is an indicator variable set to one if the deal attitude on the 
announcement day is friendly, and 0 otherwise. Horizontal Takeover is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if both the acquirer and the target are assigned to the same industry (i.e., in case of 
horizontal takeovers, see similar, e.g., Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008)) as defined by the 
first of the four SIC digits, and 0 if not (diversifying takeover).  
 Acq Characteristics  consist of numerous variables describing the characteristics of the 
acquirer (all obtained on the last trading day prior to announcement), such as: ln Acq Market 
Cap , the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the acquirer, expressed in millions 
of USD. ln Acq Vola LTM  is the one-year stock return volatility, i.e., the annualized standard 
deviation of weekly log-normal price returns of acquiring firm’s stock over the past year (last 
twelve months). Acq Performance LTM (Div. adj.) is the performance of acquirer’s share price, 
dividend adjusted and expressed in percentage terms, measured from the last twelve months 
until one trading day prior to deal announcement. I choose this control variable to account for 
possible rumors and stock price run-ups (Schwert (1996)). Acq MTB  is the market-to-book 
ratio of acquirer’s equity and is supposed to account for overvaluation or growth related to 
both short interest and ownership structure. ln Acq Turnover 1 Month  is the natural logarithm of 
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one plus the one-month average of the daily quotient of the dollar value traded divided by the 
market capitalization of the acquirer on the corresponding day19. 
 Tgt Characteristics  is a set of control variables of target firm characteristics (Tgt Per-
formance LTM (Div. adj.)  and Tgt MTB −22  20) which are defined in the same way and account for 
the same effects as described for their acquirer counterparts21.  
 To control for aggregate shocks to takeover activity in certain industries and across 
years, I estimate the regressions including acquirer industry-year fixed effects and target in-
dustry fixed effects. Both are based on the first digit of the Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) code and the year of deal announcement, respectively (e.g., Betton et al. (2008), Mal-
mendier et al. (2016), Gormley and Matsa (2014))22. All variables are additionally defined in 
detail in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
  
 
19 I include turnover of acquiring firm’s stock, since it is a proxy to measure dispersion of opinion among 
investors, and because it is positively related to short interest (see, e.g., D’Avolio (2002)). An analysis 
of pairwise correlation reveals a statistically significant correlation coefficient between these two varia-
bles of 0.51. 
20 I choose to measure target’s market-to-book ratio 22 trading days (i.e., one calendar month) prior to 
deal announcement to get rid of any stock price run-up (e.g., Schwert (1996)). 
21 The following variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to reduce the influence of outliers 
(e.g., Edmans et al. (2012), Malmendier et al. (2016)): Premium 1 Week , Premium 3 Day , Premium 1 Day , 
Premium 1 Month , Acq CAR [−1,+1] , Acq CAR [−3,+3] , Acq SI , Acq Performance LTM (Div. adj.) , Acq Turno-
ver 1 Month , ln Acq Turnover 1 Month , and Tgt Performance LTM (Div. adj.) . Instead, I winsorize Arbitrage 
Spread 2 Day at the 3rd and 97th percentile, and Acq MTB  and Tgt MTB −22  at the 99th percentile due to 
a larger number of outliers. 
Despite the large number of explanatory variables, I do not expect problems due to multicollinearity, 
because variance inflation factors of the majority of variables are below eight and for all variables of 
interest always below three. Besides, analysis of pairwise correlations of all variables lead to the same 
conclusion. 
22 All my results are robust even if I include target industry-year fixed effects instead of target industry 
fixed effects alone (see, e.g., Table 2, columns (3), (5), (7), and (9)) for the different measures of target 
premiums) and remain qualitatively the same if I include industry fixed effects based on the first two 
SIC digits. 
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1.4 Empirical Results 
1.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 The summary statistics of the sample (presented in Table 1) show that the mean of 
Deal Completion  is 0.879, indicating that 87.9% of the deals in my dataset are comsummated 
and have been closed before end of May 2017. I further observe weekly target share price 
premiums of 32.8% on average, which is consistent with the literature, such as Malmendier et 
al. (2016) and Officer (2003). The median of Premium 1 Week is 28%, revealing that the distri-
bution is right-skewed and has a minimum of −83.4% and a maximum of 260%. The distribu-
tion parameters are similar and comparable across all four measures of the target share price 
premium. 
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns, BHARs , are measured from one trading day before 
until several months after announcement. Means and medians for all BHARs  are negative, 
consistent with Savor and Lu (2009), although they split their sample in cash- vs. stock-fi-
nanced bids, whereas I do not. In extreme cases, values for BHARs   fall below −400% and on 
the other side exceed +360%, which is not a reason for concerns given that it is common that 
sample firms can have annual abnormal  returns in excess of +200% or −200%. In comparison, 
for cumulative abnormal returns (CAR ), it is not common to observe a return on the market 
index, i.e., reference (normal) return, in excess of 100% during these usually short event win-
dows (Barber and Lyon (1997)). The number of observations for BHARs  drops from 1,182 for 
the one-month BHAR  to 1,166 for the twelve-month BHAR . This can be explained by acquir-
ers being delisted or dropping out of the sample because of other reasons, such as, e.g., bank-
ruptcy. 
 Short interest of the acquirer, Acq SI , averages at around four percent, with heavily 
shorted acquirer stocks culminating in more than 20% of common shares outstanding, con-
sistent with Prado et al. (2016), Chuprinin and Ruf (2017), and Aggarwal et. al. (2015). Hirsch-
man-Herfindahl indices describe the ownership concentration and peak in values close to 0.87 
for acquirers, but are on average higher for targets, no matter if institutional or insider owner-
ship is being considered. 




Table 1 reports summary statistics of the sample consisting of 1,304 transactions announced between 
January 2004 and May 2017. All variables are obtained one trading day prior to deal announcement, 
unless otherwise noted (through an added time index). Indices display the point in time (i.e., trading 
day) relative to the transaction announcement date when the variable was measured. Cumulative ab-
normal returns (CAR ) are measured from one trading day prior until one trading day after offer an-
nouncement, and from three trading days before until three trading days after offer announcement, 
respectively, applying a Carhart (1997) four-factor-model to model normal returns. All variables except 
Deal Completion , Hirschman-Herfindahl indices and their interaction terms, Transaction Value (TV) , 
all deal control dummy variables, Acq Market Cap , Acq MTB  , Acq Turnover 1 Month , and Tgt MTB −22  
are reported in percentage terms. All variables are defined in detail in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
  Summary Statistics 
 Variables Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Panel A: Target Share Price Premium, Announcement Returns, and Deal Outcomes 
 Premium 1 Week 1,304 32.820 28.005 34.789 −83.392 260.000 
 Premium 3 Day 1,304 32.298 27.372 34.255 −83.132 250.980 
 Premium 1 Day 1,304 30.960 25.644 33.249 −80.890 229.546 
 Premium 1 Month 1,304 36.278 30.426 37.440 −83.556 276.800 
 Acq CAR [−1;+1] 1,294 −1.022 −0.724 6.030 −21.253 25.184 
 Acq CAR [−3;+3] 1,294 −1.246 −1.091 7.199 −32.383 27.296 
 Acq BHAR [−1;+21] 1,182 −1.343 −1.413 14.088 −93.553 80.763 
 Acq BHAR [−1;+42] 1,182 −1.976 −2.126 17.047 −85.985 69.235 
 Acq BHAR [−1;+63] 1,180 −1.838 −2.066 21.627 −117.170 232.080 
 Acq BHAR [−1;+84] 1,179 −1.949 −1.944 24.321 −147.499 102.504 
 Acq BHAR [−1;+126] 1,179 −1.937 −1.334 30.606 −265.464 180.125 
 Acq BHAR [−1;+189] 1,174 −2.382 −2.821 40.277 −315.142 314.622 
 Acq BHAR [−1;+252] 1,166 −2.667 −1.644 46.041 −433.169 369.578 
 Arbitrage Spread 2 Day 1,303 3.952 2.718 9.687 −34.843 35.029 
 Deal Completion 1,273 0.879 1 0.326 0 1 
Panel B: Short Interest, Variables of Interest, and Ownership Controls 
 Acq SI 1,304 3.799 2.510 3.809 0.012 21.198 
 Acq SI × Acq Instit Herf  1,304 0.092 0.036 0.187 0.000 3.936 
 Acq SI × Acq Insider Herf 1,304 0.019 0.001 0.094 0.000 1.640 
 Acq Instit Herf 1,304 0.026 0.016 0.064 0.000 0.869 
 Acq Instit Sum 1,304 49.887 49.682 21.141 0.327 99.828 
 Acq Instit Sum Active 1,304 10.010 8.243 7.053 0.000 38.003 
 Acq Insider Herf 1,304 0.007 0.001 0.028 0.000 0.304 
 Acq Insider Sum 1,304 5.713 1.474 9.815 0.000 70.897 
 Tgt Instit Herf 1,304 0.033 0.023 0.053 0.000 0.710 
 Tgt Instit Sum 1,304 52.229 53.968 28.385 0.009 99.894 
 Tgt Insider Herf 1,304 0.010 0.001 0.039 0.000 0.425 
 Tgt Insider Sum 1,304 7.559 2.609 11.734 0.000 75.819 
Panel C: Deal Characteristics 
 Transaction Value (TV) 1,304 3.086 0.401 9.100 0.002 111.702 
 Stock (% of TV) 1,304 35.807 29.068 36.982 0.000 100.000 
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 BTF Dummy 1,304 0.252 0 0.434 0 1 
 TTF Dummy 1,304 0.867 1 0.340 0 1 
 Friendly 1,304 0.989 1 0.103 0 1 
 Horizontal Takeover 1,304 0.824 1 0.381 0 1 
Panel D: Acquiring Firm Characteristics 
 Acq Market Cap 1,304 19,814.810 2,554.978 47,441.640 9.648 538,896.00 
 ln Acq Market Cap 1,304 8.006 7.846 2.060 2.267 13.197 
 Acq Vola LTM 1,304 32.034 27.172 21.811 4.322 500.185 
 ln Acq Vola LTM 1,304 3.343 3.302 0.468 1.464 6.215 
 Acq Performance LTM (Div. adj.) 1,304 17.722 12.107 39.460 −72.143 300.753 
 Acq MTB 1,304 3.226 2.155 4.052 0.250 34.624 
 Acq Turnover 1 Month 1,304 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.036 
 ln Acq Turnover 1 Month 1,304 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.035 
 
Acq Financial Advisor Top 8 
Equity & Equity Linked 
1,003 0.565 1 0.496 0 1 
Panel E: Target Firm Characteristics 
 Tgt Performance LTM (Div. adj.) 1,304 18.140 10.912 61.375 −86.108 391.228 
 Tgt MTB −22 1,304 2.925 1.827 4.074 0.102 33.071 
(Table 1 continued) 
As mentioned above, I restrict the sample to transactions whose transaction value (TV ) 
exceeds USD 1 million to focus on economically meaningful transactions. The average value 
for TV   is USD 3.09 billion. Another interesting point is the use of termination fee provisions: 
the mean for BTF Dummy  is 0.252, meaning that in around 25% of the transactions both 
parties agreed on such a clause, similar to Chen, Mahmudi, Virani, and Zhao (2020). On the 
other hand, 86.7% of the transactions include agreements for target termination fees (compa-
rable to, e.g., Boone and Mulherin (2007)). The mean and median of Stock (% of TV) are quite 
similar, but the standard deviation is relatively high as well, indicating that a lot of deals use 
either pure cash or pure stock as deal currency. 82.4% of all transactions involve acquirer-
target pairs within the same one-digit SIC industry. Comparing the values for acquiring firms’ 
market capitalization and Transaction Value (TV) as a proxy for target firms’ size signifies 
that the average acquirer is around ten times larger than the average target firm, congruent 
with Bodnaruk et al. (2009). 
1.4.2 Main Regression Results 
 The coefficient on Acq SI  × Acq Instit Herf   is negative and statistically significant at 
the  5%  level  for  Premium 1 Day ,   and  negative  and  statistically   highly  significant  at  the  1% 




Effect of the Informational Advantage through Short Selling on Target Premiums 
Table 2 presents the results of linear fixed effects regressions of Premium 1 Week on acquirer short interest one trading day prior to the announcement date, Acq SI , and 
institutional ownership, Acq Instit Herf , one trading day prior to the announcement date (1) and on the variable of interest, the interaction term Acq SI  × Acq Instit 
Herf  (2) as defined in Section 1.3. Column (3) repeats the regression in column (2) but applies target industry-year fixed effects. I repeat regression models (2) and (3) 
in columns (4)–(9) for different measures of the target premium. Several control variables are included in the regression: ownership controls contain Hirschman-
Herfindahl indices and the sums of both institutional and insider ownership one trading day prior to offer announcement. I furthermore control for deal features as 
well as acquirer and target characteristics as defined in Section 1.3. All independent variables are obtained one trading day prior to deal announcement, unless otherwise 
noted (through an added time index). All regressions include fixed effects (as denoted) as well as an intercept but are unreported. All standard errors (in parentheses) 
are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster correlation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  Target Premium 
   1 Week  3 Day  1 Day  1 Month 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
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Acquiring Firm Characteristics              
 



































































































Target Firm Characteristics              
 







































               
Acq Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Tgt Industry FE  Yes Yes No  Yes No  Yes No  Yes No 
Tgt Industry × Year FE  No No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
               
Observations  1,304 1,304 1,304  1,304 1,304  1,304 1,304  1,304 1,304 
Adjusted R2  0.080 0.083 0.126  0.077 0.112  0.087 0.125  0.077 0.102 
(Table 2 continued)
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level for Premium 3 Day and Premium 1 Week  , respectively (depicted in Table 2, column (2), (4), 
and (6), respectively)23. This finding indicates that the higher acquirer short interest and the 
higher acquirer institutional ownership concentration, the lower is the one-week and three- and 
one-day bid premium. Thus, my central hypothesis is supported. An increase of Acq SI  × Acq 
Instit Herf  by one standard deviation (0.187) is associated with a decrease of the one-week 
premium by 3.46 percent (= 0.187(−18.485)) and by USD 69.264 million for the average target 
with a market capitalization of USD 2,003.760 million. This is economically significant. 
 In addition, I find a positive and statistically insignificant coefficient on the separate 
short interest variable and no statistically significant coefficient on acquirer institutional own-
ership concentration (specification (1)), supporting my expectation that both conditions of a 
high short interest and a high value of the informational advantage are reflected by the inter-
action term24. Both must be met in order to enable the premium reduction. Using stock in a 
transaction yields a negative and statistically highly significant relation to Premium 1 Week , sim-
ilar to comparable regressions in, e.g., Bates and Lemmon (2003). The market capitalization 
of the acquiring firm one trading day prior to offer announcement is highly and positively 
related to Premium 1 Week , consistent with Officer (2003). 
 Table A2 (deferred to the Appendix for brevity) shows the results obtained from a 
modular regression setup. Column (1) regresses the one-week premium on the interaction term 
and its components alone. The effect of Acq SI  × Acq Instit Herf   is statistically significant at 
the 5% level. The inclusion of Ownership Controls  does not change this result (see column 
(2)). Once I additionally control for Deal Characteristics  (column (3)), the magnitude and 
significance of the effect of the interaction term on the one-week premium noticeably rise from 
−8.161 to −13.661. Column (4) adds acquirer and target firm characteristics, but drops deal 
features, which does not change the inferences fundamentally. Regression (5) includes a set of 
fixed effects for the announcement-year, acquirer industry, and target industry, and exhibits a 
strong increase in the magnitude of the coefficient (−17.379) once I control for these potential 
 
23 For the one-month premium, I obtain an insignificant coefficient, indicating that my effect impacts 
only the final stages of the determination of the bid premium, because the latest short interest numbers 
give the best estimate of the short interest at deal announcement. 
24 The further descriptions refer to the specification with the one-week premium. 
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sources of omitted variable bias. Furthermore, comparing regressions (4) with (5) shows that 
the inclusion of year, acquirer industry, and target industry fixed effects significantly increases 
the R2, which suggests that these fixed effects account for a large amount of variation in the 
data. Columns (6)–(8) apply the full model with changing fixed-effects25. Regression (7) depicts 
that the inclusion of acquirer industry-year fixed effects increases the marginal effect of Acq SI  
× Acq Instit Herf   on Premium 1 Week  slightly. 
 
1.5 Discussion and Robustness Tests 
1.5.1 Value Effects on Acquirer Stocks 
 To analyze value effects on acquirer stocks caused by the premium reduction effect, I 
conduct both a short-term and a long-term stock performance event study. In the first step, I 
regress the acquiring firm’s cumulative abnormal return, measured from one trading day before 
until one trading day after announcement, and based on dividend adjusted day close prices, 
Acq CAR [−1,+1] , on the interaction term and other controls as depicted in Table 3, columns 
(1)–(3). Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated applying a Carhart (1997) four-factor 
model. The model parameter estimation period begins twelve months before and ends two 
trading days prior to announcement. The first model includes acquirer industry-year fixed 
effects and consists of all variables except target characteristics and respective industry fixed 
effects. The coefficient on the interaction term is negative and statistically insignificant, indi-
cating that the market does not incorporate the premium reduction effect instantaneously in 
acquiring firms’ stock prices. Regressions (4)–(6) repeat analysis (1)–(3), but replace the de-
pendent variable with the seven-day symmetric abnormal return, Acq CAR [−3,+3] 26. 
 
 
25 Given that the fixed effects residuals are correlated with the fixed effects predicted values (which 
suggests that the model is a poor candidate for random effects), I perform a classical Hausman specifi-
cation test (Hausman (1978)) which always rejects the null in favor of a fixed effects model. I therefore 
allow for arbitrary dependence between these industry-year effects and the observed explanatory varia-
bles. 
26 My results hold independently of the applied normal return model (e.g., the Fama-French (1993) 
three-factor model), the inclusion of ownership controls, and changes in the short-term event window to 
[–5,+5] trading days around deal announcement. 




Acquirer Short-Term Value Effects 
Table 3 depicts linear fixed effects regressions of acquirer cumulative abnormal returns (CAR ) on the 
variable of interest, the interaction term Acq SI  × Acq Instit Herf  (1) and other controls as defined in 
Section 1.3, including acquirer industry-year fixed effects. All independent variables are obtained one 
trading day prior to deal announcement, unless otherwise noted (through an added time index). Cumu-
lative abnormal returns are calculated applying a Carhart (1997) four-factor model to model normal 
returns. Columns (2) and (3) additionally contain target firm characteristics and industry fixed effects. 
All regressions include ownership controls and deal features as well as the one-month target share price 
premium, Premium 1 Month . The dependent variable in columns (1)–(3) is the acquiring firm’s cumulative 
abnormal return, measured one trading day before until one trading day after announcement, Acq 
CAR [−1;+1] . Columns (4)–(6) repeat regressions (1)–(3), whereas the dependent variable, Acq CAR [−3;+3] , 
is the acquiring firm’s cumulative abnormal return from three trading days before until three trading 
days after announcement. The results are robust to whether or not I include ownership controls, apply 
a Fama-French (1993) three-factor model to model normal returns, and/or change the short-term event 
window to [–5;+5] trading days around offer announcement. All regressions include fixed effects (as 
denoted) as well as an intercept but are unreported. All standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster correlation. *, **, and *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  Acq CAR 
 Event Window  [–1;+1]  [–3;+3] 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
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Controls  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
          
Acq Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Tgt Industry FE  No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
          
Observations  1,294 1,294 1,294  1,294 1,294 1,294 
Adjusted R2  0.065 0.079 0.078  0.052 0.062 0.063 
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 Since I do not find an incorporation of the premium reduction effect in acquiring firms’ 
stock prices, at least in the short run, I additionally perform a long-term event study to examine 
if any positive effects occur via this proposed channel in the near future. Given that a merger 
announcement significantly changes the factor loadings on risk factors that verifiably explain 
cross-sectional expected returns in normal return models for both the acquirer and target, I 
cannot rely on normal return models, such as Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model. Performance 
analyses multiple months or even years after the event date are then likely biased, especially 
when changes in an event portfolio, e.g., as in a calendar-time portfolio approach, occur (Mitch-
ell and Stafford (2000), Fama (1998)). Due to these problems of appropriate post-event risk-
adjusting for long-term abnormal returns, I cannot apply a short-term factor model approach 
where risk adjustment is straightforward and usually less important. 
The proper methodology for long-term performance event studies has been widely de-
bated in the literature, mainly because of ambiguities concerning the decision which long-run 
return benchmark to use (Kothari and Warner (2007)). Early attempts have been made by 
Ritter (1991), who analyzed the long-run performance of IPOs. Barber and Lyon (1997) and 
Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) propose to apply a buy-and-hold abnormal return model, since 
it best captures investor experience and yields well-specified test statistics in a high variety of 
sampling situations. Savor and Lu (2009) opt for both the buy-and-hold abnormal return and 
calendar-time portfolio approach (CTIME  ) in their analysis, also arguing that these methods 
best mimic investors’ actual investment experience. However, the CTIME  approach does not 
fit to my purpose of analysis, because I do not want to evaluate if event firms in general  earn 
abnormal returns which cannot be explained by common risk factors. Their BHAR  results 
remain the same, independently of the benchmark model used in the buy-and-hold abnormal 
return setting, i.e., independently of using a single matched firm return or an equally-weighted 
portfolio return of ten matched firms as a benchmark.  
 I choose the single matched firm approach to mitigate concerns of varying portfolio 
sizes for special (large) event firms where the number of matches is relatively low. Barber and 
Lyon (1997) argue that this control firm approach yields well-specified test statistics, because 
it alleviates the new listing, rebalancing, and skewness biases: the new listing bias is eliminated 
because both the event and matched firm must be listed in the respective investment period, 
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the rebalancing bias is eliminated since both firms’ returns are calculated without rebalancing, 
and the skewness bias is eliminated because both firms are equally likely to experience large 
positive returns. Thus, I apply the buy-and-hold abnormal return control firm approach.  
 The buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR ) for the acquiring firm in transaction i   is 
given by (see, e.g., Savor and Lu (2009)): 
BHAR  t1,t2
  i  = BH  t1,t2
  i  – BH  t1,t2
  i,match 
                                         = 1 + R t,t+1 i
t2 – 1
t = t1





whereas in my case, BH  t1,t2
  i   is the (daily) continuously compounded buy-and-hold in-
vestment return of the acquiring firm, t1 is the day when the investment is made, i.e., going 
long in acquirer’s stock one trading day prior to announcement, and t2  is the number of trading 
days after announcement to the point of time until this stock is sold, i.e., t2 − t1  is the whole 
holding period. I calculate all single returns on a daily basis by using respective dividend ad-
justed day close prices. BH  t1,t2
  i,match is the long-run return benchmark and calculated in exactly 
the same way, except that the investment is made in a control firm matched by size, market-
to-book, and industry. More specifically, I match the control firm in the following way: first, I 
identify all public firms with the same one-digit SIC code and market value of equity, 22 
trading days prior to offer announcement, between 50% and 150% of the market value of equity 
of the sample acquiring firm. Second, I choose the same size restriction for control firms as I 
do for acquiring (event) firms: market values of equity one trading day prior to announcement 
(t1 ) and at the end of the holding period (t2 ) both must exceed USD 1 million. I thus avoid 
the case in which the control firm disappears from Capital IQ or is delisted from the stock 
exchange. Third, the geographic location of the headquarters of the control firm must also be 
situated in the U.S. Fourth, I then choose the final control (matched) firm as the firm with the 
market-to-book ratio 22 trading days prior to announcement nearest to that of the acquiring 
(event) firm on the same day. I do this to rule out any influences of takeover rumors. Firms 
with negative market-to-book ratios are dropped (Lyon et al. (1999)). If there was no match 
left over, the observation is dropped from the long-term performance analysis. Moreover, given 
that I analyze buy-and-hold abnormal returns until twelve months after announcement, I drop 
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all observations announced after the end of April 2016, which explains why the sample size is 
reduced from 1,304 to 1,182 observations. In contrast to Savor and Lu (2009), I do not exclude 
control firms that were involved in a merger bid over the previous three years. I am not inter-
ested in the fact that acquirers create value through successfully closing an M&A deal, but 
rather through the premium reduction effect, caused by merger arbitrageurs lured by the in-
formational advantage through short selling. 
Table 4 
Acquirer Long-Term Value Effects 
This table depicts linear fixed effects regressions of acquirer buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR ) on 
the variable of interest, the interaction term Acq SI  × Acq Instit Herf  and other controls as defined in 
Section 1.3. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns are calculated using a matched-firm approach whereas the 
corresponding firm is matched on factors explaining abnormal returns, i.e., size, market-to-book, and 
industry. All regressions include all control variables. The dependent variable in column (1) is the ac-
quiring firm one-month buy-and-hold abnormal return, Acq BHAR [−1;+21] , measured one trading day 
before until one trading month (21 trading days) after announcement. Columns (2)–(7) repeat regression 
(1) with different buy-and-hold abnormal return periods. The results are robust to changes in the point 
in time when the buy-and-hold strategy was formed (i.e., to the point in time prior to deal announce-
ment). All regressions include fixed effects for acquirer’s and target’s industry, year fixed effects as well 
as an intercept but are unreported. All standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedas-
ticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster correlation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  Acq BHAR 
 Event Window  [–1;+21] [–1;+42] [–1;+63] [–1;+84] [–1;+126] [–1;+189] [–1;+252] 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 

















































Deal Characteristics         
 
































Stock (% of TV) 
−0.06*** 





























          
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Acq Ind., Tgt Ind. & Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Observations  1,182 1,182 1,180 1,179 1,179 1,174 1,166 
Adjusted R2  0.041 0.031 0.013 0.018 0.021 0.016 0.022 
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 Table 4 shows the results for regressions of several buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHAR ) on the interaction term, Acq SI  × Acq Instit Herf , and the full set of control variables. 
All regressions include standard errors which are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and within-
cluster correlation (White (1980)), as well as year, acquirer industry, and target industry fixed 
effects. The latter is done to control for unobserved heterogeneity within certain industries and 
common year-specific shocks.  
The effect of the interaction term on short-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns (col-
umns (1)–(3)) is positive but statistically insignificant. After four months after announcement, 
I obtain estimates that are positive, around ten times the magnitude compared to short-term 
BHARs, and statistically significant at the five percent level (see Table 4, column (4)). This 
marginal effect increases in magnitude with the buy-and-hold investment time horizon until 
nine months after announcement, as column (6) with BHAR [−1,+189] as the dependent variable 
represents27. 
 I suggest that this result is due to market inefficiency: given that the average duration 
between announcement date and resolution date (i.e., closed or withdrawn date as reported in 
Capital IQ) of the deal is roughly 80 trading days, I suggest that market participants price in 
positive effects of the premium reduction effect only if it becomes certain whether the acquirer 
has succeeded with a lower premium.  
For the short-term analyses, liquidity issues could also explain the insignificant returns, 
because merger arbitrageurs sell acquirer stocks short and thus neutralize value creation. Given 
the pervasive statistical significance of the coefficient of the interaction term across several 
months, I infer that the premium reduction effect, in fact, has a positive long-term effect on 
acquiring firm’s value. 
I interpret this as an indication that wealth is transferred from merger arbitrageurs to 
acquirer shareholders, because the former lose if acquirer stocks appreciate. 
 
27 I include announcement-year fixed effects, as well as acquirer industry and target industry fixed effects, 
based on one-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. The inclusion of announcement-year 
fixed effects is questionable, because long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns might be driven by un-
observed factors in the year subsequent to deal announcement. Anyway, I obtain similar qualitative 
results after excluding announcement-year fixed effects and including deal resolution-year fixed effects. 
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1.5.2 Acquirers’ Deal Advisors’ Capital Market Expertise 
 I expect that acquirer managers might not be aware of my suggestion that merger 
arbitrageurs enable acquirers to lower premiums, or – even if they know this effect – might not 
be comprehensively informed about current short sellers’ and stock lenders’ identity, struc-
ture28, and expertise to predict merger arbitrageurs’ and shareholders’ behavior properly. Thus, 
I assume that deal advisors, such as investment banks29 with equity capital market expertise, 
might fill this void and provide missing information. 
I regard deal advisor’s equity market expertise as high if the advisor firm belongs to 
the Top 8 firms in the “U.S. Equity & Equity Linked Annual League Tables” of the year prior 
to the deal announcement year as published by Bloomberg. The cut-off value of eight is chosen 
following Fang (2005) and Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2012), who use the Top 8 list of 
M&A league tables as the top-tier, most reputable advisors, whose deals’ performance is ex-
amined30. Though, this equity league table is just a proxy for my notion of equity capital 
market expertise regarding short selling and lending information, because it lists investments 
banks who advise in IPOs and SEOs and are not directly involved as lending agents. However, 
I assume that investment banks that perform well with equity capital market advising more 
likely possess this kind of information I refer to, for example when they also act as lending 
agents31.  
Since acquirers might use this kind of information to lower bid premiums, I expect 
empirically that the relation of Acq SI  × Acq Instit Herf  and premiums is more pronounced, 
if acquirers’ deal advisors have high equity capital market expertise. 
 
28 In particular, lender concentration is very crucial for the determination of bid premiums to have the 
best measure for the value of the informational advantage through short selling shortly before takeover 
announcement. Relevant is the short-term proprietary information of lending agents that are more likely 
part of deal advisory firms with a high ranking in the chosen equity league table. Some prominent 
examples for such firms are, e.g., Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, Morgan Stanley, and Bank of America 
Merrill Lynch. 
29 Bao and Edmans (2011), for instance, document better outcomes for deals with investment banks as 
advisors. 
30 Since the number eight as the cut-off value looks arbitrarily chosen, I also take the Top 10 list 
(although also arbitrary) and get the same qualitative results. 
31 Due to Chinese walls, I cannot expect a direct information transfer, but I expect that some legal 
information spillover effects exist, as it is suggested by some literature (e.g., Griffin, Shu, and Topaloglu 
(2012)). 
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 For each deal, I retrieve all financial advisors of the acquirer from the Capital IQ data-
base and choose the advisor with the highest equity capital market expertise as ranked in the 
above-mentioned league table of the year preceding the deal announcement. I then define a 
dummy variable, Acq Financial Advisor Top 8 Equity & Equity Linked , that is set to 1 (Yes), 
if the deal advisor with the highest equity market expertise is in the Top 8, and 0 (No) other-
wise. I then split the sample based on this indicator variable and find that the coefficient on 
the interaction term is only statistically significant for the subsample with advisors that have 
a high equity capital market expertise (see Table 5, columns (2), (4), and (6)).  
Table 5 
Effect of the Informational Advantage through Short Selling on Target Premiums: 
Presence of a Top-ranked Equity Capital Market Financial Advisor 
Table 5 presents the results of linear fixed effects regressions of Premium 1 Week , Premium 3 Day , and 
Premium 1 Day on the variable of interest, the interaction term Acq SI  × Acq Instit Herf  as defined in 
Section 1.3. Columns (2), (4), and (6) show the results for deals where at least one financial advisor of 
the acquiring firm was listed in the Top 8 U.S. league table “Equity & Equity Linked” as reported by 
Bloomberg in the year prior to the year of deal announcement (Acq Financial Advisor Top 8 Equity & 
Equity Linked = Yes); columns (1), (3), and (5) show the results if no such advisor was listed in the 
corresponding league table (Acq Financial Advisor Top 8 Equity & Equity Linked = No), respectively. 
Several control variables are included in the regression: ownership controls contain Hirschman-Herfindahl 
indices and the sums of both institutional and insider ownership of the acquiring and target firm one 
trading day prior to offer announcement. I furthermore control for deal features as well as acquirer and 
target characteristics as defined in Section 1.3. All regressions include fixed effects (as denoted) as well 
as an intercept but are unreported. All standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedas-
ticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster correlation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  Target Premium 
   1 Week  3 Day  1 Day 
 Acq Financial Advisor   
Top 8 Equity & Equity Linked 
 No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 











































           
Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
           
Acq Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Tgt Industry FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
           
Observations  436 567  436 567  436 567 
Adjusted R2  0.147 0.111  0.154 0.091  0.166 0.086 
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This supports my hypothesis that the premium reduction effect is more pronounced for 
better advised acquirers. In addition, the insignificant results from the low expertise advisor 
subsample indicate that the choice of high expertise advisors might be crucial in the process of 
determining premiums. To conclude, such findings might give some explanation to Dessaint, 
Eckbo, and Golubov (2019), who find that the positive time effect in acquirer announcement 
returns is likely linked to deal advice: they might add value to their advice and thus to their 
acquirer clients through their proprietary knowledge of the premium reduction effect. 
1.5.3 Indication of Short Sellers becoming Merger Arbitrageurs 
 Since I cannot directly observe if short sellers become merger arbitrageurs as I assume 
in this chapter, I explore how short sellers and their informational advantage might be corre-
lated with post-announcement target stock reactions. As a measure for these reactions, I choose 
the so-called arbitrage spread, Arbitrage Spread 2 Day  (e.g., Mitchell and Pulvino (2001), Jindra 
and Walkling (2004), and Liu and Wu (2014)), defined as the ratio between the difference of 
the offer price per share on the announcement date and the last sale price of target’s stock on 
the second trading day after bid announcement, and the offer price per share on announcement, 
expressed in percentage terms: 
Arbitrage Spread2 Day  =  
Offer Price per Target Sharet – Last Sale Price of Target Sharet+2
Offer Price per Target Sharet
 
Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) state that it conveys information about the likelihood of 
takeover completion. Jindra and Walkling (2004) see a relation of it with the length of the 
takeover attempt and the size of the final premium. 
 As I argue above, short sellers as merger arbitrageurs accept a low premium p low due 
to their informational advantage, whereas incumbent target shareholders would only tender at 
a high premium p high   . Hence, merger arbitrageurs must pay a higher price than p low  to target 
shareholders to acquire their stocks in the market after announcement. Consequently, I expect 
that target stock prices are closer to the premium, reflected by tighter arbitrage spreads, the 
more merger arbitragers (acquirers’ short interest) with a more valuable informational ad-
vantage (acquirers’ concentration of institutional ownership) exist. My results (exhibited in 
Table 6, columns (1)–(4)) show that the relation is negative and statistically significant at the  




Post-Announcement Target Stock Reactions 
Table 6 presents the results of linear fixed effects regression models without and with interaction term regressing Arbitrage Spread 2 Day on acquirer short interest one 
day prior to the announcement date, Acq SI  , and institutional ownership, Acq Instit Herf , one day before the announcement date ((1) and (3)) and on the variable of 
interest, the interaction term Acq SI  × Acq Instit Herf  ((2) and (4)) as defined in Section 1.3. Columns (5)–(8) show the results of seemingly unrelated regressions 
(Zellner (1962)) of both Arbitrage Spread 2 Day and Deal Completion  on the variable of interest, the interaction term Acq SI  × Acq Instit Herf  and the same set of 
control variables: ownership controls contain Hirschman-Herfindahl indices and the sums of both institutional and insider ownership one trading day prior to offer 
announcement. I furthermore control for deal features as well as acquirer and target characteristics as defined in Section 1.3. All regressions include fixed effects (as 
denoted) as well as an intercept but are unreported. All standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster 
correlation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
              
Tgt Industry FE  Yes Yes  No No  Yes Yes  No No 
Acq Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Tgt Industry × Year FE  No No  Yes Yes  No No  Yes Yes 
              
Observations  1,303 1,303  1,303 1,303  1,303 1,303  1,303 1,303 
Adjusted R2  0.221 0.222  0.233 0.234  0.347 0.445  0.396 0.489 
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5% level32. This supports my reasoning that merger arbitrageurs pay higher prices after an-
nouncement to acquire target shares. 
 Since the arbitrage spread also mirrors the likelihood of takeover completion and to 
control for deal completion as a component of the arbitrage spread, I test this relation in a 
Zellner (1962) seemingly unrelated regression model with the two dependent variables Arbi-
trage Spread 2 Day  and Deal Completion . My results (exhibited in Table 6, columns (5)–(8)) are 
qualitatively the same, whereas no statistically significant relation with deal completion exists. 
This indicates that merger arbitrageurs pay high prices to acquire target shares, irrespective of 
the market’s assessment of the probability of deal completion.  
 The insignificant result regarding deal completion is not surprising, because merger 
arbitrageurs are only able to influence target shareholders’ approval33, but have minor to no 
influence on acquirer-induced or exogenous deal failures. Even though they might be open to 
renegotiate deal conditions, such as the premium, their main interest is that the acquirer does 
not change, because a change would render their informational advantage worthless.  
 Table A3 (deferred to the Appendix for brevity) shows the modular regression setup 
analogous to Table A2 but with Arbitrage Spread 2 Day  as the dependent variable. The negative 
coefficient on the interaction term increases and becomes statistically more significant after I 
include fixed effects, which can be seen by comparing column (2) with column (4) and column 
(3) with column (6), respectively. Once I include acquirer characteristics, the statistically sig-
nificant coefficient on Acq SI  for Arbitrage Spread 2 Day  disappears in all regression setups. 
Another interesting point is the positive coefficient on Acq Instit Herf , which is almost always 
significant at the 1% level. If high arbitrage spreads are interpreted as reflecting high uncer-
tainty about takeover completion, this finding suggests that high institutional ownership con-
centration in acquirer firms’ shares increases this uncertainty, represented by significantly 
 
32 Contrary to my basic models, I include the one-month premium to control for all price-related deal 
characteristics. 
33 Merger arbitrageurs can prefer to approve deals (e.g., Cornelli and Li (2002)), particularly in stock 
deals when they want to close out their short position through the deal-induced stock exchange (Mitchell 
et al. (2004)). 
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larger arbitrage spreads. This finding is not surprising, because a high propensity of the pres-
ence of blockholders with strong incentives to monitor acquiring firms’ managers need to ap-
prove the deal proposal. A denial of a deal is less likely if no such large monitors exist, which 
in turn is consistent with the intervention argumentation of Strych (2020) and Aggarwal et al. 
(2015). 
Table 7 
Effect of the Informational Advantage through Short Selling on Target Premiums: 
Low vs. High Target Insider Ownership 
This table presents the results of linear fixed effects regressions of Premium 1 Week , Premium 3 Day , and 
Premium 1 Day on the variable of interest, the interaction term Acq SI  × Acq Instit Herf  as defined in 
Section 1.3. Columns (1), (3), and (5) show the results for deals where the sum of insiders’ holdings in 
the target firm one trading day prior to deal announcement is below the sample median (Tgt Insider 
Sum Median = 0 ); columns (2), (4), and (6) show the results if the sum was above the sample median 
(Tgt Insider Sum Median = 1 ), respectively. Several control variables are included in the regression: 
ownership controls contain Hirschman-Herfindahl indices and the sums of both institutional and insider 
ownership of the acquiring and target firm one trading day prior to offer announcement. I furthermore 
control for deal features as well as acquirer and target characteristics as defined in Section 1.3. All 
regressions include fixed effects (as denoted) as well as an intercept but are unreported. All standard 
errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster correlation. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  Target Premium 
   1 Week  3 Day  1 Day 
 Tgt Insider Sum Median  0 1  0 1  0 1 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
















Acq SI × Acq Instit Herf 
−23.199** 

























           
Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
           
Acq Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Tgt Industry FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
           
Observations  652 652  652 652  652 652 
Adjusted R2  0.105 0.085  0.099 0.080  0.116 0.081 
 
 Even though merger arbitrageurs are willing to pay higher prices for target shares than 
the offered premium indicates, target insider shareholders will not sell their shares to them, 
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because they are restricted from selling due to their involvement in the deal negotiation process 
or insider trading laws. Consequently, I expect that the premium reduction effect is less pro-
nounced, if target shareholders include high insider ownership that is greater than the median 
of target insider ownership in the sample, denoted as Tgt Insider Sum Median = 1. I interpret 
this as a case of lower post-announcement liquidity of target stocks from the merger arbitra-
geurs’ perspective. Consistently, I find that the coefficient on Acq SI  × Acq Instit Herf   is only 
statistically significant for low target insider ownership (exhibited in Table 7, column (1), (3), 
and (5)). This result indicates an obstacle for short sellers to become merger arbitrageurs as 
investors in target stocks if target insider ownership is high. 
1.5.4 Variation of the Value of the Option to Trade on the Informational Advantage  
 Since recalls convey information about lenders’ behavior privately to short sellers, the 
value of the option to trade on that informational advantage likely differs among certain types 
of lenders: to know if lenders, which are usually well-informed about their firm, intend to sell 
their stocks, is more valuable than knowing that uninformed investors, such as index funds or 
even retail investors, plan to sell. If these lenders are also insiders of the firm, this value would 
be even higher. 
In the empirical literature, one very prevalent measure of sophistication of investors is 
their individual fraction of ownership in the firm (e.g., Rubin (2007), Boehmer and Kelley 
(2009)). The reasoning for this is that investors who hold a high fraction of the firm’s stocks 
(i.e., blockholders) are more incentivized to monitor the firm, engage in corporate governance 
activities (e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer (2009), Edmans (2009), Shleifer and Vishny (1986), 
Maug (1998)), and gather information about the firm (e.g., Holderness (2003), Edmans (2014), 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985)). Bushee and Goodman (2007) and Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003), 
for instance, provide empirical evidence that larger shareholders are better informed. Accord-
ingly, as described above, blockholders that are very likely stock lenders might recall their 
stock to be able to sell it, because they anticipate imminent stock losses.  
 To the contrary, if blockholders are passive investors, such as an index funds, a possible 
stock recall by these blockholders is likely neither related to their opinion about the announced 
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deal nor to any voting on the deal (Strych (2020))34. The reason for this is that passive inves-
tors, that, e.g., just mimic indexes, have no incentive to gather information about underlying 
stocks and are thus not able to trade them on any information. In this case, recalls triggered 
by them do not convey information about deal failure, hence the informational advantage 
through short selling is rendered worthless (i.e., has no value). Conversely, if I follow this 
reasoning, I expect that the effect of the interaction term on premiums is more pronounced, if 
passive institutional ownership of acquirer stock is low, i.e., when active investors’ percentage 
share is high35. 
 I identify active and passive institutional investors of acquirer stocks according to 
Standard and Poor’s Capital IQ database. Capital IQ provides information about the invest-
ment style orientation of the institutional investor36. I sum up all active institutional investors’ 
percentage share in acquiring firm’s stock one trading day prior to deal announcement in a 
variable named Acq Instit Sum Active  . The sample is then split into two subsets, based on the 
variable Acq Instit Sum Active Median , which is a dummy variable equal to one if the sum is 
above the median of Acq Instit Sum Active  , and 0 otherwise.  
 The results are shown in Table 8. The coefficient on Acq SI  × Acq Instit Herf  is 
statistically significant at the 5% level for Premium 1 Week , as depicted in column (2), and sig-
nificant at the 1% level for both the three- and one-day premium, shown in columns (4) and 
(6), respectively. If Acq Instit Sum Active is below the median, i.e., for firms with low active 
– or conversely high passive – institutional ownership, the coefficient on the interaction term 
is statistically insignificant. Both results indicate that with low active institutional ownership, 
the value of the informational advantage through short selling might be too low that short 
 
34 Due to this reason, passive investors are considered to be “safer” stock lenders (D’Avolio (2002)). 
35 Alternatively, consistent with Prado et al. (2016), passive investors restrict lending supply less severely 
than active investors. This might also produce my stronger results for less passive ownership acquirers. 
36 Since institutional investors are often stockholders through a fund structure, some institutions, such 
as BlackRock, have actively and passively managed funds and I do not know the name of the directly 
investing fund: the classification should be seen as a likely estimate of the real investment style orienta-
tion of the fund that directly holds acquirer stocks. A more precise classification is provided by Aggarwal 
et al. (2015) who, following Evans, Ferreira, and Prado (2017), identify the name of the corresponding 
fund via the Morningstar database and classify it as passive according to data retrieved form SEC’s N-
SAR filings. 
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sellers as merger arbitrageurs might not be attracted due to no feasible trading on such an 
“advantage”. 
Table 8 
Effect of the Informational Advantage through Short Selling on Target Premiums: 
Low vs. High Acquirer Active Institutional Ownership 
This table presents the results of linear fixed effects regressions of Premium 1 Week , Premium 3 Day , and 
Premium 1 Day on the variable of interest, the interaction term Acq SI  × Acq Instit Herf  as defined in 
Section 1.3. Columns (1), (3), and (5) show the results for deals where the sum of active institutional 
investors’ holdings in the acquiring firm one trading day prior to deal announcement is below the sample 
median (Acq Instit Sum Active Median = 0 ); columns (2), (4), and (6) show the results if the sum is 
above the sample median (Acq Instit Sum Active Median = 1 ), respectively. Several control variables 
are included in the regression: ownership controls contain Hirschman-Herfindahl indices and the sums 
of both institutional and insider ownership of the acquiring and target firm one day prior to offer an-
nouncement. I furthermore control for deal features as well as acquirer and target characteristics as 
defined in Section 1.3. All regressions include fixed effects (as denoted) as well as an intercept but are 
unreported. All standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and 
within-cluster correlation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  Target Premium 
   1 Week  3 Day  1 Day 
Acq Instit Sum Active Median  0 1  0 1  0 1 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
           

























   (10.132) 













           
Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
           
Acq Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Tgt Industry FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
           
Observations  652 652  652 652  652 652 
Adjusted R2  0.079 0.083  0.067 0.075  0.075 0.076 
 
 As an alternative driver for the value of the informational advantage, I suggest the 
likelihood of deal completion measured prior to deal announcement, i.e., before acquirer share-
holders assess the deal proposal and might incorporate their information in acquirer and target 
stock prices. My intuition for this is that merger arbitrageurs might profit from private signals 
of deal failure more often, and thus render the expected value of such an informational ad-
vantage higher, if deal completion is not very certain. Since an acquirer termination fee is paid 
Chapter 1                                   Real Effects of Possible Stock Recalls on M&A Premiums 
43 
if the acquirer or exogenous events, such as regulatory burdens, lead to deal termination (Bates 
and Lemmon (2003), Chen et al. (2020)), I suggest that recalls as signals of imminent deal 
failures occur less likely if an acquirer termination fee provision, indicated by the binary vari-
able BTF Dummy , exists. In this case, short sellers less often profit from their informational 
advantage. Hence, I expect that the relation of the interaction term and premiums is more 
pronounced, if the deal does not include an acquirer termination fee provision. Consistently, I 
only find in the case of no negotiated acquirer termination fee provision a negative and statis-
tically significant coefficient on Acq SI  × Acq Instit Herf   (Table 9, column (1), (3), and (5))37. 
Table 9 
Effect of the Informational Advantage through Short Selling on Target Premiums: 
Inclusion of Acquirer Termination Fee Provisions 
Table 9 presents the results of linear fixed effects regressions of Premium 1 Week , Premium 3 Day , and 
Premium 1 Day on the variable of interest, the interaction term Acq SI  × Acq Instit Herf  as defined in 
Section 1.3. Columns (1), (3), and (5) show the results for deals without an acquirer termination fee 
(BTF = No ); columns (2), (4), and (6) show the results if such a fee was agreed on in the merger 
agreement (BTF = Yes ), respectively. Several control variables are included in the regression: ownership 
controls contain Hirschman-Herfindahl indices and the sums of both institutional and insider ownership 
of the acquiring and target firm one day before offer announcement. I furthermore control for deal 
features as well as acquirer and target characteristics as defined in Section 1.3. All regressions include 
fixed effects (as denoted) as well as an intercept but are unreported. All standard errors (in parentheses) 
are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster correlation. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  Target Premium 
   1 Week  3 Day  1 Day 
 BTF  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
















Acq SI × Acq Instit Herf 
−19.777** 

























           
Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
           
Acq Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Tgt Industry FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
           
Observations  975 329  975 329  975 329 
Adjusted R2  0.076 0.207  0.068 0.190  0.072 0.202 
 
37 Though it should be taken with caution because this result may suffer from a selection bias. Bates 
and Lemmon (2003), for instance, report that bidder terminations fee provisions are positively correlated 
with stock deals. Future research should remedy this by applying a Heckman (1979) two-stage model. 
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1.5.5 Overvaluation 
 Since high short interest usually signals stock price overvaluation (e.g., Diether, Lee, 
and Werner (2009)) and concentrated institutional ownership might even exacerbate it (Prado 
et al. (2016)), I might measure a relation of a lower bid premium with overvaluation rather 
than short sellers’ merger arbitrage activities38. If this were true, I would, however, expect that 
the coefficient on the interaction term would be positive rather than negative as I find. The 
reason for this might be that overvaluation gives acquirers financial strength that target share-
holders might exploit by requiring higher bid premiums. 
Table 10 
Effect of the Informational Advantage through Short Selling on Target Premiums: 
Under- vs. Overvalued Acquirers 
This table presents the results of linear fixed effects regressions of Premium 1 Week , Premium 3 Day , and 
Premium 1 Day on the variable of interest, the interaction term Acq SI  × Acq Instit Herf  as defined in 
Section 1.3. Columns (1), (3), and (5) show the results if the acquiring firm was undervalued in relation 
to the median of the market-to-book ratio of all acquiring firms in the sample one day prior to bid 
announcement (Acq Overvaluation Median = 0 ); columns (2), (4), and (6) show the results if the 
acquiring firm was overvalued (Acq Overvaluation Median = 1 ), respectively. Several control variables 
are included in the regression (Section 1.3). All regressions include fixed effects (as denoted) as well as 
an intercept but are unreported. All standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
(White (1980)) and within-cluster correlation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  Target Premium 
   1 Week  3 Day  1 Day 
 Acq Overvaluation Median  0 1  0 1  0 1 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
















Acq SI × Acq Instit Herf 
−42.245** 

























           
Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
           
Acq Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Tgt Industry FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
           
Observations  652 652  652 652  652 652 
Adjusted R2  0.129 0.070  0.123 0.054  0.138 0.058 
 
38 Though I control for overvaluation by including market-to-book ratios and one-year stock price per-
formance in the regression models. 
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 Despite these theoretical considerations, I want to rule out that overvaluation drives 
my results by splitting the sample into acquirers with low vs. high market-to-book ratios one 
trading day prior to deal announcement, delimited by the median of this ratio, Acq Overval-
uation Median  . My results (shown in Table 10, column (1), (3), and (5)) show that the coeffi-
cients on the interaction term are statistically significant only for presumably lower valued 
acquirers. This indicates that overvaluation does not drive my results. 
1.5.6 Insider Ownership Concentration 
 Since insiders, such as directors and executives (as Capital IQ classifies insiders in the 
database), are well-informed about the true value of their firm, I also examine if there is a 
negative relation of acquirer insider ownership concentration39 interacted with acquirer short 
interest and bid premiums.  
Table 11 
Effect of the Informational Advantage through Short Selling on Target Premiums: 
Acquirer Insider Ownership Concentration 
This table presents the results of linear fixed effects regressions of Premium 1 Week , Premium 3 Day , and 
Premium 1 Day replicated from Table 2, columns (2), (4), and (6), except that I replace Acq SI  × Acq 
Instit Herf  with Acq SI  × Acq Insider Herf  as the interaction term (specifications (1), (3), and (5)), or 
include both (specifications (2), (4), and (6)), respectively. Several control variables are included in the 
regression: ownership controls contain Hirschman-Herfindahl indices and the sums of both institutional 
and insider ownership of the acquiring and target firm one day before offer announcement. I furthermore 
control for deal features as well as acquirer and target characteristics as defined in Section 1.3. All 
regressions include fixed effects (as denoted) as well as an intercept but are unreported. All standard 
errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster correlation. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  Target Premium 
   1 Week  3 Day  1 Day 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
           
 














Acq SI × Acq Instit Herf 
  −19.240*** 
   (6.353) 
 −18.739*** 
   (6.673) 
−17.298*** 






























39 Measured as the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of all insider owners one trading day before deal an-
nouncement. 
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Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
           
Acq Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Tgt Industry FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
           
Observations  1,304 1,304  1,304 1,304  1,304 1,304 
Adjusted R2  0.081 0.085  0.075 0.078  0.085 0.088 
(Table 11 continued) 
I also find a negative coefficient on Acq SI  × Acq Insider Herf , though statistically 
weaker at the 10% level (shown in Table 11, specification (1)). In addition, my premium re-
duction effect is greater for Acq SI  × Acq Instit Herf  (0.187(−18.485) = −3.457) than for Acq 
SI  × Acq Insider Herf  (0.094(−19.904) = −1.871), indicating that the informational advantage 
through short selling might be greater when institutional shareholders instead of insiders de-
termine lending supply. This supports my preference of using institutional investor concentra-
tion over insider investor concentration, because I assume insider trading laws and insiders’ 
involvement in deal negotiations prevent them from trading, and as such from strategically 
lending and recalling their shares. 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
Summary and Discussion 
 This chapter explores the informational advantage through short selling introduced by 
Strych (2020). Since short sellers can trade on it, it represents a “bright side” of recall risk that 
stands in contrast to the costly “dark side” promoted in the current literature (Chuprinin and 
Ruf (2017), Engelberg et al. (2018)). 
 To profit from such an informational advantage, this chapter assumes a merger arbi-
trage trading strategy in the case of takeover attempts: short sellers buy target shares and stay 
short in acquirer shares. Since this trading behavior is anticipated by the acquirer and the 
target, I expect lower bid premiums. Consistently, I find that the higher the concentration of 
institutional ownership and the higher the short interest, the lower the bid premium is. Further, 
I find positive long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns of acquirer stocks, indicating a wealth 
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transfer from merger arbitrageurs to acquirer shareholders. In addition, I report that the arbi-
trage spread is then even tighter while deal completion itself is not affected, indicating that 
short sellers become new target shareholders subsequent to bid announcement. I also find that 
my premium reduction effect is more pronounced if target insider ownership is low. Further, I 
document that this effect is more pronounced if acquirer active institutional ownership is high, 
suggesting that active blockholders’ recalls can be exploited more profitably by merger arbi-
trageurs, consistent with Strych (2020). Moreover, the premium reduction effect is more pro-
nounced if deal completion is a priori low, detected by takeovers with no acquirer termination 
fee provision. 
Practical Relevance 
 The results of my study are relevant to managers involved in mergers and acquisitions, 
because I document that short sellers’ bets on acquirer stocks with more concentrated institu-
tional ownership are correlated with takeover premiums. Thus, managers of acquirers and tar-
gets should take acquirers’ short interest and ownership structure into account when they 
negotiate or decide on bid premiums, because I report that an increase of the interaction term 
by one standard deviation is associated with a decrease of the one-week premium by 3.46% 
and by USD 69.264 million for the average target.  
 The fact that my results are more pronounced for deals involving investments banks 
with high equity market expertise as acquirers’ deal advisors shows that M&A advisors add 
value to the takeover process, which might, in part, justify their usually high fees (e.g., 
McLaughlin (1990, 1992)). This might also partially explain Dessaint, Eckbo, and Golubov 
(2019), who find a positive time effect in acquirer announcement returns. Song, Wei, and Zhou 
(2013) find that M&A boutiques as deal advisors lead to better deal outcomes and lower pre-
miums if they advise acquirers. Their finding is contrary to mine, because M&A boutiques 
usually do not undertake equity market activities and thus likely have lower equity capital 
market expertise40. Generally, my findings indicate that M&A league tables do not capture all 
 
40 It should be noted that boutiques are usually founded by, or consist of, former investment bank 
employees that might have some (equity) capital market expertise. Though, in most cases, they do not 
have access to very recent capital market data, such as short interest and lender concentration, that is 
crucial for negotiating lower premiums. 
Chapter 1                                   Real Effects of Possible Stock Recalls on M&A Premiums 
48 
information of M&A expertise of deal advisors, as far as my suggested effect driven by merger 
arbitrageurs is concerned. This could be an explanation why studies such as Fang (2005), 
Hunter and Jagtiani (2003), and Ismail (2010) find that top advisors, ranked according to 
M&A league tables, are associated with adverse deal outcomes from the acquirers’ perspective41. 
Future Research 
 My reasoning might provide a possible mechanism how overvalued stocks can maintain 
their overvaluation, as established in Savor and Lu (2009): since overvalued stocks are corre-
lated with higher short interest (e.g., Diether et al. (2009)), a manager might lock in some of 
the overvaluation by setting lower exchange ratios in stock deals, because short sellers as mer-
ger arbitrageurs require a lower premium for target stocks to get compensated for bearing this 
stock price risk. This idea might be fruitful to explore in future research. 
 
 
41 To the contrary, studies such as Golubov et al. (2012) and Kale, Kini, and Ryan (2003) show that 
top-ranked M&A advisors lead to better deal outcomes if target deal advisors have relatively low exper-
tise according to M&A league tables. 
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1.8 Appendix   Appendix − Table A1 
Variable Definitions 
Table A1 presents the definitions of all variables used throughout this chapter. All variables are obtained 
from Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ database, except Acq Financial Advisor Top 8 Equity & Equity 
Linked , which I retrieved from Bloomberg’s annually published League Tables. 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Target Share Price Premiums, Announcement Returns, and Deal Outcomes 
Premium 1 Week 
Difference of the announced offer price per share and target’s last sale share price five 
trading days prior to offer announcement, divided by target’s last sale share price five 
trading days prior to offer announcement, and expressed in percentage points. 
Premium 1 Day 
Defined as Premium 1 Week , but instead measured with target’s last sale share price one 
trading day prior to offer announcement as the premium’s reference. 
Premium 3 Day 
Defined as Premium 1 Week , but instead measured with target’s last sale share price three 
trading days prior to offer announcement as the premium’s reference. 
Premium 1 Month 
Defined as Premium 1 Week , but instead measured with target’s last sale share price 22 
trading days prior to offer announcement as the premium’s reference. 
Acq CAR [−1;+1] 
Three-trading-day cumulative abnormal announcement return (in percentage points) of 
target firm’s stock calculated using the Carhart (1997) model to model normal returns. 
The model parameters are estimated over the period −250 to −23 trading days (prior) 
to offer announcement. Security prices are dividend adjusted day close prices, further 
adjusted for stock splits, cash dividends, rights offerings, and spin-offs. 
Acq CAR [−3;+3] 
Defined as Acq CAR [−1;+1] , but instead measured for the seven-trading-day window 
around offer announcement. 
Acq BHAR 
One-month buy-and-hold abnormal return of acquiring firm’s stock, measured relative 
to a public size-, market-to-book-, and industry-matched control firm headquartered in 
the U.S. in the same time period. The numbers in brackets denote trading days relative 
to the deal announcement date when the investment in acquiring firm’s stock is made, 
and terminated, respectively: [−1;+21] measured one trading day before until one month 
after deal announcement, [−1;+42] until two months, [−1;+63] until three months, 
[−1;+84] until four months, [−1;+126] until six months, [−1;+189] until nine months, 
and [−1;+252] until one year after deal announcement. 
Arbitrage Spread 2 Day 
Ratio between the difference of the offer price per share on the announcement date and 
the last sale price of target’s stock on the second trading day after bid announcement, 
and the offer price per share on announcement, expressed in percentage terms. 
Deal Completion Dummy variable that is set to 1 if the deal is closed successfully before end of May 2017, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Panel B: Short Interest, Variables of Interest, and Ownership Controls 
Acq SI Short interest of acquiring firm’s stock, expressed in percentage points of the latest num-
ber of common shares outstanding, measured one trading day prior to announcement. 
Acq Instit Herf 
Concentration of institutional ownership in acquiring firm’s stock: measured one trading 
day prior to deal announcement by calculating the sum of the squares of each individual 
institutional investors’ percentage share in acquiring firm’s stock. 
Acq Instit Sum Percentage sum of institutional ownership in acquiring firm’s stock, measured one trad-
ing day prior to deal announcement. 
Acq Instit Sum Active 
Percentage sum of active institutional ownership in acquiring firm’s stock, measured one 
trading day prior to deal announcement. S&P Capital IQ classifies the investment style 
of the holder of a firm’s stock into active and passive. 
Acq Insider Herf  
Concentration of insider ownership in acquiring firm’s stock: measured one trading day 
prior to deal announcement by calculating the sum of the squares of each individual 
insider investors’ percentage share in acquiring firm’s stock. 
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Acq Insider Sum Percentage sum of insider ownership in acquiring firm’s stock, measured one trading day 
prior to deal announcement. 
Tgt Instit Herf Defined as Acq Instit Herf , but instead measured for target firm’s stock. 
Tgt Instit Sum Defined as Acq Instit Sum , but instead measured for target firm’s stock. 
Tgt Insider Herf Defined as Acq Insider Herf , but instead measured for target firm’s stock. 
Tgt Insider Sum Defined as Acq Insider Sum , but instead measured for target firm’s stock. 
Panel C: Deal Characteristics 
Transaction Value (TV) 
Total transaction value in billions of USD, historical nominal value. It is calculated as 
the total consideration to target shareholders + total other consideration, net assumed 
liabilities, and adjustment size, plus cash and short-term investments. 
Stock (% of TV) Percentage share of the total transaction value that is paid with acquirer’s stock. 
BTF Dummy Dummy variable that equals 1 if the merger agreement includes a bidder (acquirer) 
termination fee provision, and 0 otherwise. 
TTF Dummy Dummy variable that equals 1 if the merger agreement includes a target termination fee 
provision, and 0 otherwise. 
Friendly  Dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal attitude is friendly on the announcement day 
of the deal, and 0 otherwise. 
Horizontal Takeover Dummy variable that equals 1 if both the acquiring and the target firm are primarily 
assigned to the same industry as defined by the first SIC digit, and 0 otherwise. 
Panel D: Acquiring Firm Characteristics 
ln Acq Market Cap 
Natural logarithm of the value of acquiring firm’s market capitalization. Market capital-
ization is last sale price of the acquiring firm’s stock (adjusted for stock splits) multiplied 
with the latest number of common shares outstanding, measured one trading day prior 
to offer announcement and expressed in millions of USD. 
ln Acq Vola LTM 
Natural logarithm of 1 plus the standard deviation of weekly log-normal price returns of 
acquiring firm’s stock over the year preceding the offer announcement, annualized with 
a factor of 52 for the 52 trading weeks in a year, and measured one trading day prior to 
offer announcement. 
Acq Performance LTM (Div. adj.) 
Price performance of acquirer’s stock based on dividend adjusted day close prices, further 
adjusted for stock splits, cash dividends, rights offerings, and spin-offs: relative difference 
of acquirer’s dividend adjusted day close price one trading day prior to deal announce-
ment to acquirer’s dividend adjusted day close price one year before deal announcement, 
and expressed in percentage points. 
Acq MTB 
Market-to-book ratio of acquirer’s stock, calculated as Acq Market Cap  divided by the 
latest available value of total common equity (= common stock & additional paid in 
capital + retained earnings + treasury stock & other) one trading day prior to offer 
announcement. 
ln Acq Turnover 1 Month 
Natural logarithm of one plus acquiring firm’s share turnover, which is the one-month 
average of the daily quotient of the dollar value traded (= acquirer’s stock last sale price 
multiplied with the respective trading volume on that day) divided by the market capi-
talization (as defined above) on the corresponding trading day. 
Acq Financial Advisor Top 8 
Equity & Equity Linked 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if (at least one of) acquirer’s deal advisor(s) is in the Top 
8 of Bloomberg’s annually published Equity & Equity Linked league tables in the (cal-
endar) year preceding the (calendar) year of deal announcement, and 0 otherwise. 
Panel E: Target Firm Characteristics 
Tgt Performance LTM (Div. adj.) Defined as Acq Performance LTM (Div. adj.) , but instead measured for target firm’s stock. 
Tgt MTB −22 
Defined as Acq Market-to-Book , but instead measured for target firm’s stock 22 trading 
days prior to offer announcement. 
(Table A1 continued) 
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Appendix − Table A2 
Modular Regression Setup − Effect of the Informational Advantage through Short Selling on the One-week Target Premium 
This table presents the results of linear fixed effects regressions of Premium 1 Week on the variable of interest, the interaction term Acq SI  × Acq Instit Herf  (1) as 
defined in Section 1.3. Column (2) repeats the regression in column (1) but additionally includes Hirschman-Herfindahl indices and the sums of both institutional and 
insider ownership of the acquiring and target firm one trading day prior to offer announcement. Deal controls and acquirer industry and target industry fixed effects 
are added in column (3). Columns (4) and (5) include acquirer firm and target firm characteristics but no deal controls. Column (6) represents the full regression model 
with year, acquirer industry, and target industry fixed effects. The last two regressions ((7) and (8)) control for acquirer industry-year fixed effects and target industry-
year fixed effects, respectively. All regressions include fixed effects (as denoted) as well as an intercept but are unreported. All standard errors (in parentheses) are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster correlation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  Target Premium 1 Week 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 























































           
Other Ownership Controls  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deal Characteristics  No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Acquiring Firm Characteristics  No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Target Firm Characteristics  No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Year FE  No No No No Yes Yes No No 
Acq Industry FE  No No Yes No Yes Yes No No 
Tgt Industry FE  No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
Acq Industry × Year FE  No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Tgt Industry × Year FE  No No No No No No No Yes 
           
Observations  1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 
Adjusted R2  0.002 0.013 0.073 0.039 0.101 0.120 0.083 0.126 
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Appendix − Table A3 
Modular Regression Setup − Post-Announcement Target Stock Reactions: Arbitrage Spread 
Table A3 depicts the results of linear fixed effects models regressing Arbitrage Spread 2 Day on acquirer short interest one day before the announcement date, Acq SI , 
and institutional ownership, Acq Instit Herf  , one day before the announcement date and on the variable of interest, the interaction term Acq SI  × Acq Instit Herf  (1) 
as defined in Section 1.3. Column (2) repeats the regression in column (1) but additionally includes Hirschman-Herfindahl indices and the sums of both institutional 
and insider ownership of the acquiring and target firm one day before offer announcement. Deal controls and acquirer and target characteristics are added in column 
(3). Columns (4)–(6) repeat this progressive adding of control variables including year, acquirer industry, and target industry fixed effects. The three last regressions 
((7)–(9)) show the full model results with varying fixed effects. All regressions include fixed effects (as denoted) as well as an intercept but are unreported. All standard 
errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster correlation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  Arbitrage Spread 2 Day 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 





























































            
Other Ownership Controls  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deal Characteristics  No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquiring & Target Firm Charact.  No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            
Year FE  No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Acq Industry FE  No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Tgt Industry FE  No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
Acq Industry × Year FE  No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Tgt Industry × Year FE  No No No No No No No No Yes 
            
Observations  1,303 1,303 1,303 1,303 1,303 1,303 1,303 1,303 1,303 
Adjusted R2  0.004 0.020 0.224 0.060 0.246 0.252 0.211 0.222 0.234 
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Appendix − Figure A1 
Stylized Short Selling Process and Transactions 
Figure A1 illustrates the stylized short selling process and its associated transactions. 
  




Appendix − Figure A2 
The Market for Borrowing Stock − Supply, Demand, and Utilization 
The figure on the left side depicts the average percentage of shares available for lending and onloan (short interest). 
The graphic on the right side shows the change in utilization for different scenarios. 
 
 














Appendix − Figure A3 
Example of a Stock Recall Notice 
Figure A3 shows an example of a buy-in notice (due to a stock recall) of GoPro, Inc. (NasdaqGS: GPRO) 
common stock. The notice was sent by Interactive Brokers (IB – the lending agent) to short sellers of 
GoPro common shares on November 14th, 2014 (Chuprinin and Ruf (2017)). 
 





Entrenchment through Discretion over 
M&A Contractual Provisions § 
 
 
I apply the idea that managers of acquiring firms intend to entrench themselves through M&A in the 
sense of Shleifer and Vishny’s (1989) entrenchment strategy through manager-specific investments. I 
propose that these managers implement bidder termination fee provisions in M&A contracts to make it 
costly for acquirers’ shareholders to disapprove the deal after announcement and to prevent the manager 
from such entrenchment through M&A. In such cases, managers announce M&A deals before getting 
dismissed after bad performance. Consistently, I find that the market reacts on average negatively to 
deal announcements if bidder termination fees are high and if the likelihood of imminent forced CEO 
turnover is high. For these firms I detect significant increases in their level of entrenchment post offer 
announcement. This finding is economically significant and is more pronounced, if the CEO’s motivation 
for entrenchment is high, if subordinated managers are not motivated to intervene, if directors are busy, 
and if the deal is characterized as a diversifying takeover. The results suggest that small- to medium-
sized bidder termination fees might serve as efficiency enhancing contractual devices, whereas excessively 
high fees destroy shareholder value and possibly signal agency problems. 
Keywords: Takeovers, Mergers and Acquisitions, Managerial Entrenchment, Bidder Termination 
Fees, Reverse Termination Fees. 





§ This chapter is the outcome of a joint research project in collaboration with Jan-Oliver Strych. The research paper on which this 
chapter is based on was featured on the Columbia Business School Law Blog in October 2019 (https://clsbluesky.law.colum-
bia.edu/2019/10/18/entrenchment-through-discretion-over-ma-contractual-provisions/ (permanent link)). I thank Audra Boone, 
Jean-Gabriel Cousin, David Feldman, Manuela Geranio, SeungHun Han, Chloe Ho, Mark Humphery-Jenner, Gael Imad’Eddine, 
Dan Li, Gilberto Loureiro, Ronald Masulis, Martin Ruckes, Rik Sen, Peter Swan, and seminar participants at the University of 
Lille, the 28th Annual Meeting of the European Financial Management Association (EFMA) − “Merton H. Miller” Doctoral 
Seminar in 2019 in Ponta Delgada, the UNSW Brown Bag Research Seminar in Sydney, and the 32nd Australasian Finance and 
Banking Conference (AFBC) in Sydney for their valuable and very helpful comments.  
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2.1 Introduction 
 It has been shown that managerial entrenchment is detrimental to shareholder value 
(Faleye (2007), Cohen and Wang (2013, 2017)) and can be accomplished by CEOs making 
specific investments, which make it costly for shareholders to replace them (Shleifer and Vishny 
(1989)). By investing the firms’ resources in a complex investment whose value is higher under 
them than under the next-best alternative CEO, CEOs can counter the disciplinary forces of 
the market for corporate control. These CEOs might also extract higher wages in the future, 
gain more discretion over the strategy of the firm, and reduce the probability of being replaced 
by other managers, at least over the short run. One of the largest physical investments a CEO 
seeking entrenchment can undertake is buying another firm or division through M&A.  
 If CEOs performed poorly in the past, they are more likely to be replaced by other 
managers, and thus have an incentive to increase entrenchment in order to further collect their 
rents in the form of secured compensation. In this chapter, I propose a strategy CEOs, who 
are currently under the threat of being replaced, can carry out to make it costly for shareholders 
to replace them and to increase their level of entrenchment. By announcing a large physical 
investment such as a takeover, they intend to increase the size of the firm and undertake an 
investment which secures their position at least over the medium term, given that the replace-
ment of CEOs during a pending merger would be detrimental to shareholder value. As pointed 
out by Shleifer and Vishny (1989), top managers, such as CEOs, have discretion over the 
contracts of their firm, i.e., contracts with suppliers and customers, employees and other out-
side stakeholders. In order to increase the likelihood of successfully closing the deal or at least 
incentivizing incumbent acquiring firms’ shareholders to not disapprove the deal, I propose 
that CEOs can make use of a specific contractual provision that makes it costly to abandon 
this investment: bidder termination fees. Bidder termination fees – also known as reverse or 
acquirer termination fees1 – are cash payments from the bidder to the target firm, if the deal 
is terminated due to reasons under bidder’s sphere of control, including exogenous reasons. 
They are usually negotiated by target management to compensate them for the costs incurred 
 
1 The terms “bidder termination fee (BTF)“, “acquirer termination fee (ATF)”, and “reverse termination 
fee (RTF)” can be used interchangeably. I use the term “bidder termination fee” throughout this chapter. 
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in such a case2. Once the merger agreement is signed by the merging parties, termination 
provisions become legally binding, which reflects an important attribute of manager-specific 
investments, namely its irreversibility (Shleifer and Vishny (1989)). Acquiring firms’ CEOs 
seeking entrenchment can thus apply their discretion over the firms’ contracts and can misuse 
high bidder termination fees in deal negotiations to make abandoning these investments costly. 
High fees provide a strong incentive for acquirers to abide by the merger agreement and incen-
tivize them to close the deal. Given that information about the size of termination fees is 
disclosed in SEC filings published on or shortly after public offer announcement, outside inves-
tors then incorporate this information into prices and should react accordingly. This leads to 
my central value destruction prediction: 
If a CEO is under high turnover pressure and announces a deal with a high, irreversible   
bidder termination fee, I expect significantly negative acquirer announcement returns. 
Main Findings 
 In a sample of 852 U.S. deal announcements between 2004 and 2015, including public 
acquirers and public as well as private targets, I find that the market reacts significantly 
negative on average to deal announcements if bidder termination fees are high and the ac-
quirer’s one-year stock price performance is negative (i.e., my proxy for a higher likelihood of 
imminent forced CEO turnover). All results hold if I restrict my analysis to public targets. 
Moreover, I find that my findings are even more pronounced if the target is public. This indi-
cates that the entrenchment strategy is more easy to implement for acquirer CEOs if target 
managers are less aligned with their shareholders, as I assume is the case with public firms. I 
find the relation on acquirer announcement returns to be more pronounced, if the CEO’s wealth 
is less sensitive to firm’s stock price changes, if the CEO is not close to retirement age, if the 
acquiring firm has not implemented a staggered board, if the acquiring firm’s management 
 
2 Reasons typically include failure of the bidder to obtain (debt) financing, failure of the bidder to obtain 
shareholder approval or regulatory approval by the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DoJ) or 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the emergence of a competing bid with the primary bidder as 
the target firm (“bid-for-bidder”), the breach of representations, warranties and/or covenants by the 
bidder, failure of the acquirer to close before the “drop dead date”, and the exercise of a pure termination 
option by the bidder (see, e.g., Chen, Mahmudi, Virani, and Zhao (2020), and Quinn (2010)). 
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executives (all VPs, CEO excluded) have low equity-based alignment incentives, if the board 
is busy, and if the deal is characterized as a diversifying takeover. This suggests that such a 
proposed entrenchment-increasing strategy is easier and more likely being pursued by CEOs, 
if their incentives to do so are high and if they more likely profit from future entrenchment. 
 Additionally, I find strong evidence that the level of entrenchment is increasing in the 
years after offer announcement, as measured by acquiring firm’s entrenchment index changes 
(Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009)). Underperforming acquirers conducting such investments 
with high bidder termination fees also seem to lose value over the months and even years 
following the deal. 
I also conduct a variety of robustness checks. First, I add controls for agency problems 
between the CEO, other board members, and outside investors. Studies such as Weisbach 
(1988) show that CEOs face more intense monitoring when the board of directors is controlled 
by independent or outside directors. In addition, Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis 
predicts that firms with excess cash flows but few value-increasing investment opportunities 
are more likely to conduct value-destroying acquisitions. After including the size of the board 
of directors, the percentage of outside directors on the board, and free cash flow of the acquiring 
firm scaled by its assets, I find that my results still hold which helps me to rule out that my 
finding is driven by these types of agency problems. 
Second, I split the size of the bidder termination fee into size quantiles and find quali-
tatively similar results. I detect that my result is driven by excessively high amounts of bidder 
termination fees and not driven by potential nonlinearities. This suggests that low- or moder-
ate-sized fees might serve as efficient contractual devices, whereas large fees are most detri-
mental to shareholder value and therefore suggest potential agency conflicts. 
Third, I alleviate concerns for potential alternative explanations: my finding might be 
driven by high bidder termination fees required or negotiated in horizontal takeovers that, by 
their nature of increasing potential collusion among firms in the same industry, face a higher 
probability of being challenged by antitrust authorities. After further allowing for the flexibility 
in the definition of horizontal takeovers, I find that my results remain robust and the inferences 
are unchanged. 
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Contribution to the Literature 
I contribute to current research in a variety of ways. First, I contribute to the classical 
M&A literature that focuses on shareholder wealth effects around merger announcements and 
long-term value creation. I extend prior research that mainly addresses the use and impact of 
target termination fees on deal outcomes. Seminal articles in this strand of literature comprise 
Officer (2003) and Bates and Lemmon (2003), who regard the inclusion of target termination 
fee provisions as an efficient contractual device rather than a means by which they deter com-
petitive bidding after deal announcement. They both test two competing hypothesis for the 
use of these fees: first, the “managerial entrenchment” or “managerial discretion” hypothesis, 
that claims that target fees are being implemented in takeover contracts to truncate an other-
wise natural bidding process. Second, target fees might be used as a device that improves the 
incentives for bidding by providing potential bidders compensation for negotiating costs (“ef-
ficiency hypothesis” or “shareholder interest hypothesis”). Adding target termination fees in 
merger agreements has been found to result in higher takeover premiums and deal completion 
rates compared to deals without such clauses. Bates and Lemmon (2003) find that bidder 
termination fees are more likely incorporated in transactions where the costs of negotiation, 
including price discovery, are high. These fees are more likely implemented in relatively large 
deals and deals financed with stock. Chen, Mahmudi, Virani, and Zhao (2020) develop an 
option framework for the inclusion of bidder termination fee provisions and liken these fees to 
real options on targets’ assets. The value of this option lies in facilitating the termination of 
takeovers that are not optimal for the bidder to pursue at the time of completion. They find 
that the inclusion of such provisions is more likely the longer the ex-post realized time-to-
completion of the merger as a proxy for the ex-ante anticipation of the time the takeover takes 
to complete. I add to this literature by investigating the relation of bidder termination fees and 
firm value with regard to acquiring firms’ abnormal announcement returns. 
Second, I extend the corporate governance literature with an additional motive for 
implementing bidder termination fees in merger agreements. If managers are under pressure of 
being replaced by another manager, they might make use of such contractual provisions to 
make it costly for their shareholders to abandon the deal after announcement. I hence demon-
strate how CEOs can exploit their discretion over contracts between their firms and third 
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parties for their own advantage. I thereby extend the literature with the motive of implement-
ing high bidder termination fees as a means by which managers can increase their level of 
entrenchment through M&A, i.e., entrenching themselves through the deal, which complements 
Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) and adds empirical evidence to prior theoretical work as done 
by Shleifer and Vishny (1989). 
Third, I add to the growing literature at the intersection of law and finance. Prior 
research in this field mainly focuses on the legal and economic role and limitation of the use of 
target termination fees in takeovers. Driven by the results, I deliver an argument to closely 
monitor the setting and to restrict the size of the bidder termination fee, if a takeover might 
be alienated as an empire-building tool. My study hence contributes to the general debate and 
fundamental questions at the intersection of law and finance, whether a particular contractual 
device, such as a bidder termination fee, harms shareholders by entrenching incumbent man-
agement or instead acts in shareholders’ interest. As an efficient contract clause, these deal 
provisions should incentivize both parties to invest their time and effort in the pending takeover 
and to reveal private information to each other. I furthermore introduce a novel measure to 
better capture potential wealth effects in case bidder termination fees are paid. Prior literature 
scales termination fees – irrespectively of being paid by the bidding or target firm – by trans-
action value: I scale bidder termination fees by acquiring firms’ market capitalization to assess 
the potential negative economic impact on acquirer value. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the theoret-
ical reasoning, key assumptions, and develops the main hypotheses. Section 2.3 describes the 
data sample, the empirical specification and variables used. Section 2.4 presents the main em-
pirical results with additional subsample tests where I find the relation to be more pronounced. 
Section 2.5 includes some discussion and robustness tests to support my central hypotheses. 
Section 2.6 concludes.  
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2.2 Theoretical Reasoning, Key Assumptions, and Hypothesis Development 
  It is widely known and well documented in the literature that managers who underper-
form their industry peers are under high pressure of being replaced by either an outside or 
inside successor (e.g., Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004), Warner, Watts, and Wruck 
(1988), Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001), Jenter and Lewellen (2019), and Jenter and Kanaan 
(2015)). Jenter and Kanaan (2015) show that CEOs are fired after bad firm performance that 
might also be caused by factors beyond their control, which is against standard economic theory 
that suggests that boards filter out any exogenous shocks to performance before deciding on 
CEO retention. I apply their findings about the inverse relationship between firm performance 
and forced CEO turnover. 
 Managers of firms experiencing strong negative returns during their tenure face, all else 
equal, the highest probability of imminent dismissal. Such managers might be prone to 
strengthen their job positions by pursuing investments that have the highest value under them, 
and thereby seek entrenchment (Shleifer and Vishny (1989)). Acquisitions of firms or divisions 
are among the largest, most expensive, and most visible forms of corporate investments. CEOs 
that seek entrenchment through such investments then might enjoy private benefits of control, 
have a larger latitude and more leeway in deciding on corporate strategy, and face less discipline 
by the market for corporate control.  
 In this chapter, I suggest an entrenchment-increasing strategy through M&A that can 
be made costly for acquiring firm’s shareholders to abandon, and thus serves as an above-
mentioned entrenchment project. CEOs under replacement pressure can proactively implement 
relatively high bidder termination fee provisions in M&A contracts, i.e., merger agreements. 
By relatively high I mean high values of the dollar termination fee amount scaled by acquiring 
firm’s market capitalization. Termination fees are in general the outcome of merger negotiations 
between acquiring and target firm, whereby both parties want to get compensated if the other 
party backs out of the deal. These fees should cover potential direct and indirect costs3 associ-
ated with abandoning the deal.  
 
3 Direct costs are costs such as fees for financial and legal deal advisors, consulting firms, opportunity 
costs of the assets involved and other transaction fees, and indirect costs are, e.g., costs of information 
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By focusing on the bidder termination fee, size-scaled by acquiring firm’s market capi-
talization, I concentrate on the potential negative economic impact on acquirer value rather 
than the demand of target managers in negotiations4. 
 A key assumption is that the CEO has discretion to select legal as well as financial 
advisors for M&A deals, and both parties have an incentive to close the deal: the CEO seeks 
entrenchment through a successful acquisition and advisors aim to collect fees once deals are 
closed. I further assume that the board of directors is usually busy, does not audit all provisions 
in the merger agreement, and awaits the market reaction on deal announcement to evaluate 
the proposal (i.e., additional information revelation after deal announcement). If CEOs under 
pressure of losing their jobs announce deals with high bidder termination fees, shareholders 
have to outweigh the costs the acquiring firm incurs between (1) get the CEO to abandon the 
deal, pay the bidder termination fee to the target firm, and replace their incumbent CEO, and 
(2) retain their CEO, not paying the bidder termination fee and thereby accepting entrench-
ment of the CEO and granting her further employment. Notwithstanding how the shareholders 
or board of directors will act, I expect that announcement returns will be significantly negative 
in both cases. This leads to my first central hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1:  If the acquiring firm underperformed during the last year and                       
 if the bidder termination fee is high,                                            
 the lower are acquirer cumulative abnormal announcement returns. 
  Given that above mentioned deals are announced as a means to improve acquiring 
CEOs job prospects, I hypothesize that these investments increase entrenchment through the 
deal. This leads to my second central hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2:  If the market evaluates the announced takeover from underperforming 
 acquirers as value destroying, and if the bidder termination fee is  high,
 the higher the increase of acquirer’s entrenchment index after the deal. 
 
expropriation, i.e., private information about future synergies and intellectual property other market 
participants can potentially free ride on. It mostly depends on their relative bargaining power if fees are 
implemented and how high the dollar amount is. 
4 To draw inferences about and to assess economic impacts on target firms, one should scale termination 
fees with deal value or other measures for target firm size, such as its market capitalization. 
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2.3 Data and Methodology 
2.3.1 Data Sample 
 I extract my M&A sample from Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ database. I identify 852 
transactions between January 01, 2004 and December 31, 20155 that meet the following criteria 
commonly applied in empirical M&A literature (see, e.g., Masulis et al. (2007)): 
1. The acquisition is announced and either completed or withdrawn in the sample period. 
2. The acquirer is a publicly listed U.S. firm, holds less than 50% of target’s outstanding 
shares prior to offer announcement, and aims for a change in control in the target firm 
(acquirer must seek a majority stake in the target firm). The target firm is either a 
public or a private firm and also headquartered in the U.S. (no cross-border deals). 
3. The total transaction value exceeds USD 1 million (historical value). 
4. There must not be a CEO turnover in the acquiring firm between the last fiscal year 
end date prior to offer announcement and the offer announcement date itself 6. Tenure 
of acquiring firm’s CEO (measured at offer announcement) must exceed one calendar 
year. 
 My M&A dataset is extended by data on acquiring firms’ Investor Responsibility Re-
search Center (IRRC) governance provisions (staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw 
amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and 
charter amendments) as published in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) DEF14A 
filings, provided by the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) website7.  
 I further obtain data on acquiring firm’s CEO age, tenure, equity alignment incentives, 
duality, the firm’s board size, and percentage of independent directors on the board from the 
SEC EDGAR database. One advantage of my study in comparison to older studies applying 
 
5 As shown in Table 1, I am not concerned with any possible sample selection biases. The effect also 
holds “univariately”, i.e., if I only include the proposed interaction term and its components. Table A2 
in the Appendix shows the detailed sample selection process with the number of remaining observations 
after applying respective filters. 
6 I require that condition since a lot of control variables (acquiring firms’ CEO characteristics, measures 
of entrenchment, board characteristics, etc.) are published only at the end of each fiscal year in respective 
SEC reports. 
7 https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html (permanent link). 
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measures such as the governance index (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)) or the entrench-
ment index (Bebchuk et al. (2009)), is that I am able to track all governance provisions on a 
yearly basis with no interruptions between firm-years. Older studies rely on data provided by 
IRRC that have been published only every second or third year8. Stock price and accounting 
data, as well as data on institutional and insider ownership, are also obtained from Standard 
& Poor’s Capital IQ database. Factor returns come from Kenneth French’s website9. 
 
2.3.2 Empirical Specification and Variables 
The core specification to measure the relation of bidder termination fees implemented 
by underperforming acquirers and their cumulative abnormal announcement returns is the 
following fixed effects regression model: 
Acq CAR[–k;+k]i,t = αi,t + β1 Acq Underperformancei,t × BTF Sizei,t 
              + β2 Acq Underperformancei,t + β3 BTF Sizei,t + β4 TTF Sizei,t 
              + β5 Acq E-Indexi,t + γ Acq CEO Characteristicsi,t 
              + δ Acq Firm Characteristicsi,t + ϑ Deal Characteristicsi,t 
              + φ Acq Industry × Year FEi,t + λ Tgt Industry FEi,t + εi,t 
Where i  indexes the unique transaction (i.e., the unique acquirer-target-combination), 
t  indexes the time, k  indexes the trading days relative to offer announcement, and β1 is the 
coefficient of primary interest – the estimate of the relation of bidder termination fee size 
implemented by underperforming acquirers and their cumulative abnormal announcement re-
turns. The dependent variable is the acquiring firm’s cumulative abnormal announcement re-
turn, measured in symmetric trading day event windows [−k;+k]  around the trading-day-
adjusted announcement date10. I apply the Carhart (1997) four-factor model to model normal 
 
8 IRRC has published data for the years 1990 to 2006 in eight volumes: 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 
2002, 2004, and 2006. Studies often assume that during the years between the publications firms have 
the same provisions in place as in the previous publication year (i.e., assuming a certain “stickyness”). 
9 https://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html (permanent link). 
10 I focus on the seven-trading-day window around offer announcement, Acq CAR [−3;+3] , given that 
Coates, Palia, and Wu (2018) find that in about one in five cases the filing with the SEC (and thereby 
disclosure of the merger agreement which contains information about the dollar amount of both bidder 
and target termination fees) takes one or more days after offer announcement. I also provide additional 
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returns and set the estimation period of the parameters to (−250;−23) trading days prior to 
offer announcement to rule out any dilution caused by potential stock price run-ups. My vari-
able of interest is the interaction term, Acq Underperformance × BTF Size , which consists of 
Acq Underperformance  11, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquiring firm’s share price 
performance during the year preceding the offer announcement is negative, 0 otherwise, and 
BTF Size , the USD (mm) amount of the bidder termination fee divided by the market capi-
talization (also in USD mm) of the acquiring firm 22 trading days prior to offer announcement, 
expressed in percentage points12. To support hypothesis 1, I should find a negative and statis-
tically significant coefficient on Acq Underperformance × BTF Size . 
The baseline regression model13 also controls for the size of the target termination fee, 
TTF Size , which is the USD (mm) amount of the target termination fee divided by the total 
transaction value (TV, also in USD mm) and expressed in percentage points. Recent research 
has shown that the use of both types of termination fees is highly positively correlated, i.e., 
deals that include a bidder termination fee provision almost always include a target termination 
fee provision (see, e.g., Chen et al. (2020))14. I include the entrenchment index of the acquiring 
firm, Acq E-Index , constructed by Bebchuk et al. (2009), in my baseline regressions since 
Masulis et al. (2007) show that a high acquirer E-Index significantly negatively affects respec-
tive firm’s announcement returns. Beyond that, a reason to include the E-Index is that it is 
also a more direct measure of managerial entrenchment. The E-Index is constructed based on 
 
regression results for smaller (Acq CAR [−1;+1] ) and larger (Acq CAR [−5;+5] ) event windows: the results 
are qualitatively and quantitatively similar (see Table 2 and Table 10). 
11 The use of negative past performance as a proxy for imminent CEO dismissal is motivated by Jenter 
and Kanaan (2015) and Huson et al. (2001), who show that a variety of firm performance measures are 
negatively and statistically significantly related to forced CEO turnover. 
12 Figure A1 in the Appendix shows the average size of the BTF over time: increases during the ’08-’09 
financial crisis, mainly due to lower market valuations and higher uncertainty, can be detected. Omitting 
this period does not change my results. 
13 I do not industry-adjust all variables but instead include industry-year fixed effects (Gormley and 
Matsa (2014)). Table A3 in the Appendix shows the empirical relation between the inclusion of bidder 
termination fees and certain control variables and justifies their implementation in the main regression 
model. 
14 Chen et al. (2020) find in their sample that about 96 percent of deals with bidder termination fee 
provisions also include target termination fee provisions, and in about 65 percent these fees are of equal 
size as scaled by the transaction value. 
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the existence of the following governance provisions each year, whereas each provision equiva-
lently counts 1: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden 
parachutes, and supermajority requirements for (1) mergers and (2) charter amendments. 
Acq CEO Characteristics  is a vector consisting of the following variables that might 
affect, or are at least correlated with, the level of managerial entrenchment (all obtained at the 
last fiscal year end date prior to offer announcement, unless otherwise noted): ln Acq CEO 
Total Current Compensation , the natural logarithm of 1 plus the USD (000s) amount of ac-
quiring firm CEO’s total current cash compensation (salary and bonus), a proxy for managerial 
quality15 (Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and Powell (2012), and Masulis et al. (2007)). Acq CEO 
Tenure  is the number of years since the appointment of the CEO in the acquiring firm, meas-
ured from the day of the appointment until the day of offer announcement, and Acq CEO Age  
is the age of the CEO of the acquiring firm (Guo and Masulis (2015))16. I further control for 
CEO pay-performance sensitivity (Delta), as well as the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock 
volatility (Vega): Acq CEO Delta is the expected USD change in acquiring firm CEO’s wealth 
associated with a 1% change in acquiring firm’s stock price (in USD 000s), calculated following 
Core and Guay (2002), and Acq CEO Vega  is the expected USD change in acquiring firm 
CEO’s wealth associated with a 1% change in the standard deviation of acquiring firm’s stock 
returns (in USD 000s) and calculated following Guay (1999). A high Delta is seen as better 
aligning the incentives of managers with the interests of shareholders, but an increased Delta 
may also expose the manager to more risk. I therefore additionally control for the CEO’s risk-
taking behavior given that Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) find that a high prior Vega im-
plements riskier firm policy choices17. Acq CEO Duality  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
 
15 E.g., Fee and Hadlock (2003) find that larger firms, that – ceteris paribus – usually pay higher salaries 
and bonuses, more likely attract executives taking on the CEO position, and suggest that managers of 
large firms are more highly desired in the labor market (perhaps because a high-level position in a big 
firm is a relatively more credible signal of managerial quality, or alternatively because there are more 
opportunities to develop managerial expertise in a large enterprise). 
16 Prior literature has interpreted the decline of forced CEO turnover over CEO tenure as evidence of 
increasing managerial entrenchment (see, e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), Dikolli, Mayew, and 
Nanda (2014), and Jenter and Lewellen (2019)). 
17 Coles et al. (2006) find that higher sensitivity to stock volatility (Vega) in the managerial compensa-
tion scheme gives executives an incentive to invest in riskier assets and implement a more aggressive 
debt policy. They also find that stock-return volatility is positively correlated with both Delta and Vega. 
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the acquiring firm’s CEO is also chairperson of the board of directors, and 0 otherwise, as 
disclosed at the last fiscal year end date prior to announcement18. 
Acq Firm Characteristics  is comprised of subsequent covariates (also obtained at the 
last fiscal year end date prior to offer announcement, unless otherwise noted): Acq Executive 
Board Size  is the total number of management executives on the acquiring firm’s board. The-
oretical articles such as Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) have identified board size 
as an important determinant of corporate governance effectiveness19. Acq Institutional Own 
Sum [OA−1]  is the sum of institutional holdings in acquiring firm’s stock and Acq Insider Own 
Sum [OA−1]  is the sum of insider holdings in respective stock, both measured one trading day 
prior to offer announcement and expressed in percentage points. Monitoring problems are less 
severe if the shareholder base is less dispersed as is the case if (multiple) blockholders exist. By 
including insider ownership, I control for the stock based incentive alignment of acquiring firm’s 
management executives and its affiliated and linked directors. Acq Market Cap [OA−22]  is the 
last sale price of acquiring firm’s stock (adjusted for stock splits) multiplied with the latest 
number of shares outstanding, both obtained 22 trading days prior to offer announcement and 
expressed in millions of USD. I control for acquiring firm’s size since Moeller, Schlingemann, 
and Stulz (2004) show that larger acquirers earn abnormal announcement returns of about two 
percent less than smaller acquirers20. Acq Market-to-Book [OA−22]  is the market-to-book ratio of 
acquirer’s stock, calculated as Acq Market Cap [OA−22]  divided by the latest available value of 
the firm’s total common equity 22 trading days prior to offer announcement, and is included 
to rule out a simple low-growth effect on acquirer returns21. I include measures related to 
acquiring firm’s financial constraints in every regression. This helps me to mitigate concerns 
that high bidder termination fees, as a simple outcome of takeover negotiations in which targets 
 
18 I also control for duality since prior work has shown that it is correlated with CEO tenure (Kini and 
Williams (2012)), and since it is an important characteristic of CEO overall power, mostly within the 
board of the firm. 
19 Yermack’s (1996) study shows a significantly negative relation between board size and firm value. He 
further finds that CEO disciplining mechanisms, such as the threat of dismissal, lose power as board size 
increases. 
20 The authors suggest that this might be due to a hubris effect: managers of larger acquirers tend to be 
overconfident about their acquisition strategies (Roll (1986)). Replacing market capitalization with total 
assets or their respective natural logarithms as a control for firm size does not change my results. 
21 In untabulated regressions I include acquiring firm’s Tobin’s Q as an alternative measure for growth 
and overvaluation and receive qualitatively and quantitatively similar results. 
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force acquirers to provide high fees, drive announcement returns, since these acquirers might 
have problems to obtain financing for the deal. The set of these variables include ln Acq 1YR 
Stock Return Volatility [OA−1] , which is the natural logarithm of one plus the standard deviation 
of weekly log-normal stock price returns of the acquiring firm over the year preceding the offer 
announcement, annualized with a factor of 52 for the 52 trading weeks in a year, and expressed 
in percentage points. I include volatility not simply because it is a measure captioning uncer-
tainty, but also since Guo and Masulis (2015) show that stock volatility is significantly posi-
tively correlated with forced CEO turnover. Acq Market Leverage [OA–22] is book value of total 
debt divided by the market value of acquiring firm’s total assets. Market value of total assets 
is calculated in the following way: Acq Total Assets + Acq Market Cap [OA−22] − Acq Total 
Common Equity , all measured 22 trading days prior to offer announcement. It is widely known 
that leverage serves as an important governance mechanism, since it forces managers to make 
timely debt payments and thereby limits managerial discretion (Masulis et al. (2007)). Acq 
Dividend Payer is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquiring firm paid positive dividends 
during the fiscal year preceding the offer announcement, and 0 otherwise (Farre-Mensa and 
Ljungqvist (2016), and Whited and Wu (2006)). 
Besides these variables I include the following Deal Characteristics  in the baseline re-
gression model, which are widely used in empirical M&A literature, especially when analyzing 
announcement returns (Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008)): Transaction Value (TV) is the 
historical nominal value of the total transaction value in millions of USD. Friendly is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the deal attitude is friendly on the announcement day of the deal, and 
0 otherwise. Stock [% of TV]  is the percentage share of the transaction value that is paid with 
acquirers’ stock. Horizontal Takeover  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if both the acquiring 
and the target firm are primarily assigned to the same industry, as defined by all four SIC 
digits, and 0 otherwise (see, e.g., Eckbo (1983), Betton et al. (2008), Fee and Thomas (2004), 
and Shahrur (2005)). Private Target  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the target firm is 
private, i.e., if there are no stock price data available one trading day prior to offer announce-
ment, and 0 otherwise (Masulis et al (2007)). Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) find in 
their sample of firms that make multiple acquisitions that acquirers’ abnormal announcement 
returns are significantly positive if they target private firms. Ln Time-to-Resolution (Actual)  
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is the natural logarithm of one plus the ex-post number of calendar days between the date the 
takeover is announced and the date on which the takeover is either completed or withdrawn, 
divided by 365 (Chen et al. (2020), Officer (2006), and Houston and Ryngaert (1997)). I include 
this variable since Chen et al. (2020) find that the length of this time span is significantly 
positively correlated with the size of the bidder termination fee and serves as a good proxy for 
the ex-ante expected length of time it will take for the deal to close. I also include Acquirer 
Industry × Year Fixed Effects  and Target Industry Fixed Effects , based on the first digit of 
the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code and the year of deal announcement (e.g., 
Betton et al. (2008), Malmendier, Opp, and Saidi (2016)) to control for aggregate shocks to 
takeover activity in certain industries and across years, regulation changes, and further unob-
served heterogeneity (Gormley and Matsa (2014)). 
 
2.4 Main Empirical Results and Additional Subsample Tests 
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Abnormal Returns, Antitakeover Provision Index, and Termination Fees 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the M&A sample. Acquiring firms’ cumulative 
abnormal announcement returns are measured in percentage points and are slightly negative 
on average (Betton et al. (2008) and Officer (2003)), except for the [−1;+1] trading day window 
around offer announcement, consistent with Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005). Buy-
and-hold abnormal returns vary stronger in extreme values, which is typical due to their longer 
time window of up to three years after announcement. All abnormal return variables are addi-
tionally winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to rule out the effect of outliers. The acquiring 
firm’s entrenchment-index, Acq E-Index , takes on values between zero and six with a mean 
(median) value of 2.89 (3), which is consistent with the findings of Bebchuk et al. (2009), who 
additionally observe an increasing positive trend in the E-Index over time. Since I am not able 
to find filings for all firm-years in my study, the number of observations of both Acq E-Index 
and ∆ Acq E-Index 3YR    is slightly less than 852 (the number of observations of the main sample). 
The mean of Acq Div Adj Performance LTM [OA−1] , the continuous variable on which the 
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dummy variable Acq Underperformance  is based on, is positive, yet there are firms that sig-
nificantly underperformed in the year preceding the offer announcement, with returns down to 
−88%. The size of the bidder termination fee, BTF Size , varies from 0 to more than 8% of 
acquiring firm’s market capitalization 22 trading days prior to offer announcement. My variable 
of interest, the interaction term Acq Underperformance × BTF Size , culminates in values of 
up to 6%. TTF Size  is the dollar amount of the target termination fee scaled by transaction 
value and is included in approximately 44% of all observations. The size of TTF is comparable 
to summary statistics obtained in Officer (2003) and Neyland and Shekhar (2018). 
Acquirer CEO Characteristics 
Ln Acq CEO Total Current Compensation , the natural logarithm of acquiring firm 
CEO’s cash compensation, has a mean of around 7, similar to Humphery-Jenner et al. (2016) 
and Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran (2009). The average CEO in my study is 56 years old, has 
a tenure of 8.2 years, and is in 58% of the cases also chairperson of the board of directors: all 
mean, median and standard deviations are comparable to Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2014), 
and Cai, Fang, and Li (2019). The values for Acq CEO Delta  and Acq CEO Vega  are about 
twice to thrice the size in comparison to the values obtained in Kini and Williams (2012), 
which I explain by the firms being acquirers. These firms are on average significantly bigger in 
terms of market capitalization and CEO pay in comparison to the average firm, and thus a 
higher value should be expected. My variable proxying for overall alignment of the CEO with 
the firm, i.e., Acq CEO Alignment , takes on values between 0 and 25 with a mean (median) 
of 1.425 (0.594), smaller than the average value and median obtained in Kale et al. (2009), 
which I again explain with the average acquirer being larger than the average firm in their 
data sample22. My results for Acq VP Alignment come closer to their results: mean and median 
values are 0.164 and 0.099, respectively, and Acq CEO Turnover  increases from year to year 
following the offer announcement, which is what one would expect. 
 
22 Kale et al. (2009) analyze equity-based (alignment) incentives on firm performance for a broader 
sample of firms, not a subsample of acquiring firms as in my study. One important point to keep in 
mind here is, that the alignment variable measures the sum of stock and option sensitivities to a USD 
100 change in shareholder wealth. This, all else equal, mechanically results in lower values of Acq CEO 
Alignment  for larger firms in comparison to smaller firms. 




Table 1 reports summary statistics of the sample consisting of 852 transactions announced and either 
closed or withdrawn between January 01, 2004 and December 31, 2015. Indices display the point in time 
(i.e., trading day) relative to the offer announcement date when the variable was measured. Acquirer 
cumulative abnormal announcement returns (Acq CARs ) are measured in symmetric event windows 
from five, three, and one trading day before until five, three, and one trading day after offer announce-
ment, respectively, applying a Carhart (1997) four-factor-model to model normal returns. Acquirer buy-
and-hold abnormal returns (Acq BHARs ) are measured from one trading day prior until 250, 500, and 
750 trading days after offer announcement, respectively, applying the CRSP® value-weighted market 
return to model normal returns. Acq E-Index , Acq CEO Total Current Compensation , Acq CEO Age , 
Acq CEO Delta , Acq CEO Vega , Acq CEO Duality , Acq CEO Alignment , Acq Executive Board Size , 
Acq VP Alignment , Acq Staggered Board , Acq Board of Directors Size , Acq Percentage of Independent 
Directors , and Acq Dividend Payer are measured on the last fiscal year end date prior to offer announce-
ment. Acq CEO Tenure  is measured from the day of the appointment of acquiring firm’s CEO until the 
day of offer announcement. All Acq CARs  and Acq BHARs , Acq Market-to-Book [OA–22] , Tgt Market-
to-Book [OA−22] , Tgt Premium 1 Month , Relative Size Market Cap [OA−22] , Acq Div Adj Performance 
LTM [OA−1] , and Tgt Div Adj Performance LTM [OA−1] are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All 
variables are additionally defined in detail in the Appendix (Table A1). 
  Summary Statistics 
 Variables Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns, Anti-takeover Provision Index, and Termination Fees 
 Acq CAR [−1;+1] 852 0.041 −0.067 4.848 −20.719 23.916 
 Acq CAR [−3;+3] 852 −0.155 −0.069 6.157 −26.889 23.665 
 Acq CAR [−5;+5] 852 −0.124 −0.089 6.808 −29.097 27.530 
 Acq BHAR [−1;+250] 852 −1.176 −2.410 26.416 −90.970 138.060 
 Acq BHAR [−1;+500] 852 −0.055 −2.490 43.235 −103.830 290.430 
 Acq BHAR [−1;+750] 852 −0.263 −3.860 54.451 −132.440 336.190 
 Acq E-Index 772 2.890 3 1.291 0 6 
 ∆ Acq E-Index 3YR 720 0.479 0 1.069 −3 4 
 Acq Div Adj Performance LTM [OA−1] 852 17.770 14.407 33.051 −88.486 225.702 
 Acq Underperformance 852 0.275 0 0.447 0 1 
 Acq Underperformance × BTF Size 852 0.066 0.000 0.481 0.000 5.890 
 BTF Size 852 0.203 0.000 0.816 0.000 8.128 
 TTF Size 852 1.422 0.000 1.854 0.000 14.312 
 Acq Neg OA Reaction 852 0.506 1 0.500 0 1 
Panel B: Acquirer CEO Characteristics 
 Acq CEO Total Current Compensation 852 1,548.071 1,030.713 1,505.113 0.001 9,249.000 
 ln Acq CEO Total Current Compensation 852 7.012 6.939 0.943 0.001 9.132 
 Acq CEO Tenure 852 8.247 6.367 6.854 1.000 42.792 
 Acq CEO Age 852 56.116 56 6.592 39 83 
 Acq CEO Delta 852 4,529.250 437.539 33,747.13 8.272 486,621.0 
 Acq CEO Vega 852 371.646 151.981 776.105 0.000 9,442.926 
 Acq CEO Duality 852 0.575 1 0.495 0 1 
 Acq CEO Alignment 852 1.425 0.594 2.971 0.000 24.947 
 Acq CEO Turnover 1YR 852 0.147 0 0.354 0 1 
 





 Acq CEO Turnover 2YR 852 0.293 0 0.456 0 1 
 Acq CEO Turnover 3YR 852 0.440 0 0.497 0 1 
Panel C: Acquiring Firm Characteristics 
 Acq Executive Board Size 852 5.668 5 0.999 3 13 
 Acq VP Alignment 852 0.164 0.099 0.206 0.000 2.213 
 Acq Staggered Board 772 0.467 0 0.499 0 1 
 Acq Board of Directors Size 746 10.184 10 2.743 5 24 
 Acq Percentage of Independent Directors 746 76.662 77.777 11.857 27.277 94.118 
 Acq Board Busyness 772 28.994 28.571 21.467 0.000 100.000 
 Acq Institutional Own Sum [OA−1] 852 48.363 47.699 15.699 0.481 98.430 
 Acq Insider Own Sum [OA−1] 852 3.238 0.715 6.603 0.000 54.368 
 Acq Market Cap [OA−22] 852 24,851.16 5,014.216 47,910.96 58.765 346,124.5 
 Acq Market-to-Book [OA−22] 852 3.609 2.618 5.239 0.429 76.642 
 Acq 1YR Stock Return Volatility [OA−1] 852 29.994 27.350 13.488 10.186 132.648 
 ln Acq 1YR Stock Return Volatility [OA−1] 852 3.354 3.345 0.392 2.415 4.895 
 Acq Market Leverage [OA−22] 852 0.122 0.099 0.111 0.000 0.617 
 Acq Dividend Payer 852 0.612 1 0.488 0 1 
 Acq Free Cash Flow to Total Assets [OA−22] 369 0.054 0.057 0.050 −0.102 0.243 
 Acq Run-up CAR [−22;−2] 852 −0.324 −0.237 7.828 −37.337 36.372 
 Acq Run-up CAR [−22;−4] 852 −0.354 −0.423 7.368 −34.367 31.966 
 Acq Run-up CAR [−22;−6] 852 −0.318 −0.413 6.981 −33.115 31.980 
Panel D: Deal Characteristics 
 Transaction Value (TV) 852 1,975.077 281.130 7,292.306 3.000 98,684.41 
 Friendly 852 0.995 1 0.068 0 1 
 Stock [% of TV] 852 16.155 0.000 30.095 0.000 100.000 
 Horizontal Takeover 852 0.322 0 0.467 0 1 
 Horizontal Takeover × BTF Size 852 0.098 0.000 0.536 0.000 4.993 
 Horizontal Takeover SIC 3 852 0.502 0 0.500 0 1 
 Horizontal Takeover SIC 3 × BTF Size 852 0.129 0.000 0.625 0.000 6.652 
 Private Target 852 0.613 1 0.487 0 1 
 Time-to-Resolution (Actual) 852 0.242 0.156 0.238 0.000 1.734 
 ln Time-to-Resolution (Actual) 852 0.201 0.145 0.168 0.000 1.006 
 Tgt Premium 1 Month 362 40.066 32.460 41.080 −89.056 383.871 
 Relative Size Market Cap [OA−22] 363 90.925 12.655 266.159 0.541 1,792.928 
 Deal Completion 852 0.947 1 0.224 0 1 
Panel E: Target Firm Characteristics 
 Tgt Div Adj Performance LTM [OA−1] 355 25.230 14.475 70.383 −91.579 409.849 
 Tgt Market-to-Book [OA−22] 351 3.506 2.168 4.952 0.191 35.653 
 Tgt 1YR Stock Return Volatility [OA−1] 350 48.031 39.785 59.715 13.075 1,057.783 
 ln Tgt 1YR Stock Return Volatility [OA−1] 350 3.721 3.708 0.513 2.644 6.965 
(Table 1 continued)
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Acquiring Firm Characteristics, Target Firm Characteristics, and Deal Characteristics 
Summary statistics of the two measures of board size, Acq Executive Board Size  and 
Acq Board of Directors Size , are in line with Faleye (2007), Guo and Masulis (2015), and Fich 
and Shivdasani (2006). Approximately every second board is staggered, i.e., elects only a por-
tion of directors (usually a third) each year. The percentage of independent directors on ac-
quiring firm’s board is larger than 75, consistent with Harford et al. (2012). Other acquirer and 
target characteristics, such as institutional and insider holdings in acquiring firm’s stock, as 
well as its market capitalization, market-to-book ratio, stock return volatility and leverage, are 
all consistent with prior research. The average value of Transaction Value (TV) is close to 
USD 2 billion, right skewed with a median value of USD 281 million. Almost every deal is 
friendly (as classified by Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ database), similar to Harford et al. 
(2012), who also find that 99% in their sample is classified as friendly. The average share of 
stock as transaction currency equals 16.2%. Similar to Fu, Lin, and Officer (2013), I find that 
the target is private in more than 60% of the deals. The average one-month target share price 
premium for public targets is 40%, right skewed, and comparable to Officer (2003) and Mal-
mendier et al. (2016). The actual time-to-resolution of the deal, measured as the ex-post time 
difference between the offer announcement day and the day the deal is either closed or with-
drawn, as well as deal completion rates, are similar to Chen et al. (2020) and Jeon and Ligon 
(2011). 
 
2.4.2 Short-Term Acquirer’s Firm Value Change 
 Table 2 depicts the baseline regression results. I test my central hypothesis (hypothe-
sis 1) by regressing acquirer cumulative abnormal announcement returns with varying sym-
metric event windows on Acq Underperformance , a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ac-
quirer performed negatively in the year preceding the offer announcement (0 otherwise), BTF 
Size , the size of the bidder termination fee as a fraction of acquiring firm’s market capitalization 
22 trading days prior to offer announcement, and the variable of interest, the interaction term 
Acq Underperformance × BTF Size  as defined in Section 2.3. In regressions (1), (4), and (7), 
respectively, I first omit the interaction term to test whether acquirer’s underperformance or 
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the size of the bidder termination fee by itself show any significant relation to announcement 
returns, which does not seem to be the case. I then add the interaction term in regressions (2), 
(5), and (8), respectively, and obtain a negative and statistically highly significant coefficient 
on Acq Underperformance × BTF Size . 
The relation of bidder termination fee size implemented by underperforming acquirers 
and their announcement returns becomes even stronger if I add acquiring firm’s entrenchment 
index, Acq E-Index , as an additional control variable (regressions (3), (6), and (9)). The coef-
ficient of −3.650 on the interaction term is not only statistically significant at the 1% level, it 
is also economically significant: a one-standard deviation increase in this interaction term re-
sults in a reduction of Acq CAR [−3;+3]  of about 1.76 percentage points (= 0.481(−3.650)), 
which translates to a decrease of acquiring firms’ market capitalization of about USD 436 
million for the average acquirer with a market capitalization of USD 24,851.16 million. The 
reason I include Acq E-Index  in all my regressions is because Masulis et al. (2007) find that 
managers of acquirers with more antitakeover provisions are more insulated from the discipline 
imposed by the market for corporate control and are thus more likely to display self-serving 
behavior. Consistent with their study of the relation of corporate governance mechanisms and 
the profitability of acquisitions, I also find a negative and statistically significant coefficient on 
Acq E-Index . I thus find strong support for hypothesis 1. 
 Acq Management Board Size  is negatively related to Acq CAR [−3;+3] , but only weakly 
statistically significant, suggesting that smaller boards might be better monitors. Consistent 
with Officer (2003), I find a negative and significant coefficient on Acq Market-to-Book [OA−22]  
and a weakly significant and negative coefficient on ln Acq 1YR Stock Return Volatility [OA−1] , 
proposing that, on average, shareholders react negatively, if ex-ante uncertainty over the ac-
quiring firm’s value is high. Acq Institutional Own Sum [OA−1]  loads positively on announcement 
returns, which is in line with prior research finding that increased monitoring by blockholders 
also improves acquisition performance. Friendly  is significantly negatively related to Acq 
CAR [−3;+3]  (Harford et al. (2012)). Paying for the target with a high stock percentage share 
gives rise to negative announcement reactions fueled by overvaluation concerns (Sokolyk 
(2015)). Larger deals that usually take a longer time to completion also relate to lower an-
nouncement returns, the acquisition of a private firm, however, positively affects returns since 




Relation of Bidder Termination Fees implemented by Underperforming Acquirers on Acquirer Cumulative Abnormal Announcement Returns 
Table 2 presents the results of linear fixed effects regressions of different symmetric-window acquirer cumulative abnormal announcement returns (Acq CAR ) on Acq 
Underperformance , a dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquirer performed negatively in the year preceding the offer announcement (0 otherwise), BTF Size , the 
size of the bidder termination fee as a fraction of acquiring firm’s market capitalization 22 trading days prior to offer announcement, and the variable of interest, the 
interaction term Acq Underperformance × BTF Size  as defined in Section 2.3. The set of control variables for the baseline regressions include Acquirer CEO Charac-
teristics , Acquiring Firm Characteristics , Deal Characteristics , and a control variable for share price run-up (Acq Run-up CAR ). Regression (1) shows the isolated 
effect of Acq Underperformance  and BTF Size  on Acq CAR [−5;+5]  alone. I include the interaction term Acq Underperformance × BTF Size  in regression (2) and 
further add acquiring firm’s entrenchment index, Acq E-Index , in regression (3). I repeat regressions (1)–(3) for different event windows, a seven-trading-day symmetric 
event window (Acq CAR [−3;+3] , regressions (4)–(6)) as well as a three-trading-day symmetric event window (Acq CAR [−1;+1] , regressions (7)–(9)). All regressions include 
Acquirer Industry × Year Fixed Effects , Target Industry Fixed Effects  as well as an intercept but are unreported. All standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster correlation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  Acq CAR 
 Event Window  [−5;+5]  [−3;+3]  [−1;+1] 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
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Acq Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Tgt Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
              
Observations  852 852 772  852 852 772  852 852 772 
Adjusted R2  0.036 0.051 0.069  0.039 0.069 0.101  0.040 0.058 0.076 
(Table 2 continued)
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such acquisitions have generally been shown to be associated with value creation (see, e.g., 
Fuller et al. (2002) and Chang (1998))23. 
Table 3 
Relation of Bidder Termination Fees implemented by Underperforming Acquirers on               
Acquirer Cumulative Abnormal Announcement Returns − Public Targets Only 
This table presents the results of linear fixed effects regressions of acquirer cumulative abnormal an-
nouncement returns (Acq CAR [−3;+3] ) on Acq Underperformance , a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
acquirer performed negatively in the year preceding the offer announcement (0 otherwise), BTF Size , 
the size of the bidder termination fee as a fraction of acquiring firm’s market capitalization 22 trading 
days prior to offer announcement, and the variable of interest, the interaction term Acq Underperfor-
mance × BTF Size  as defined in Section 2.3 for the subsample of public targets. The set of control 
variables (Controls ) include Acquirer CEO Characteristics , Acquiring Firm Characteristics , Deal Char-
acteristics , a control variable for share price run-up (Acq Run-up CAR [−22;−4] ), and Target Firm Char-
acteristics . Regression (1) shows the isolated effect of Acq Underperformance  and BTF Size  on Acq 
CAR [−3;+3] alone. I include the interaction term Acq Underperformance × BTF Size  in regression (2) 
and further add acquiring firm’s entrenchment index, Acq E-Index , in regression (3). All regressions 
include Acquirer Industry × Year Fixed Effects , Target Industry Fixed Effects  as well as an intercept 
but are unreported. All standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White 
(1980)) and within-cluster correlation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  Acq CAR [−3;+3] 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3) 
      

































Target Firm Characteristics     





















      
Controls  Yes Yes Yes 
      
 
23 Despite the large number of control variables I am not concerned with any multicollinearity problems 
given that variance inflation factors (vifs) are all below four and for my main variables of interest always 
below three. In untabulated regressions, I additionally include more granular fixed effects and addition-
ally cluster standard errors on the acquiring firm, revealing that the results remain qualitatively and 
quantitatively the same. 
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Acq Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Tgt Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations  338 338 311 
Adjusted R2  0.112 0.141 0.207 
(Table 3 continued) 
 As shown in Table 3, I restrict the baseline analysis of the relation between bidder 
termination fees implemented by underperforming acquirers on acquirer announcement returns 
to the subsample of public targets. Even after additionally controlling for factors that might 
influence value and synergy creation in the new bidder-target-combination, my findings still 
hold. Buying a more likely overvalued target negatively affects acquirer announcement returns, 
yet the coefficient is not statistically significant in every specification (see similar, e.g., Officer 
(2003)). The inferences, including the relation of controls on acquirer returns, remain un-
changed. 
 
2.4.3 Long-Term Acquirer’s Firm Value Change 
 I so far conclude, that if underperforming acquirer CEOs implement high bidder termi-
nation fees in merger agreements, some of their shareholders might interpret this as an en-
trenchment-increasing and thus value-decreasing investment, and consequently sell their 
shares, i.e., react negatively on offer announcement. Table 2 and Table 3 show that this is 
indeed the case, at least if I focus on short-term acquirer’s firm value change. Table 4 now 
extends the main analysis to a longer time horizon. Here, I regress acquiring firms’ buy-and-
hold abnormal returns over one, two, and three years after offer announcement on the interac-
tion term and all other control variables. Given that the final outcome of the deal (i.e., if the 
deal is successfully closed or withdrawn) might affect these returns, I additionally include Deal 
Completion , a dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal is closed successfully, and 0 if with-
drawn, in all regressions in Table 4. I further control for acquiring firm CEO’s turnover in the 
respective period captured by buy-and-hold abnormal returns. The coefficient on Acq Under-
performance × BTF Size  is negative in all specifications and across all time periods, and 
statistically significant in specification (1) and all regressions for two-year buy-and-hold abnor-
mal returns,  Acq BHAR [−1;+500] . I  regard the results in regressions (4)–(6), i.e., the results on  




Relation of Bidder Termination Fees implemented by Underperforming Acquirers on Acquirer Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns − Long-Term Value Effects 
Table 4 depicts results of linear fixed effects regressions of acquirer buy-and-hold abnormal returns (Acq BHAR ) on Acq Underperformance , a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the acquirer performed negatively in the year preceding the offer announcement (0 otherwise), BTF Size , the size of the bidder termination fee as a fraction 
of acquiring firm’s market capitalization 22 trading days prior to offer announcement, and the variable of interest, the interaction term Acq Underperformance × BTF 
Size  as defined in Section 2.3. The set of control variables (Controls ) include Acquirer CEO Characteristics , Acquiring Firm Characteristics , Deal Characteristics , and 
a control variable for share price run-up (Acq Run-up CAR [−22;−2] ). I furthermore add dummy variables for Deal Completion  and Acq CEO Turnover  for the respective 
time horizon as captured by Acq BHAR . Regression (1) shows the effect of Acq Underperformance × BTF Size  on one-year acquirer buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(Acq BHAR [−1;+250] ). I include the acquiring firm’s entrenchment index, Acq E-Index , in regression (2) and add back Target Industry Fixed Effects  in regression (3). 
I repeat regressions (1)–(3) for different time horizons, namely two-year acquirer buy-and-hold abnormal returns (Acq BHAR [−1;+500] ) in regressions (4)–(6) as well as 
three-year acquirer buy-and-hold abnormal returns (Acq BHAR [−1;+750] ) in regressions (7)–(9). All regressions include Acquirer Industry × Year Fixed Effects , Target 
Industry Fixed Effects  (except regressions (2), (5), and (8)) as well as an intercept but are unreported. All standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroske-
dasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster correlation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  Acq BHAR 
 Event Window  [−1;+250]  [−1;+500]  [−1;+750] 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
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Controls  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
              
Acq Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Tgt Industry FE  Yes No Yes  Yes No Yes  Yes No Yes 
              
Observations  852 772 772  852 772 772  852 772 772 
Adjusted R2  0.038 0.048 0.053  0.026 0.032 0.033  0.066 0.050 0.055 
(Table 4 continued) 
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two-year BHARs, as being more convincing since some deals in my sample take more than one 
year until resolution and no deal in my sample takes more than 1.5 years to resolution. These 
results strengthen the reasoning that deals with high bidder termination fees implemented by 
entrenchment-seeking acquirer CEOs are value destroying, not only in the short-run, but also 
in the long-run. 
 
2.4.4 Level of Entrenchment post Announcement 
 As announcement returns and buy-and-hold abnormal returns are evaluations of market 
participants about the value creation of deals, I next strengthen the evidence that deals an-
nounced by entrenchment-seeking managers, secured by high bidder termination fees, are really 
objectively increasing the level of entrenchment. I thus track the level of entrenchment, namely 
the Bebchuk et al. (2009) E-Index of the acquiring firm, Acq E-Index , from shortly before offer 
announcement until three years after the deal was announced. Bebchuk et al. (2009) find in 
their study that increases in the entrenchment index level are monotonically associated with 
economically significant reductions in firm valuations as well as large negative abnormal returns 
during the 1990–2003 period. The E-index consists of six out of 24 governance provisions put 
forward by Gompers et al. (2003), namely staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amend-
ments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter 
amendments24. All these six provisions have been found to provide incumbent managers, at 
least nominally, with protection from removal or the consequences of removal. Further, these 
index constituents are not captured by any other control variable included in my regression. If 
my proposed strategy with high bidder termination fees is really motivated by increasing the 
level of entrenchment, I should, all else equal, detect significantly larger positive changes of the 
E-Index over the years following the deal. Given that it takes time to implement respective 
constituents of the E-Index, I focus on the three-year change in acquiring firms’ E-Index, ∆ Acq 
 
24 Here, four out of these six provisions involve constitutional limitations on shareholders’ voting power: 
staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, and supermajority requirements for mergers 
and charter amendments. The other two provisions, poison pills and golden parachutes, can be regarded 
as “takeover readiness” provisions that boards sometimes put in place. In their 2009 study, Bebchuk et 
al. further find that the other 18 provisions, that were not included in their entrenchment index, are 
uncorrelated with either reduced firm valuation (Tobin’s Q) or negative abnormal returns. 
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E-Index 3YR , as the dependent variable in Table 5. Specifically, ∆ Acq E-Index 3YR  is defined 
as the difference between Acq E-Index OA + 3YR  (obtained at the end of the fiscal year three 
years after the last fiscal year end prior to announcement of the deal) and Acq E-Index OA 
(obtained at the last fiscal year end prior to offer announcement). I add the level, Acq E-Index 
OA , to every regression in Table 5.  
 Specification (1) in Table 5 regresses ∆ Acq E-Index 3YR  on the variable of interest, the 
interaction term Acq Underperformance × BTF Size , and all other controls from the baseline 
regression as depicted in Table 2. I obtain a statistically significant and positive coefficient on 
the interaction term: underperforming acquirers that announce deals with a high bidder termi-
nation fee seem to increase their level of entrenchment in the years following the deal25. I add 
Acq CEO Turnover 3YR as a control to rule out any impact turnover has on implementing 
governance provisions. 
This holds if I include Deal Completion as an additional control variable for successfully 
closing the deal, but also if I analyze the sample of closed deals only (regression (3)). Regres-
sions (2) and (4) interact my variable of interest with Acq Neg OA Reaction , a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if Acq CARs [−3;+3]  takes on negative values, and 0 otherwise. This is to ensure 
that I additionally observe the relation of transactions that are overall evaluated as value-
destroying by acquirer shareholders at offer announcement and transactions that are probably 
more motivated by increasing the level of entrenchment. 
As predicted by hypothesis 2, the coefficient is positive and highly statistically signifi-
cant. A one-standard deviation increase in this triple interaction term corresponds to an in-
crease of the E-Index of 0.142 index steps above and beyond their single components’ estimates. 
As one would expect, the coefficient on Acq E-Index  itself is negative and highly statistically 
significantly related to ∆ Acq E-Index 3YR : firms having a high E-Index already tend to have 
little or even no increases of the entrenchment index in the near future. Deals where the atti-
tude is hostile also seem to increase entrenchment of the acquirer, as might be the case in 
tender offers26. 
 
25 In Table A3 in the Appendix (specification (3)), I show that already entrenched managers less likely 
use bidder termination fees as a device to entrench themselves. 
26 In untabulated regressions, I find that my results hold even if I control for serial acquirers. 
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Table 5 
Relation of Bidder Termination Fees implemented by Underperforming Acquirers on               
the Level of Entrenchment Post Announcement 
This table presents the results of linear fixed effects regressions of the change in acquiring firm’s en-
trenchment index three years after offer announcement, ∆ Acq E-Index 3YR , on Acq Underperformance , 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquirer performed negatively in the year preceding the offer 
announcement (0 otherwise), BTF Size , the size of the bidder termination fee as a fraction of the ac-
quiring firm’s market capitalization 22 trading days prior to offer announcement, and the variable of 
interest, the interaction term Acq Underperformance × BTF Size  as defined in Section 2.3. The set of 
control variables (Controls ) include Acquirer CEO, Firm, and Deal Characteristics , and a control vari-
able for share price run-up. I furthermore add dummy variables for Deal Completion  and Acq CEO 
Turnover 3YR for the respective three-year time horizon. Regression (1) shows the effect of Acq Under-
performance × BTF Size  on the three-year change in acquiring firm’s entrenchment index, ∆ Acq E-
Index 3YR , which is the difference of Acq E-Index  at the fiscal year end three years after the last fiscal 
year end prior to announcement of the deal and Acq E-Index  at the last fiscal year end prior to offer 
announcement. Regression (2) additionally interacts Acq Underperformance × BTF Size  with Acq Neg 
OA Reaction , a dummy variable that equals 1 if Acq CAR [−3;+3]  takes on negative values, and 0 other-
wise. I repeat the regressions for the subsample of completed deals ((3) and (4)). All regressions include 
Acquirer Industry × Year Fixed Effects , Target Industry Fixed Effects  as well as an intercept but are 
unreported. All standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and 
within-cluster correlation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  ∆ Acq E-Index 3YR 
 Sample  All Deals  Completed Deals Only 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
        























































































   
        
Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
        
Acq Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Tgt Industry FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
        
Observations  720 720  686 686 
Adjusted R2  0.208 0.207  0.209 0.208 
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2.4.5 Subsample Tests 
Sources of CEO Motivation 
 CEOs whose wealth is more sensitive to shareholder value are more aligned with the 
interests of shareholders in a way that they are less motivated to entrench themselves and 
agency problems tend to be less severe (e.g., Murphy (1999)). I expect that CEOs can anticipate 
shareholders’ reaction to a variety of CEO’s actions, and especially negative reactions in the 
case of entrenchment activities that have been evaluated as value-destroying investments by 
the market. I thus hypothesize that CEOs more likely conduct entrenchment strategies in the 
form of value-destroying acquisitions, if the CEO’s wealth is less sensitive to acquiring firm’s 
stock price changes: 
Hypothesis 1a: The relation of high bidder termination fees, implemented by underper-
 forming acquirers, with acquiring firms’ cumulative abnormal announce-
 ment returns is more pronounced, 
if acquirer CEOs’ wealth is less sensitive to firms’ stock price changes. 
 I follow Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) and Kale et al. (2009) and split the sample by 
the median value of Acq CEO Alignment , the sum of stock and option sensitivities to a USD 
100 change in shareholder wealth. Consistent with their studies, I define Acq CEO Alignment  
in the following way: 
Acq CEO Alignment = 
Shares held by the CEO + (Delta of Options × Options held by the CEO )
Total Number of Common Shares Outstanding  × 100 
 I use the percentage of stock ownership of the CEO at the last fiscal year end prior to 
offer announcement to obtain the stock-based sensitivity of the CEO’s equity portfolio: this is 
the reported CEO’s shares held as disclosed in the proxy statement on that end of the fiscal 
year, divided by the total number of common shares outstanding of the acquiring firm, obtained 
from Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ database 22 trading days prior to offer announcement. For 
option holdings, I use the total accumulated number of options held by the CEO at the same 
fiscal year end, which by definition also represents option grants made in prior years. To 
calculate the option delta, I extend Murphy (1999) by determining an average weighted exercise  
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Table 6 
Sources of CEO Motivation 
Table 6 presents the results of linear fixed effects regressions of seven-trading-day acquirer cumulative abnormal announcement returns (Acq CAR [−3;+3] ) on Acq 
Underperformance , a dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquirer performed negatively in the year preceding the offer announcement (0 otherwise), BTF Size , the 
size of the bidder termination fee as a fraction of acquiring firm’s market capitalization 22 trading days prior to offer announcement, and the variable of interest, the 
interaction term Acq Underperformance × BTF Size  as defined in Section 2.3. The set of control variables (Controls ) include Acquirer CEO and Firm Characteristics 
, Deal Characteristics , and a control variable for share price run-up (Acq Run-up CAR [−22;−4] ). All regressions repeat specification (6) from Table 2, except that the 
sample is split in low vs. high values of acquiring firm CEO’s equity alignment incentives as separated by the sample median value of Acq CEO Alignment  (regressions 
(1) and (2)), acquiring firm CEO’s age (Acq CEO Age ) being less than 60 years vs. more or equal than 60 years (acquiring firm’s CEO close to retirement age) 
(regressions (3) and (4)), and acquiring firm’s board status as either a traditionally elected board vs. staggered board (regressions (5) and (6)). All regressions include 
Acquirer Industry × Year Fixed Effects , Target Industry Fixed Effects  as well as an intercept but are unreported. All standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster correlation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  Acq CAR [−3;+3] 
   Acq CEO Alignment  Acq CEO Age  Acq Staggered Board 
   Low High  < 60 years ≥ 60 years  No Yes 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
           













































           
Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
           
Acq Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Tgt Industry FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
           
Observations  386 386  550 222  325 285 
Adjusted R2  0.144 0.141  0.120 0.092  0.146 0.101 
Chapter 2                                         Entrenchment through M&A Contractual Provisions 
94 
price as well as an average weighted expiration date for all previously granted options. I obtain 
the following variables 22 trading days prior to offer announcement27: the risk-free rate (using 
data from the five-year treasury bill constant-maturity series available from the Federal Re-
serve Bank’s official website28), the dividend yield of the acquiring firm, its five-year stock 
return volatility29, the last sale price of acquiring firm’s stock, and the total number of common 
shares outstanding from Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ database. Using the above information, 
I compute the delta of prior option grants using the modified Black-Scholes formula. 
 Table 6 depicts the results of linear fixed effects regressions of Acq CAR [−3;+3]  on my 
variable of interest, the interaction term Acq Underperformance × BTF Size , and all other 
controls from regression (6) in Table 2. As stated above, I split the sample by the median value 
of Acq CEO Alignment in low vs. high values. Consistent with hypothesis 1a, I find the relation 
with acquirer cumulative abnormal announcement returns to be more pronounced if Acq CEO 
Alignment  is low (regression (1)). This suggests that CEOs are more prone to conduct my 
proposed entrenchment strategy if their equity alignment incentives are low and shareholders 
then react more likely negative on average. 
 Another source of motivation for CEOs seeking entrenchment might be how many re-
maining years they can stay in their position. One very natural indicator of their residual 
length of tenure might be how close they are to their potential retirement. Thus, CEOs might 
be more in need of entrenching themselves and appreciate all advantages of entrenchment, such 
as personal benefits of control, higher discretion over the strategy of the firm, job security and 
freedom of action (Shleifer and Vishny (1989)), if CEOs are not close to retirement age: 
Hypothesis 1b: The relation of high bidder termination fees, implemented by underper-
 forming acquirers, with acquiring firms’ cumulative abnormal announce-
 ment returns is more pronounced, 
if the acquirer CEO is not close to retirement age. 
 
27 This is to make sure that I use the most recent data that by definition have a significant effect on the 
option delta and thereby CEO alignment incentives. 
28 https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/ (permanent link). 
29 Calculated as the standard deviation of weekly log-normal price returns of acquiring firm’s stock over 
the five years preceding the 22nd trading day prior to offer announcement, annualized with a factor of 
52 for the 52 trading weeks in a year. 
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 Consistent with the prediction of hypothesis 1b, I find the relation with Acq CAR [−3;+3] 
to be more pronounced (regression (3)) if the CEO is less than 60 years old, i.e., if she is not 
close to retirement age, which is usually 65 years (see Huson et al. (2001), who also use a 
dummy if the CEO is less than 60 years old).  
 A further motive for CEOs undertaking the proposed entrenchment-increasing strategy 
might be, that prior to implementing such a strategy they were not sufficiently entrenched. 
Staggered boards (also known as classified boards) can, for instance, protect boards and top 
management boards from prompt removal through takeovers or proxy contests (Bebchuk and 
Cohen (2005)). In the case of firms with staggered boards, CEOs might be already sufficiently 
entrenched in a way that they are not motivated to undertake entrenchment-enhancing take-
overs. Hence, I expect that the relation is more pronounced if the firm does not have a staggered 
board: 
Hypothesis 1c: The relation of high bidder termination fees, implemented by underper-
 forming acquirers, with acquiring firms’ cumulative abnormal announce-
 ment returns is more pronounced, 
if the acquiring firm has not implemented a staggered board. 
 Consistent with this prediction, I only find in regression (5) a negative and statistically 
highly significant coefficient on Acq Underperformance × BTF Size . 
Enabling Channels of the Implementation of High Bidder Termination Fees: 
VP Alignment and Busy Boards 
 As shown above, CEOs seem to be motivated to implement high bidder termination 
fees to undertake presumably entrenchment-enhancing takeovers, if they are not sufficiently 
protected from removal due to bad performance. Since entrenchment is in those cases not yet 
established before the takeover attempt and boards might even look at and approve takeover 
contracts in advance of their signing, I now investigate how CEOs might nevertheless be able 
to implement high bidder termination fees in takeover contracts. To enable this, I put forward 
two possible channels: low VP Alignment and busy boards. 
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 Concerning VP Alignment, I assume that it is easier for the CEO to implement such 
entrenchment-increasing strategy by high bidder termination fees, if the management board, 
comprised of all VPs but excluding the CEO, has low equity alignment incentives. The reason 
for this is that VPs with low equity alignment might only have low incentives to evaluate all 
relevant clauses in the merger agreement, as is the case with bidder termination fee provisions, 
and to intervene if the level of such provisions is solely high because of the CEO’s intention to 
make deal termination costly. Even if they are not involved in writing the contract, they can 
intervene by informing external and thus presumably worse-informed directors, which are likely 
in the majority (e.g., Acharya, Myers, and Rajan (2011) and Imad’Eddine, Miihkinen, and 
Strych (2019)) and who are able to disapprove such provisions but do not know about their 
adverse use by the CEO. In addition, if their equity incentives are low and VPs have been 
appointed by their CEO in the past and now are willing to show loyalty to them (Landier, 
Sauvagnat, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012)), they might also be more aligned with their CEO rather 
than their firms’ shareholders, exacerbating this reluctance to intervene. I conclude this rea-
soning in the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1d: The relation of high bidder termination fees, implemented by underper-
 forming acquirers, with acquiring firms’ cumulative abnormal announce-
 ment returns is more pronounced, 
if the acquiring firms’ VPs have low equity-based alignment incentives. 
 In Table 7, I split the sample by the sample median value of Acq VP Alignment , which 
is defined as the median value of the alignment variable of all vice presidents in the respective 
last firm-fiscal-year preceding the offer announcement. I calculate the alignment variable for 
each VP as I did for the CEO. As shown in regressions (1) and (2) in Table 7, I find support 
for hypothesis 1d: the coefficient on Acq Underperformance × BTF Size  in the regression for 
low values of Acq VP Alignment is larger and of higher significance compared to the regression 
with high values of Acq VP Alignment . 
 Concerning busy boards, I expect that independent directors, that are marked as busy 
if they have more than one outside directorship (Masulis and Zhang (2019)), might be too 
time-constrained to thoroughly evaluate the entire M&A contract. Hence, their decision on 
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approval of the takeover contract might rely to a great extent on the information their CEOs 
present to them. In this case, it is easy for CEOs to implement high bidder termination fees to 
support entrenchment-enhancing takeovers: 
Hypothesis 1e: The relation of high bidder termination fees, implemented by underper-
forming acquirers, with acquiring firms’ cumulative abnormal announce-
ment returns is more pronounced, 
if the acquiring firms’ board busyness is high. 
Table 7 
Enabling Channels of the Implementation of High Bidder Termination Fees 
Table 7 presents the results of linear fixed effects regressions of seven-trading-day acquirer cumulative 
abnormal announcement returns (Acq CAR [−3;+3] ) on Acq Underperformance , a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the acquirer performed negatively in the year preceding the offer announcement (0 otherwise), 
BTF Size , the size of the bidder termination fee as a fraction of acquiring firm’s market capitalization 
22 trading days prior to offer announcement, and the variable of interest, the interaction term Acq 
Underperformance × BTF Size  as defined in Section 2.3. The set of control variables (Controls ) include 
Acquirer CEO and Firm Characteristics , Deal Characteristics , and a control variable for share price 
run-up (Acq Run-up CAR [−22;−4] ). All regressions repeat specification (6) from Table 2, except that the 
sample is split in low vs. high values of acquiring firm VP’s equity alignment incentives as separated by 
the sample median value of Acq VP Alignment  (regressions (1) and (2)), and acquiring firm’s Board 
Busyness  (regressions (3) and (4)). All regressions include Acquirer Industry × Year Fixed Effects , 
Target Industry Fixed Effects  as well as an intercept but are unreported. All standard errors (in paren-
theses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster correlation. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  Acq CAR [−3;+3] 
   Acq VP Alignment  Acq Board Busyness 
   Low High  Low High 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
        






























        
Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
        
Acq Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Tgt Industry FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
        
Observations  386 386  377 395 
Adjusted R2  0.119 0.101  0.097 0.157 
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In Table 7, columns (3) and (4), I split the sample by the sample median of the per-
centage share of independent directors that are busy, i.e., have more than one outside direc-
torships that I denote as Acq Board Busyness . As shown in regressions (3) and (4), I find 
support for hypothesis 1e: the coefficient on Acq Underperformance × BTF Size  in the regres-
sion for high values of Acq Board Busyness  is statistically highly significant compared to the 
statistically insignificant coefficient on the interaction term in the case of low values of Acq 
Board Busyness . This finding is consistent with broad empirical evidence in the literature that 
states that busyness of the board of directors is negatively related to firm performance (e.g., 
Masulis and Zhang (2019), Falato, Kadyrzhanova, and Lel (2014), and Hauser (2018)). 
Diversifying Takeovers 
 As previous literature (e.g., Jensen (1986, 1993)) points out, managers might pursue 
negative NPV projects because they derive private benefits of control from controlling more 
and diverse assets (Aggarwal and Samwick (2006), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990)). These 
wasteful empire-building investments might increase the level of entrenchment and are usually 
assessed as value-destroying by the market. Shleifer and Vishny (1989) motivate their entrench-
ment model with a CEO making a manager-specific investment by investing excessive resources 
in the directions suggested by the CEO’s talents and experience. 
My entrenchment strategy might be more likely pursued by a CEO undertaking a di-
versifying acquisition, i.e., an acquisition that more likely takes on the form of empire-building 
to strengthen her level of entrenchment: 
Hypothesis 1f:  The relation of high bidder termination fees, implemented by underper-
 forming acquirers, with acquiring firms’ cumulative abnormal announce-
 ment returns is more pronounced, 
if the deal is characterized as a diversifying takeover. 
 I split the sample by the level of diversifying investments according to the dummy 
variable Horizontal Takeover  that equals 1, if both the acquiring and the target firm are 
primarily assigned to the same industry as defined by all four SIC digits, and 0 otherwise.  
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As Table 8 shows, the coefficient is only negative and statistically significant in regres-
sion (1), i.e., if the takeover is classified as a diversifying acquisition. Acquiring firms’ share-
holders seem to punish management if the latter carries out my proposed entrenchment strat-
egy and the takeover more likely leads to empire-building, by putting downward pressure on 
acquiring firms’ stock. I therefore find that hypothesis 1f is supported. 
 
Table 8 
Diversification Effect of the Takeover 
Table 8 presents the results of linear fixed effects regressions of seven-trading-day acquirer cumulative 
abnormal announcement returns (Acq CAR [−3;+3] ) on Acq Underperformance , a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the acquirer performed negatively in the year preceding the offer announcement (0 otherwise), 
BTF Size , the size of the bidder termination fee as a fraction of acquiring firm’s market capitalization 
22 trading days prior to offer announcement, and the variable of interest, the interaction term Acq 
Underperformance × BTF Size  as defined in Section 2.3. The set of control variables (Controls ) include 
Acquirer CEO and Firm Characteristics , Deal Characteristics , and a control variable for share price 
run-up (Acq Run-up CAR [−22;−4] ). All regressions repeat specification (6) from Table 2, except that the 
sample is split in diversifying (regression (1)) vs. horizontal takeovers (regression (2)), whereas a takeover 
is classified as horizontal if both the acquiring and target firm share the same primary SIC 4-digit 
industry, and classified as diversifying if not. All regressions include Acquirer Industry × Year Fixed 
Effects , Target Industry Fixed Effects  as well as an intercept but are unreported. All standard errors 
(in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster correlation. *, **, 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  Acq CAR [−3;+3] 
 Takeover Type  Diversifying  Horizontal 
 Independent Variables  (1)  (2) 
      















      
Controls  Yes  Yes 
      
Acq Industry × Year FE  Yes  Yes 
Tgt Industry FE  Yes  No 
      
Observations  526  246 
Adjusted R2  0.078  0.196 
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2.5 Discussion and Robustness Tests 
 I conduct some robustness tests to strengthen my inferences. First, I present extended 
models that additionally capture acquiring firm’s board of directors characteristics, the free-
cash-flow problem, and additional deal and target characteristics that include measures for 
relative bargaining power and overpayment. Second, I dissect the size of the bidder termination 
fee into different quantiles to rule out that potential nonlinearities in BTF Size  affect the 
results. Third, I allow for an additional driver of BTF Size , namely takeovers that might require 
high bidder termination fees because the proposed takeover is horizontal, i.e., acquirer and 
target share the same industry, and the takeover thus faces a higher probability of being chal-
lenged by antitrust authorities. 
Additional Control Variables 
 As put forward in Section 2.2, I assume that boards are too busy to evaluate every 
contractual provision in merger agreements. As Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) 
have identified, board size is an important determinant of corporate governance effectiveness 
when it comes to monitoring the CEO. Weisbach (1988) furthermore shows that CEOs face 
more intense monitoring when the board of directors is controlled by more independent direc-
tors that have no significant connection with the firm. Regression (1) in Table 9 shows that 
my results hold if I include the size of the board of directors and the percentage of outside 
directors on the board to the baseline specification. 
 Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis predicts that firms with excess cash flows but 
few value-increasing investment opportunities are more likely to conduct value-destroying ac-
quisitions. I control for acquiring firm’s free cash flow problem by including the latest available 
value of free cash flow (FCF) scaled by total assets 22 trading days prior to offer announcement. 
More specifically, I calculate acquiring firm’s FCF to total assets in the following way (Masulis 
et al. (2007)): operating income before depreciation − interest expenses − income taxes − 
capital expenditures, all scaled by book value of total assets. Since I do not have valid data for 
all acquirers, my sample size is reduced, but the results remain unchanged (regression (2) in 
Table 9). 
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Table 9 
Robustness − Additional Control Variables:                                                        
Acquiring Firm’s Board Characteristics, Free Cash Flow, Deal and Target Firm Characteristics 
This table presents the results of linear fixed effects regressions of seven-trading-day symmetric-window 
acquirer cumulative abnormal announcement returns (Acq CAR [−3;+3] ) on Acq Underperformance , BTF 
Size , and the variable of interest, the interaction term Acq Underperformance × BTF Size  as defined 
in Section 2.3. The set of control variables (Controls ) include Acquirer CEO and Firm Characteristics , 
Deal Characteristics , and a control variable for share price run-up (Acq Run-up CAR [−22;−4] ). All regres-
sions repeat specification (6) from Table 2, except that the model is extended by additional control 
variables that characterize the acquiring firm’s board of directors (Acq Board of Directors Size  and Acq 
Percentage of Independent Directors , regression (1)), acquiring firm’s free cash flow scaled by total assets 
22 trading days prior to offer announcement (Acq Free Cash Flow to Total Assets [OA−22] , regression (2)), 
and deal and target firm characteristics (regression (3)). All regressions include Acquirer Industry × 
Year Fixed Effects , Target Industry Fixed Effects  as well as an intercept but are unreported. All stand-
ard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster corre-
lation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  Acq CAR [−3;+3] 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3) 
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Additional Deal Characteristics     










Additional Target Firm Characteristics     















      
Controls  Yes Yes Yes 
     
Acq Industry × Year and Tgt Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations  732 314 296 
Adjusted R2  0.085 0.122 0.191 
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The last vector of controls I add to the baseline model are additional deal and target 
characteristics. To rule out that the size of the bidder termination fee is driven by the relative 
bargaining power between acquirer and target, I include the relative size of all acquirer-target 
firm-pairs that have valid data on their market capitalization. I define relative size as the ratio 
of acquiring firm’s market capitalization to target firm’s market capitalization, both obtained 
22 trading days prior to offer announcement. All else equal, if the target is increasing in its size 
relative to the acquirer, I assume that it gains bargaining power which can be used to force the 
acquirer to provide a bidder termination fee. In this case, failure of the acquirer to obtain 
financing may also increase, all else equal. Despite Chen et al. (2020) find that relative size is 
on average higher in deals with bidder termination provisions, they find that relative size does 
not have a statistically significant association with the inclusion of bidder termination fee pro-
visions. I additionally include measures for the price paid to target shareholders, Tgt Pre-
mium 1 Month , as well as the target’s prior performance, market-to-book ratio, and stock return 
volatility in regression (3) in Table 9. 
 I find that the relation with acquirer announcement returns is not driven by bidder 
termination fees implemented as a symmetrical response to the implementation of equal-sized 
target termination fees during merger negotiations, which would be more likely the case in 
merger-of-equals (Officer (2003)). The coefficient on Acq Underperformance × BTF Size re-
mains negative and statistically significant, yet with a slightly reduced t-statistic of 1.854. It 
is worth noticing that the negative coefficient on Acq E-Index  also survives this battery of 
controls (Masulis et al. (2007))30. 
Potential Nonlinearities in BTF Size − Short-Term Acquirer’s Firm Value Change 
 It could be the case that certain-sized bidder termination fees serve as meaningful con-
tractual devices that incentivize the target to reveal private information to the acquirer. In 
this case, I expect that acquirer shareholders should not punish management by selling their 
shares on announcement. On the other side, there might be dimensions of fees that are too 
high, i.e., fees that reflect agency problems between managers and outside investors. These 
 
30 Even in this regression, variance inflation factors (vifs) are all below three. 
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excessively high fees might be used as a means to increase entrenchment through M&A as 
proposed in this chapter. 
Table 10 
Robustness − Decomposing BTF Size into Quantiles:                                                  
Short-Term Value Effects 
This table depicts results of linear fixed effects regressions of different symmetric-window acquirer cu-
mulative abnormal announcement returns (Acq CARs ) on Acq Underperformance , a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the acquirer performed negatively in the year preceding the offer announcement (0 
otherwise), terciles and the median of BTF Size , the size of the bidder termination fee as a fraction of 
acquiring firm’s market capitalization 22 trading days prior to offer announcement, and the variables of 
interest, the interaction terms Acq Underperformance × BTF Size (terciles or median ) as defined in 
Section 2.3. The set of control variables (Controls ) include Acquirer CEO Characteristics , Acquiring 
Firm Characteristics , Deal Characteristics , and a control variable for share price run-up (Acq Run-up 
CAR ). Regression (1) shows the relation between Acq Underperformance  interacted with BTF Size  
terciles and Acq CAR [−5;+5] , whereas High BTF Size  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if BTF Size  is 
in the highest tercile, and 0 otherwise. Medium BTF Size  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if BTF Size  
is in the medium tercile, and 0 otherwise. Low BTF Size  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if BTF Size  
is in the lowest tercile, and 0 otherwise. Regression (2) depicts the relation between Acq Underperfor-
mance × Above Median BTF Size  and Acq CAR [−5;+5] , whereas Above Median BTF Size  is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if BTF Size is above the sample median, 0 otherwise, and Below Median BTF 
Size  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if BTF Size  is below the sample median, and 0 otherwise. The 
benchmark case in all regressions is No BTF, i.e., if there is no BTF included in the merger agreement. 
Regressions (3)–(6) repeat regressions (1) and (2) for different event windows (Acq CAR [−3;+3]   and Acq 
CAR [−1;+1] , respectively). All regressions include Acquirer Industry × Year Fixed Effects , Target Indus-
try Fixed Effects  as well as an intercept but are unreported. All standard errors (in parentheses) are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster correlation. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Reference Group  No BTF 
 Dependent Variable  Acq CAR 
 Event Window  [−5;+5]  [−3;+3]  [−1;+1] 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
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Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
           
Acq Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Tgt Industry FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
           
Observations  772 772  772 772  772 772 
Adjusted R2  0.063 0.065  0.095 0.099  0.069 0.077 
(Table 10 continued) 
To reveal what magnitudes of bidder termination fees implemented by underperforming 
acquirers are regarded as the primary cause of negative announcement returns, I divide the 
continuous variable BTF Size  into different quantiles and interact these quantiles with Acq 
Underperformance . First, I split BTF Size  into terciles, namely High BTF Size (BTF Size  
larger than 2.50 percent of acquiring firm’s market capitalization 22 trading days prior to offer 
announcement), Medium BTF Size (BTF Size between 0.75 and 2.50 percent of the respective 
market capitalization), and Low BTF Size (BTF Size smaller than 0.75 percent of the respec-
tive market capitalization). Additionally, I define Above Median BTF Size  as a dummy vari-
able that equals 1 if BTF Size  is larger than 1.50 percent of the market capitalization, 0 
otherwise, and Below Median BTF Size  as a dummy variable that equals 1 if BTF Size  is 
between 0.00 and 1.50 percent of the market capitalization, 0 otherwise. In both cases, the 
reference group against which I benchmark the results is the group No BTF , i.e., if there was 
no bidder termination fee negotiated between the merging parties. Table 10 shows the results 
for different event windows. 
 Most of the interaction terms in Table 10 are negatively related to acquirer cumulative 
abnormal announcement returns, but the significant effect seems to be driven by excessively 
high bidder termination fees. Independent of the event window, only the highest quantiles are 
highly significantly negatively related to announcement returns. It is interesting to mention 
that, if I compare the coefficients across the event windows, I find that the relation is slightly 
weaker in Acq CAR [−1;+1]  regressions (specifications (5) and (6), respectively), but still signif-
icant at the 5% level and strongly negative. This might be the effect of some bidder termination 
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fees being disclosed and filed with the SEC two or three days after announcement, as detected 
by Coates, Palia, and Wu (2018). In this case, investors should not be able to incorporate these 
information into prices that are reflected in Acq CAR [−1;+1] . 
Potential Nonlinearities in BTF Size − Level of Entrenchment post Announcement 
 To further underpin the main story of entrenchment-seeking managers implementing 
high bidder termination fees, I additionally regress ∆ Acq E-Index 3YR   , a measure capturing 
changes in the entrenchment index post announcement, on respective quantiles of BTF Size . 
This is to investigate if excessively high bidder termination fees are detrimental to shareholder 
value on announcement, because they might be associated with potential increases in entrench-
ment after the deal is consummated. 
Table 11 
Robustness − Decomposing BTF Size into Quantiles:                                                  
Effect on the Level of Entrenchment Post Announcement 
Table 11 shows the results of linear fixed effects regressions of the change in acquiring firm’s entrench-
ment index three years after offer announcement, ∆ Acq E-Index 3YR , on Acq Underperformance , a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquirer performed negatively in the year preceding the offer an-
nouncement (0 otherwise), terciles and the median of BTF Size , the size of the bidder termination fee 
as a fraction of acquiring firm’s market capitalization 22 trading days prior to offer announcement, and 
the variables of interest, the interaction terms Acq Underperformance × BTF Size  (terciles or median ) 
as defined in Section 2.3. The set of control variables (Controls ) include Acquirer CEO Characteristics , 
Acquiring Firm Characteristics , Deal Characteristics , and a control variable for share price run-up (Acq 
Run-up CAR [−22;−4] ). I furthermore add dummy variables for Deal Completion  and Acq CEO Turno-
ver 3YR   for the respective three-year time horizon. Regression (1) shows the effect of Acq Underperfor-
mance interacted with BTF Size terciles on the three-year change in acquiring firm’s entrenchment 
index, ∆ Acq E-Index 3YR  , which is the difference of Acq E-Index  at the fiscal year end three years after 
the last fiscal year end prior to announcement of the deal and Acq E-Index  at the last fiscal year end 
prior to offer announcement. High BTF Size  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if BTF Size  is in the 
highest tercile, and 0 otherwise. Medium BTF Size  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if BTF Size  is in 
the medium tercile, and 0 otherwise. Low BTF Size  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if BTF Size  is 
in the lowest tercile, and 0 otherwise. Regression (2) shows the effect of Acq Underperformance inter-
acted with BTF Size median on the three-year change in acquiring firm’s entrenchment index, ∆ Acq E-
Index 3YR . Above Median BTF Size  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if BTF Size is above the sample 
median, 0 otherwise, and Below Median BTF Size  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if BTF Size  is 
below the sample median, and 0 otherwise. The benchmark case in all regressions is No BTF, i.e., if 
there is no BTF included in the merger agreement. I repeat regressions (1) and (2) for the subsample of 
completed deals in regressions (3) and (4), respectively. All regressions include Acquirer Industry × Year 
Fixed Effects , Target Industry Fixed Effects  as well as an intercept but are unreported. All standard 
errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster correlation. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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 Reference Group  No BTF 
 Dependent Variable  ∆ Acq E-Index 3YR 
 Sample  All Deals  Completed Deals Only 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
        
















































































































       
Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
        
Acq Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Tgt Industry FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
        
Observations  720 720  686 686 
Adjusted R2  0.206 0.205  0.207 0.206 
(Table 11 continued) 
Table 11 depicts the results from regressions applying the models in Table 5, but instead 
regress ∆ Acq E-Index 3YR on BTF Size  tercile dummies or dummies capturing values above 
and below the BTF Size  median, respectively. Consistent with the results obtained in Table 5 
and Table 11, I find that post announcement increases in acquiring firm’s entrenchment index 
are mainly driven by excessively high values of BTF Size , even after controlling for sample 
selection concerns such as Acq CEO Turnover and Deal Completion in the corresponding time 
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period after announcement. This confirms that these high fees likely serve as a medium to 
increase entrenchment levels through M&A as proposed by my strategy. 
  Taken together, I find that small- or medium-sized bidder termination fees seem to 
serve as an efficient contractual device, even if the acquirer underperformed in the year pre-
ceding the takeover, but excessively high fees are most harmful to shareholder wealth, seem to 
increase managerial entrenchment, and thus suggest agency problems. 
The Interaction of Horizontal Takeovers and BTF Size 
 It might be possible that high bidder termination fees are the outcome of negotiations 
between merging parties if both the acquirer and target operate in the same industry. In these 
cases, the probability that mergers are challenged by antitrust authorities – such as the De-
partment of Justice Antitrust Division (DoJ) or the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) – is on 
average higher compared to diversifying deals (Gao, Peng, and Strong (2017)). As prior work 
by legal scholars such as Afsharipour (2010) and Quinn (2010) points out, bidders might be 
forced to provide high bidder termination fees in negotiations of horizontal mergers to provide 
the target with a payoff should the bidder fail to obtain regulatory approval for the deal. In 
these cases, the bidder would be liable for regulatory risk that would otherwise be bourne by 
and shared among the two parties (Chen et al. (2020)). I control for this possible explanation 
of high bidder termination fees and their possible impact on announcement returns by inter-
acting the continuous variable, BTF Size , with dummy variables identifying horizontal takeo-
vers. First, I interact BTF Size with Horizontal Takeover , as defined in Section 2.3 (regressions 
(1)–(4) in Table 12). Second, I additionally allow for a more flexible definition of horizontal 
mergers by interacting BTF Size  with Horizontal Takeover SIC3 , a dummy variable that equals 
1 if both the acquiring and the target firm are primarily assigned to the same industry as 
defined by their first three SIC digits, and 0 otherwise (regressions (5)–(8) in Table 12). 
 Regression (1) shows the isolated estimates of Horizontal Takeover × BTF Size on Acq 
CAR [−3;+3] , which suggests a negative but insignificant relation. Next, I add Acq Underperfor-
mance × BTF Size  and find a strongly negative and statistically highly significant coefficient 
on this interaction term (regression (2)). I then add acquiring firm’s entrenchment index, Acq 
E-Index ,  and  all  target  characteristics  in  regressions  (3)  and  (4),  respectively,  and  find  my  




Robustness − The Effect of Horizontal Takeovers and Bidder Termination Fee Size on Acquirer Cumulative Abnormal Announcement Returns 
This table shows the results of linear fixed effects regressions of acquirer cumulative abnormal announcement returns (Acq CAR [−3;+3] ) on Acq Underperformance , a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquirer performed negatively in the year preceding the offer announcement (0 otherwise), BTF Size , the size of the bidder 
termination fee as a fraction of acquiring firm’s market capitalization 22 trading days prior to offer announcement, and the variable of interest, the interaction term 
Acq Underperformance × BTF Size  as defined in Section 2.3. The set of control variables (Controls ) include Acquirer CEO Characteristics , Acquiring Firm Charac-
teristics , Deal Characteristics , and a control variable for share price run-up (Acq Run-up CAR [−22;–4] ). Regression (1) shows the isolated effect of Acq Underperformance  
and BTF Size  on Acq CAR [−3;+3] alone but includes an interaction term, Horizontal Takeover × BTF Size . I add the interaction term Acq Underperformance × BTF 
Size  in regression (2) and further add the acquiring firm’s entrenchment index, Acq E-Index , in regression (3). Regression (4) depicts the results for the subsample of 
public targets and adds respective control variables. I repeat regressions (1)–(4) for a less strict classification of horizontal takerovers in regressions (5)–(8). All 
regressions include Acquirer Industry × Year Fixed Effects , Target Industry Fixed Effects  as well as an intercept but are unreported. All standard errors (in 
parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster correlation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  Acq CAR [−3;+3] 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
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Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Target Firm Characteristics  No No No Yes  No No No Yes 
            
Acq Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tgt Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            
Observations  852 852 772 311  852 852 772 311 
Adjusted R2  0.044 0.070 0.102 0.205  0.041 0.070 0.105 0.220 
(Table 12 continued) 
Chapter 2                                         Entrenchment through M&A Contractual Provisions 
110 
results and inferences to be unchanged. Regressions (5)–(8) in Table 12 repeat the same re-
gressions, but replace Horizontal Takeover with the above mentioned, somewhat broader meas-
ure of horizontal takeovers, Horizontal Takeover SIC3 . My results remain robust even after 
controlling for Horizontal Takeover SIC3 × BTF Size . 
 Overall, this suggests that I do not find empirical evidence that high bidder termination 
fees, as more likely negotiated in horizontal mergers, drive negative acquirer announcement 
returns. Again, confirming the results of Masulis et al. (2007), I almost always find Acq E-
Index  being negatively and significantly related to acquirer announcement returns. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 I deliver robust evidence to the idea that excessively high bidder termination fees, im-
plemented by acquirer CEOs with a high probability of being replaced, support an entrench-
ment-increasing mechanism to strengthen their job position through M&A in the sense of 
Shleifer and Vishny (1989). In this case, I find that high fees are destroying shareholder value 
on offer announcement and lead to increasing entrenchment levels post announcement of the 
transaction. 
 The negative relation with acquirer cumulative abnormal announcement returns are 
more pronounced, the less CEOs are aligned with shareholders’ interests and the more CEOs 
are in need of entrenching themselves, identified by them being close to retirement age or the 
nonexistence of a staggered board. Furthermore, I find the relation being stronger, the less 
management board members are aligned with shareholders’ interests and if the acquiring firm 
has a busy board. In addition, my proposed strategy is more likely being pursued if the takeover 
is diversifying, i.e., more likely of empire-building nature. 
 Additional robustness tests rule out competing alternative explanations, such as the use 
of high bidder termination fees in horizontal takeovers, where the probability of deal challenge 
by antitrust authorities is usually higher. I moreover find that small- to medium-sized bidder 
termination fees might serve as efficiency-enhancing contractual devices, whereas excessively 
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high fees destroy shareholder value, enable increases of entrenchment, and possibly signal 
agency problems. 
 My study furthermore offers implications for practitioners and regulating authorities. 
First, I suggest that board members should take a close look while negotiating bidder termina-
tion fee amounts and should obtain benchmark values of reasonably sized fees in comparable 
M&A deals. Second, corporate boards must be aware of potential collusion between leading 
managers of their firm and advisors which might be selected by the CEO. Corporate boards 
should thus seek CEO-independent legal and financial advisors. Third, shareholders should 
elect board members with legal deal experience that are not too busy, i.e., have not more than 
one directorship outside the firm. Lastly, my results should motivate regulating authorities to 
legally limit the maximum size of bidder termination fees (in relation to acquirer’s size) or at 
least exercise enhanced scrutiny. 
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2.8 Appendix   Appendix − Table A1 
Variable Definitions 
Table A1 presents the definitions of all variables used throughout this chapter, including the source. 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns, Anti-takeover Provision Index, and Termination Fees 
Acq CAR [−5;+5] 
Eleven-trading-day cumulative abnormal announcement return (in percentage points) of 
acquiring firm’s stock, calculated using the Carhart (1997) four-factor model to model 
normal returns. The model parameters are estimated over the period −250 to −23 trad-
ing days (prior) to offer announcement. Security prices are dividend adjusted day close 
prices, further adjusted for stock splits, cash dividends, rights offerings, and spin-offs 
(Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
Acq CAR [−3;+3] 
Defined as Acq CAR [−5;+5] , but instead measured for the seven-trading-day window 
around offer announcement. 
Acq CAR [−1;+1] 
Defined as Acq CAR [−5;+5] , but instead measured for the three-trading-day window 
around offer announcement. 
Acq BHAR [−1;+250] 
One-year buy-and-hold abnormal return (in percentage points) of acquiring firm’s stock, 
measured from one trading day before until 250 trading days after offer announcement 
using the CRSP® value-weighted market return to model normal returns (Source: S&P 
Capital IQ ). 
Acq BHAR [−1;+500] 
Defined as Acq BHAR [−1;+250] , but instead measured from one trading day before until 
500 trading days (two years) after offer announcement. 
Acq BHAR [−1;+750] 
Defined as Acq BHAR [−1;+250] , but instead measured from one trading day before until 
750 trading days (three years) after offer announcement. 
Acq E-Index 
Anti-takeover provision index (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009)) of the acquiring 
firm, based on six anti-takeover provisions (staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw 
amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mer-
gers and charter amendments) as disclosed at the last fiscal year end prior to offer an-
nouncement. Higher index levels correspond to more managerial power (entrenchment) 
(Source: S&P Capital IQ, SEC filings ). 
∆ Acq E-Index 3YR 
Three year change in Acq E-Index (Acq E-Index at the fiscal year end three years after 
the last fiscal year end prior to announcement of the deal − Acq E-Index at the last 
fiscal year end prior to offer announcement: Acq E-Index OA + 3YR  − Acq E-Index OA). 
Acq Div Adj Performance 
LTM [OA−1] 
Price performance of acquiring firm’s stock based on dividend adjusted day close prices, 
(further adjusted for stock splits, cash dividends, rights offerings, and spin-offs): relative 
difference of acquirer’s dividend adjusted day close price one trading day prior to offer 
announcement to acquirer’s dividend adjusted day close price one year prior to offer 
announcement, expressed in percentage points (Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
Acq Underperformance Dummy variable that equals 1 if Acq Div Adj Performance LTM [OA−1] is negative, and 
0 otherwise. 
BTF Size 
USD (mm) amount of the bidder termination fee divided by the market capitalization 
(also in USD mm) of the acquiring firm 22 trading days prior to offer announcement and 
expressed in percentage points (Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
TTF Size USD (mm) amount of the target termination fee divided by transaction value (TV, also 
in USD mm) and expressed in percentage points (Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
Acq Neg OA Reaction Dummy variable that equals 1 if Acq CAR [−3;+3]  takes on a negative value, and 0 oth-
erwise. 
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Panel B: Acquirer CEO Characteristics 
ln Acq CEO Total Current 
Compensation 
Natural logarithm of 1 plus the USD (000s) amount of acquiring firm CEO’s total current 
compensation (salary and bonus) as disclosed at the last fiscal year end prior to offer 
announcement (Source: SEC filings ). 
Acq CEO Tenure Number of years since the appointment of the CEO in the acquiring firm, measured from 
the day of the appointment until the day of offer announcement (Source: SEC filings ). 
Acq CEO Age Age (in years) of the CEO of the acquiring firm, as disclosed at the last fiscal year end 
prior to offer announcement (Source: SEC filings ). 
Acq CEO Delta 
Expected USD change in acquiring firm CEO’s wealth (in USD 000s) associated with a 
1% change in acquiring firm’s stock price. Calculated following Core and Guay (2002) 
(Source: S&P Capital IQ, SEC filings ). 
Acq CEO Vega 
Expected USD change in acquiring firm CEO’s wealth (in USD 000s) associated with a 
1% change in the standard deviation of acquiring firm’s returns. Calculated following 
Guay (1999) (Source: S&P Capital IQ, SEC filings ). 
Acq CEO Duality 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquiring firm’s CEO is also chairperson of the 
board of directors, and 0 otherwise, as disclosed at the last fiscal year end prior to offer 
announcement (Source: SEC filings ). 
Acq CEO Alignment 
Sum of stock and option sensitivities to a USD 100 change in shareholder wealth: Acq 
CEO Alignment = ((number of shares held by the CEO + delta of options × number of 
options held by the CEO) / total number of shares outstanding × 100). All variables 
are obtained on the last fiscal year end day prior to offer announcement. Calculated 
following Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) and Kale et al. (2009) (Source: S&P Capital IQ, 
SEC filings, Federal Reserve Bank website ). 
Acq CEO Turnover 1YR 
Dummy variable for acquiring firm’s CEO turnover, taking the value of 1 if the CEO 
one year after offer announcement is different from the CEO at offer announcement, and 
0 otherwise (Source: SEC filings ). 
Acq CEO Turnover 2YR 
Dummy variable for acquiring firm’s CEO turnover, taking the value of 1 if the CEO 
two years after offer announcement is different from the CEO at offer announcement, 
and 0 otherwise (Source: SEC filings ). 
Acq CEO Turnover 3YR 
Dummy variable for acquiring firm’s CEO turnover, taking the value of 1 if the CEO 
three years after offer announcement is different from the CEO at offer announcement, 
and 0 otherwise (Source: SEC filings ). 
Panel C: Acquiring Firm Characteristics 
Acq Executive Board Size Total number of management executives on acquiring firm’s board (Source: SEC filings ). 
Acq VP Alignment 
Median value of the alignment variable (see definition for Acq CEO Alignment , Panel 
B) for all VPs (CEO excluded) in a particular acquiring-firm-fiscal-year. Calculated fol-
lowing Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) and Kale et al. (2009). 
Acq Staggered Board 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquirer has a staggered board (i.e., if only a portion 
of the board members – usually a third – is elected each year), and 0 otherwise (Source: 
SEC filings ). 
Acq Board of Directors Size Total number of directors on acquiring firm’s board (Source: SEC filings ). 
Acq Percentage of Independent 
Directors 
Number of independent directors divided by the total number of directors on acquiring 
firm’s board, expressed in percentage terms (Source: SEC filings ). 
Acq Board Busyness Percentage share of independent directors that are busy, i.e., have more than one outside 
directorships (director has three or more directorships in total) (Source: SEC filings ). 
Acq Institutional Own Sum [OA−1] 
Sum of institutional holdings in acquiring firm’s stock, measured one trading day prior 
to offer announcement and expressed in percentage points (Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
Acq Insider Own Sum [OA−1] 
Sum of insider holdings in acquiring firm’s stock, measured one trading day prior to offer 
announcement and expressed in percentage points (Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
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Acq Market Cap [OA−22] 
Last sale price of acquiring firm’s stock (adjusted for stock splits) multiplied with the 
latest number of shares outstanding, measured 22 trading days prior to offer announce-
ment and expressed in millions of USD (Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
Acq Market-to-Book [OA−22] 
Market-to-book ratio of acquirer’s stock, calculated as Acq Market Cap [OA−22]  divided 
by the latest available value of total common equity (= common stock & additional paid 
in capital + retained earnings + treasury stock & other) 22 trading days prior to offer 
announcement (Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
ln Acq 1YR Stock Return 
Volatility [OA−1] 
Natural logarithm of 1 plus the standard deviation of weekly log-normal price returns of 
acquiring firm’s stock over the year preceding the offer announcement, annualized with 
a factor of 52 for the 52 trading weeks in a year and measured one trading day prior to 
offer announcement (Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
Acq Market Leverage [OA−22] 
Book value of total debt divided by the market value of acquiring firm’s total assets. 
Market value of total assets is calculated in the following way: Acq Total Assets  + Acq 
Market Cap [OA−22]  − Acq Total Common Equity , all measured 22 trading days prior to 
offer announcement. Total Common Equity is defined in the following way: common 
stock & additional paid in capital + retained earnings + treasury stock & other (Source: 
S&P Capital IQ ). 
Acq Dividend Payer Dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquiring firm paid positive dividends during the 
fiscal year preceding the offer announcement, and 0 otherwise (Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
Acq Free Cash Flow to 
Total Assets [OA−22] 
Acquiring firm’s operating income before depreciation − interest expenses − income 
taxes − capital expenditures, all scaled by book value of total assets. All variables are 
measured 22 trading days prior to offer announcement (Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
Acq Run-up CAR [−22;−6] 
Defined as Acq CAR (Panel A), but instead measured for the 16 trading day window 
(−22;−6) prior to offer announcement. 
Acq Run-up CAR [−22;−4] 
Defined as Acq CAR (Panel A), but instead measured for the 18 trading day window 
(−22;−4) prior to offer announcement. 
Acq Run-up CAR [−22;−2] 
Defined as Acq CAR (Panel A), but instead measured for the 20 trading day window 
(−22;−2) prior to offer announcement. 
Panel D: Deal Characteristics 
Transaction Value (TV) 
Total transaction value in millions of USD, historical nominal value. It is calculated as 
the total consideration to target shareholders + total other consideration, net assumed 
liabilities, and adjustment size, plus cash and short-term investments (Source: S&P Cap-
ital IQ ). 
Friendly Dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal attitude is friendly on the announcement day 
of the deal, and 0 otherwise (Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
Stock [% of TV] 
Percentage share of Transaction Value (TV) that is paid with acquirers’ stock (Source: 
S&P Capital IQ ). 
Horizontal Takeover 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if both the acquiring and the target firm are primarily 
assigned to the same industry as defined by all four SIC digits, and 0 otherwise (Source: 
S&P Capital IQ ). 
Horizontal Takeover SIC 3 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if both the acquiring and the target firm are primarily 
assigned to the same industry as defined by their first three SIC digits, and 0 otherwise 
(Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
Private Target 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the target firm is private, i.e., if there are no stock price 
data available one trading day prior to offer announcement, and 0 otherwise (Source: 
S&P Capital IQ ). 
ln Time-to-Resolution (Actual) 
Natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of calendar days between the date the takeover 
is announced and the date on which the takeover is either completed or withdrawn, 
divided by 365 (Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
Tgt Premium 1 Month 
Difference of the announced offer price per share and the target’s last sale share price 22 
trading days prior to offer announcement, divided by the target’s last sale share price 22 
trading days prior to offer announcement, and expressed in percentage points (Source: 
S&P Capital IQ ). 
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Relative Size Market Cap [OA−22] Acq Market Cap [OA−22]  divided by Tgt Market Cap [OA−22] . 
Deal Completion Dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal is closed successfully, and 0 if withdrawn 
(Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
Panel E: Target Firm Characteristics 
Tgt Div Adj Performance 
LTM [OA−1] 
Defined as Acq Div Adj Performance LTM [OA−1] , but instead measured for target firm’s 
stock. 
Tgt Market-to-Book [OA−22] Defined as Acq Market-to-Book [OA−22] , but instead measured for target firm’s stock. 
ln Tgt 1YR Stock Return 
Volatility [OA−1] 
Defined as ln Acq 1YR Stock Return Volatility [OA−1] , but instead measured for target 
firm’s stock. 







Appendix − Table A2 
Sample Selection 
Table A2 shows the selection criteria of the final sample with the respective remaining number of obser-
vations. After applying filters 1–6, 852 observations are left over. The availability of the six entrenchment 
index constituents in SEC filings further restricts the sample to 772 observations. 
Selection criteria Number of observations 
1. All M&A deals announced between 01/01/2004 and 12/31/2015 393,292 
2. Deal status either “closed” or “withdrawn” 373,657 
3. Acquirer and Target headquartered in the U.S. 78,628 
4. Acquirer publicly listed firm 18,338 
5. Acquirer seeks majority stake and change of control in the Target 17,376 
6. Total transaction value exceeds USD 1 mm 9,961 
7. Availability of SEC filings, control variables, and ownership data 852 
8. Valid data on entrenchment index constituents 772 
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Appendix − Table A3 
Determinants of Bidder Termination Fee Inclusion 
This table depicts the results of fixed effects logistic regressions of BTF Dummy , a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the deal includes a bidder termination fee provision, an 0 otherwise, on Deal Characteristics 
and Acquiring Firm Characteristics  for the samples for which I have all possible data. All regressions 
include Acquirer Industry × Year Fixed Effects , Target Industry Fixed Effects  as well as an intercept 
but are unreported. All standard errors (in round parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White 
(1980)) and within-cluster correlation. All models include odds ratios [in angular parentheses], that relate 
to the change in the probability of including a bidder termination fee provision for a one-unit increase 
in a continuous variable, or a shift from zero to one for a dummy variable. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  BTF Dummy 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3) 
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Acq Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Tgt Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations  7,788 6,217 2,725 
Pseudo R2  0.293 0.298 0.340 
(Table A3 continued) 
 
Appendix − Figure A1 
Average Termination Fee Size over Time 
Figure A1 depicts the average size of termination fees over the sample period (2004–2015) for which I 
have valid data. The blue bars show the annual average percentage value of BTF scaled by Transaction 
Value (TV) and the orange bars show the annual average percentage value of BTF  scaled by acquiring 
firm’s market capitalization 22 trading days prior to offer announcement. The grey bars represent the 
annual average percentage value of TTF scaled by Transaction Value (TV). The number of observations 
for BTF Size  (N=1,438) is lower than the number of observations for TTF Size (N=6,212) because of 
two reasons: first, BTF Size  is shown for public acquirers only (i.e., acquirers that have a non-zero 
market capitalization to better compare the annual average percentage values to BTF scaled by Trans-
action Value (TV)), and second, the use frequency of bidder termination fees is generally lower compared 
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 Average BTF Size (N=1,438): BTF scaled by Transaction Value (TV)
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 Average TTF Size (N=6,212): TTF scaled by Transaction Value (TV)





Intellectual Property Protection in M&A Negotiations ¶ 
 
 
In this chapter, I show that a major share of the value of target firm’s intellectual property can be 
protected from expropriation by the acquirer through negotiating a compensating bidder termination fee 
(BTF), which is paid to the target in case the acquirer abandons the deal. I apply a capitalization model 
for intangible capital stocks to proxy for the component of intellectual property in target firm’s market 
value. The results suggest that, on average, for every dollar of target firm’s R&D capital stock, roughly 
16 cents of protective share is incorporated in the BTF. I strengthen my causal interpretation with an 
instrument variables approach that exploits exogenous industry-level variation in R&D worker quota. 
The relation between target firm’s innovation activity and BTF size is more pronounced, if the target is 
a pioneer in its technology sector, if the target operates in an industry that sells unique products, if the 
target is assigned to the hightech or healthcare industry, and if the target mentions “trade secrets” in 
its 10-K report filed with the SEC prior to deal announcement. The effect is further increasing in the 
degree of technological proximity as well as product market rivalry between acquirer and target. Ex-
tending prior research at the intersection of innovation, law, and M&A, this chapter concludes that 
BTFs serve as a contract mechanism that provide target firms compensation for revelation of sensitive 
information in M&A negotiations if acquirers terminate deals. The option to include BTFs in M&A 
contracts thereby increases acquirers’ incentives to close the deal and increases targets’ ex-ante incentives 
to reveal innovative secret information. 
Keywords: Intellectual Property, Innovation, Intangible Capital, Takeovers, Mergers and Acquisi-
tions, Product Market Competition, Industrial Organization, Bidder Termination Fees. 





¶ The main part of the work on this chapter was done while I was visiting the University of Sydney Business School. I greatfully 
acknowledge financial support with a research grant provided by the Karlsruhe House of Young Scientists (KHYS). Parts of this 
chapter are the output of a joint research project with Jan-Oliver Strych called “Intellectual Property Protection with Bidder 
Termination Fees”. I also thank Martin Ruckes for his valuable and constructive comments and Markus Gengenbach for his 
support in collecting auxiliary data.  
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3.1 Introduction 
 “In recent decades, for example, the fraction of the total output of our economy that is 
essentially conceptual rather than physical has been rising. This trend has, of necessity, shifted 
the emphasis in asset valuation from physical property to intellectual property and to the legal 
rights inherent in intellectual property.” 
Keynote Speech by Alan Greenspan, former Chair of the Federal Reserve of the United States, about Intellectual Property 




 “The future of the nation depends in no small part on the efficiency of industry, and 
the efficiency of industry depends in no small part on the protection of intellectual property.” 
Richard A. Posner, Judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 
in Rockwell Graphic Systems, Inc. v. DEV Industries, Inc., 925 F.2d 174 (1991) [Nr. 17]. 
 
 
 Since the late 1970s, intangible assets have become an increasingly important factor of 
production, whereas physical and financial assets more and more became commodities. At the 
same time, intellectual property evolved to play a more central role in mergers and acquisitions, 
where synergistic gains in product markets and technological innovations have found to be 
among the main reasons why these corporate acquisitions take place (e.g., Bena and Li (2014), 
Frésard, Hoberg, and Phillips (2020), and Hoberg and Phillips (2010)). Simultaneuously, intel-
lectual property is notoriously hard to value and has traditionally been seen as an asset inex-
tricably linked to the business and revenues of the firm. 
 Whether it is the trade secret of a beverage producer’s unique recipe, the (ongoing) 
R&D results of a cancer drug developed by a pharmaceutical company, the patent portfolio of 
a technology company, or the customer data and algorithms of an internet company – intel-
lectual property is nowadays often one of the most important assets of targets in M&A deals 
and firms in general.  
A second trend underlining the significance of intellectual property in M&A is that the 
market for buying and selling these assets has become more liquid over time. Thus, not only is 
the value of intellectual property difficult to estimate (e.g., Kogan et al. (2017)), it is also no 
longer inevitably bound to the firm where it is generated. 
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 Firms have an incentive to invest in innovation and into their organization to generate 
intellectual property if they can also reap the benefits that are expected to materialize in the 
future. From a legislator’s perspective it is thus important to provide the economy with a 
functioning legal system on which firms can rely on their intellectual property to be protected. 
As a consequence, trade secret law has evolved from the common law of unfair competition, 
and developed over time to prohibit misappropriation of important technology and business 
secrets1, and patent law has established rules to protect a particular implementation of an 
idea2. 
 In M&A, acquirers increasingly select targets to gain access to their innovations and to 
commercialize them (Phillips and Zhdanov (2013), Bena and Li (2014), and Frésard et al. 
(2020)). Gaining insights into these sensitive information begins with the start of the M&A 
process and signing of confidentiality/non-disclosure agreements (NDAs): the longer and the 
more intense the private and public takeover process, the more information about the target 
firm is revealed to the acquirer. The protection of sensitive information is particularly relevant 
for R&D-intense targets that might generate major shares of their future revenues through 
their patents, trade secrets, and other intellectual property. 
 Intellectual property of the target that should be protected from expropriation in M&A 
negotiations includes trade secrets, transferable knowledge applied in (not already granted) 
patents3, and even so-called “negative” information. Trade secrets – as a special form of intel-
lectual property – encompass any “information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, pro-
gram, device, method, technique, or process that (1) derives independent economic value, ac-
tual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by 
 
1 Most important legislation in this area comprises the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), published 
by the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) in 1979 and amended in 1985, later enacted in all U.S. states, 
as well as the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD), adopted by many U.S. courts since the mid-1990s. 
The UTSA does not distinguish between tangible and memorized trade secrets. 
2 See, e.g., Economic Report of the President (2006), and Gould and Gruben (1996). Beyond trade secrets 
and patents, innovators can also rely on copyrights and trademarks to protect their intellectual property. 
Legislators often have to outweigh the benefits for innovating firms versus the associated costs for soci-
ety, such as the potential for creating monopoly power and the restrictions on exploiting useful technol-
ogies. 
3 Successfully granted patents itself are already legally protected and give the owner the exclusive right 
to exclude others from copying, using, and selling the invention for a limited period of time. 
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proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and 
(2) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.” 
(National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1985)). I.e., trade secrets only 
exist if their secrecy is preserved and can comprise both technical as well as business infor-
mation4. “Negative” information refers to, e.g., designs that didn’t work5: “The definition in-
cludes information that has commercial value from a negative viewpoint, for example the re-
sults of lengthy and expensive research which proves that a certain process will not work could 
be of great value to a competitor.” (National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws (1985)). More precisely, these can be dead-ends encountered in research and development, 
relinquished technical solutions, details of unsuccessful efforts to remedy problems in manufac-
turing certain products, and also failed attempts to spark sales of the firm’s products. If not 
properly protected, competitors could expropriate it without bearing the costs and risks asso-
ciated with its development, resulting in an ex-ante deterrent of firms to innovate. 
 Thus, if mergers are closed successfully, the acquirer obtains all control and property 
rights of the target firm, including its intellectual property. In these cases, no protection of 
target firms’ intellectual property from expropriation by acquirers would’ve been needed, since 
the property rights are de jure transferred. 
Nevertheless, it remains an open question how target firms’ intellectual property can 
be protected in – sometimes intense – M&A negotiations, especially if acquirers later terminate 
deals under their control and walk away with sensitive information about the target’s business, 
that, in some cases, can be vital to its very existence. 
 
4 Many firms rely on trade secrets, rather than patents, as their primary, most valuable innovation. 
Reasons to not patent include, e.g., that patenting is costly (especially for small firms – application costs 
are low, but patent litigation and other legal issues may be expensive), that their most valuable innova-
tion is simply not “patentable”, or firms voice concerns about the legal enforcement of patents (see, e.g., 
Athreye and Fassio (2018) for a comprehensive study on why firms decide to not patent). Besides 
technical trade secrets, business secrets can be marketing and sales as well as advertising plans, compet-
itors’ (re-) actions, (key) personnel information, customer and supplier data, internal cost and pricing 
information, market analyses, and unannounced financial and business-related information, among oth-
ers. 
5 Yet, even if it runs directly contrary to the principles of competition in a capitalistic society, “negative” 
information receives the same protection as trade secrets, although this issue is under current discussion 
by legal scholars (see, e.g., Khoury (2014)). 
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 This chapter suggests that the protection of target firms’ sensitive intellectual property 
can be achieved in M&A by negotiating a bidder termination fee (BTF). Bidder termination 
fees6 are cash payments from the acquirer to the target, in case the acquirer terminates the 
pending deal due to reasons under his control7, and are usually negotiated by target firm’s 
management during the private takeover process. BTFs are becoming legally binding with the 
signing of the merger agreement between the two parties, and are thought to compensate the 
target for the direct and indirect costs incurred if the deal is terminated. Direct costs are costs 
such as fees for financial and legal deal advisors, consulting firms, opportunity costs of the 
assets involved and other transaction fees. Indirect costs are, most important, above mentioned 
costs of information expropriation, and other private information about future synergies on 
which competitors can potentially free ride on. This chapter’s central prediction hence is: 
The higher the value of target firm’s intellectual property,                                           
the higher the negotiated bidder termination fee. 
Main Findings 
I find that – controlling for a wide array of covariates that reliably affect the size of the 
BTF – the value of target firm’s intellectual property, as proxied by accumulated R&D ex-
penses as a fraction of the firm’s market value prior to deal announcement, is significantly 
positively related to the size of the BTF. The estimated relation is also economically important 
as a one-standard deviation increase in this target firm R&D intensity measure is associated 
with a 0.57% increase in the size of the BTF. BTF size is defined as the USD (mm) amount of 
the negotiated bidder termination fee, divided by the market capitalization (also in USD mm) 
of the target firm 42 trading days prior to offer announcement. A back-of-the-envelope calcu-
lation suggests that, on average, for every dollar of target firm’s R&D capital stock, roughly 
16 cents of protective fee is incorporated in the BTF. I regard this a protective share, since the 
target receives a legal claim on this compensation payment in case of bidder terminated deals 
– representing an insurance-like payment for (likely) intellectual property revelation. 
 
6 The terms “bidder termination fee (BTF)“, “acquirer termination fee (ATF)”, and “reverse termination 
fee (RTF)” can be used interchangeably. I use the term “bidder termination fee” throughout this chapter. 
7 Reasons are discussed in Section 3.2. 
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  Further test reveal that the relation between target firm’s intellectual property value 
and BTF size is more pronounced, if the target is a pioneer in its technology sector, as proxied 
by its knowledge capital stock growth rate prior to offer announcement. At early stages, sen-
sitive R&D outcomes are likely not yet legally protected through patenting8, so the risk of 
revealing them at this stage is highest, since without patenting them there exists no claim 
under patent law. The effect is also stronger if the target is in an industry that produces unique 
products, if the target is assigned to the hightech or healthcare industry, and if the target 
mentions “trade secret”, “trade secrets” and/or “trade secrecy” in its most recent 10-K report 
filed with the SEC prior to deal announcement. I moreover find that the relation is increasing 
in the degree of technological proximity as well as product market rivalry between acquirer 
and target. This confirms the theoretical prediction that the target’s private intellectual prop-
erty might be of highest value for an acquirer that has a similar knowledge base and is com-
peting with the target in similar product markets. 
 Utilizing an event study of target firms’ stock price reactions at the resolution date of 
the deal reveals that the stock market reacts, on average, significantly less negative if acquirers 
abandon deals and if the negotiated bidder termination fee is high. This deal cancellation effect 
not only holds for bidder’s termination announcement and the associated de jure claim of the 
target to receive the BTF, but also for the announced de facto realized payment of the BTF 
to the target. This result strengthens the reasoning that the BTF has a protective, insurance-
like component priced in, providing the target with a payment if acquirers abandon deals due 
to reasons under their sphere of control. 
Contribution to the Literature 
 A key methodological contribution of this chapter is the application of an instrumental 
variables estimation to instrument the value of target firm’s intellectual property. I suggest 
two candidates as valid instruments, but focus on one specifically, namely the share of employ-
ees working in strictly R&D-related jobs as a fraction of all jobs in target firm’s SIC2 industry. 
 
8 The average duration from filing a patent (patent application) until receiving a patent grant is roughly 
2–3 years (20–32 months, depending on the workload required to process, see the current wait time 
statistics at the USPTO website: https://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml (perma-
nent link)). 
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Tests show that this industry-level instrument is likely uncorrelated with deal-level BTF size 
and only correlated with BTF size through its correlation with target’s knowledge capital stock. 
The results are thus robust to endogeneity concerns, in particular omitted variable bias and 
reverse causality. Pancost and Schaller (2019) further suggest that, in practice, the instrumen-
tal variables approach also resolves a substantial amount of attenuation bias resulting from 
classical errors-in-variables in linear regressions. Consistent with their findings, I find that the 
marginal effect between target’s knowledge capital stock and BTF size increases with the in-
strumental variables estimation. Exploiting this source of exogenous variation strengthens the 
causal interpretation of this chapter. 
 This chapter belongs to the growing body of work that emphasizes the important role 
of innovation in mergers and acquisitions. Phillips and Zhdanov (2013) model and empirically 
test how an active M&A market and competition affect the decision to conduct R&D and 
innovate. They find that smaller firms optimally may decide to innovate more when they can 
sell out to larger firms, and larger firms may find it disadvantageous to engage in a “R&D 
race” with smaller firms, as they can obtain access to innovation through acquisitions. Contrary 
to standard industrial organization theory (e.g., Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980)9), their model 
suggests a positive relation between innovation and competitive pressure – but less so for large 
firms: M&A provides a strong ex-ante incentive for small firms to innovate aggressively, but a 
competitve market itself decreases large firms’ odds of successfully innovating themselves. I 
add to their findings by hightlighting the role of bidder termination fees in R&D-driven M&A. 
 Frésard et al. (2020) examine determinants of vertical acquisitions using product text 
linked to vocabulary from input-output tables and propose that the innovation stage is im-
portant in explaining vertical integration. They find that R&D-intensive firms that are at an 
early stage of unrealized innovation are less likely to become targets of vertical acquisitions10. 
 
9 Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) suggest that more competition reduces the monopoly rents that reward 
successful innovators, hence innovation should decline with competition. 
10 They further note: “When innovative assets require further investment and development, it is optimal 
to leave control to the firms that perform the innovation, as their incentives are most important for the 
value of the vertical relationship (e.g., Aghion and Tirole 1994), and because their employees may leave 
in case of acquisition and take the unrealized innovation (i.e., their ideas) with them (e.g., Hart and 
Moore 1994).” See, e.g., a seminal case on inevitable disclosure of trade secrets of a former employee in 
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However, if innovation is patented, i.e., realized, and thus legally protected, incentives to in-
novate decline and incentives to commercialize the innovation increases in importance. Another 
related paper in this field is the one of Bena and Li (2014), who conclude that synergies ob-
tained from combining innovation capabilities are important drivers of acquisitions. Their re-
sults show that, after looking at a unique patent-merger data set, companies with large patent 
portfolios and low R&D expenses are acquirers, while companies with high R&D expenses and 
slow growth in patent output are targets. I build on one of their findings – namely that tech-
nological overlap between firms’ innovation activities has a positive and significant effect on 
the likelihood of merger pair formation – by demonstrating that the relation between target’s 
intellectual property value and the size of the BTF is increasing in the degree of technological 
proximity between the merging firms. 
 The industry-level instrumental variable I suggest in this chapter can be used by re-
searchers to mitigate endogeneity concerns, especially if applied in cases where the variable of 
interest is related to firm-level (R&D-)intangibles, as in Ewens, Peters, and Wang (2020). They 
characterize off-balance sheet intangibles – knowledge (R&D) and organizational (SG&A) cap-
ital – by using real transaction prices paid in M&A deals. The core of their contribution is the 
exploitation of market valuations of acquired intangible assets11: they validate and update 
parameter estimates for (1) the depreciation parameters for knowledge capital based on prior 
R&D spending and (2) the fraction of SG&A capital that represents investment into long-lived 
organizational capital. I apply their capitalization model to proxy for the component of intel-
lectual property in target firms’ market values. This component is expressed by their accumu-
lated and depreciated knowledge and organizational capital stocks scaled by market capitali-
zation, representing my main variable of interest. 
 
PepsiCo, Inc., v. Redmond – 54 F.3d 1262 (1995), available online on LexisNexis: https://www.lex-
isnexis.com/community/casebrief/p/casebrief-pepsico-inc-v-redmond (permanent link). 
11 Extending their parameter estimates to all publicly listed firms requires that the prices paid for intan-
gible capital in their sample represent a public or market value. Given that prices paid for targets in 
acquisitions contain private valuations of the acquirer about the intended firm pair combination, the 
authors properly adjust acquisition prices for over-/underpayment and synergies, and adjust goodwill 
(using information obtained through purchase price allocations in acquirers’ subsequent SEC documents, 
such as 10-Ks, 10-Qs, 8-Ks, and S-4s). 
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 Besides, another contribution of this chapter is to explain drivers of implementing BTFs 
in merger agreements as well as drivers of BTFs’ relative size, which arise from a legal, regu-
latory perspective. If mergers are horizontal and/or are thought to significantly alter product 
market competition by increasing the market power of the combined firm beyond certain limits, 
the deal stands under augmented scrutiny by regulating (antitrust) authorities. I apply the 
merger-induced same-industry concentration increase12 as introduced in Gao, Peng, and Strong 
(2017) and suggested by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission 
(2010). This “regulatory risk” measure proves to be a significant determinant of both the 
probability of BTF inclusion and BTF size, and complements the empirical findings related to 
BTF pricing in Chen et al. (2020b). They further find that both the likelihood of inclusion and 
the size of the BTF increase in the volatility of target’s value to the bidder and with the 
expected completion time of the takeover. Chen et al. (2020b) note that acquirers cannot easily 
walk away from an announced deal if no BTF was agreed on, yet exogenous reasons under 
acquirer’s sphere of responsibility or target material adverse changes can still force both parties 
to abandon the transaction. My findings are also consistent with Choi and Wickelgren’s (2019) 
paper13, who show theoretically that BTFs act as a commitment device for acquirers. 
 A direct managerial implication of this chapter is that implementing BTFs in M&A 
contracts serve as a mechanism that provide target firms compensation for revelation of infor-
mation in M&A negotiations if acquirers terminate deals. BTFs thereby increase targets’ in-
centives to reveal information and increase acquirers’ incentives to close the deal.  
 This chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2, I develop my hypotheses. I provide a 
sample overview, describe the empirical methodology and key variables in Section 3.3. I present 
the main regression results and relations between intellectual property protection and techno-
logical proximity as well as product market rivalry in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5, I provide 
additional robustness and subsample tests to strengthen my reasoning. Section 3.6 concludes. 
 
12 Defined as the merger-induced change (increase) in industry sales concentration in the same SIC4-
industry, whereas I measure industry sales concentration as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), i.e., 
based on firms’ sales (market shares) at the last fiscal year-end date prior to deal announcement. 
13 They are – to my knowledge – the first to analyze bidder termination fees using game theory. 
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3.2 Theoretical Reasoning, Hypothesis Development, and Predictions 
 In this chapter, I apply Ewens’ et al. (2020) parameter estimates for knowledge and 
organizational capital stocks, obtained through their novel approach by exploiting acquisition 
prices paid for intangible assets of M&A targets, to proxy for the share of target firm’s intellec-
tual property value in its market valuation. I then relate this ratio to an outcome of the private 
deal negotiation process, namely the size of the negotiated bidder termination fee (BTF). I 
show that the higher this value ratio, the higher the BTF (also scaled by target firm’s size), 
which compensates the target with a payment by the acquirer if the latter terminates the deal 
due to reasons under his control (and walks away with revealed sensitive private information, 
such as business and trade secrets, among many others). This information revelation represents 
– sometimes existential – indirect costs incurred by the target in failed M&A negotiations. 
 As Ewens et al. (2020) highlight in their paper, current accounting standards dictate 
R&D and SG&A expenditures to be fully expended in the period they occur, and prohibit the 
disclosure of internally generated intangible capital on firms’ balance sheets. These off-balance 
sheet intangibles – most of all knowledge and organizational capital based on R&D and SG&A 
expenditures – have become increasingly important over the last few decades. Scholars and 
GAAP’s accounting standards frequently quote their lack of collateral value, the risks associ-
ated with estimating their useful life, and uncertainty in measuring their value14 for the main 
reasons why R&D and SG&A expenditures cannot be capitalized on the firm’s balance sheet15. 
However, these intangible assets are among the most important sources enabling long-term 
economic growth through innovation. Their lack of capitalization thus results in a downward 
bias of reported assets, which is one of the main reasons why market-to-book ratios seem to 
inflate over recent decades16. 
 
14 https://asc.fasb.org/section&trid=2127268#topic-730-10-05-subsect-01-108369 (requested: 03/21/2020). 
15 For an intangible asset to be capitalized, i.e., to be identifiable, ASC 805 requires the asset under 
consideration to meet either the separability criterion (meaning it can be separated from the entity and 
sold) or the contractual-legal criterion (meaning that the control of future economic benefits arising from 
the asset is warranted by contractual or legal rights). This is the case for, e.g., computer software. See 
Ewens et al. (2020) for a detailed discussion of intangible accounting. 
16 See Figure A4 in the Appendix with plots documenting the trend in market-to-book ratios over time, 
based on estimates obtained in Ewens et al. (2020). 
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 On the other hand, once successfully acquired, intangible assets of the target are rec-
orded as either goodwill (GW) or identifiable intangible assets (IIA) on acquirer’s balance 
sheet. I.e., the acquirer pays for the target the following purchase price17: 
Acq Price Paid for Tgt  =  PTgt Physical Assets  +  PTgt Financial Assets  +  PTgt GW  +  PTgt IIA  +  PTgt UIA 
 where the index Tgt UIA stands for target’s unidentifiable intangible assets. On target i ’s 
side, its intangible capital can be separated into externally acquired intangible capital, I i,text, 
disclosed on its balance sheet in year t, and internally generated intangible capital K i,tint: 
Tgt Total Intangible Capitali,t  =  I i,t
ext  +  K i,tint 
 whereas K i,tint can be separated into knowledge (Gi,t) and organizational capital (Si,t)18: 
K i,tint  =  Gi,t  +  Si,t 
 with knowledge capital stock value defined as accumulated and depreciated R&D ex-
penses using the perpetual inventory method, with industry-specific depreciation factor δG : 
Gi,t  =  1 – δG Gi,t–1  +  R&Di,t 
 and organizational capital stock value defined as accumulated and depreciated SG&A 
expenses, also applying the perpetual inventory method, with industry-specific fraction γ  rep-
resenting the share of SG&A invested into long-living organizational capital, and depreciation 
factor δS : 
Si,t  =  1 – δS Si,t–1  +  γ SG&Ai,t 
 Due to data limitations, especially if the target was not publicly listed before, I calculate 
the value of intangible capital stocks over the last ten years prior to deal announcement, re-
sulting in the following capitalization model: 
K i,tint   =  1 – 𝛿G k R&Di,t–k
10
k = 1





17 Including a control premium. 
18 As modeled in Ewens et al. (2020), who build on a large empirical literature (e.g., Eisfeldt and Pa-
panikolaou (2013), Peters and Taylor (2017), and Falato, Kadyrzhanova, Sim, and Steri (2020)). 
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 As for physical assets, Ewens et al. (2020) estimate depreciation parameters δG for 
knowledge capital stocks based on prior R&D spending, as well as the share γ of SG&A capital 
that represents investment into long-lived organizational capital, using the value of 0.2 as the 
literature’s consensus estimate for δS . To obtain a measure that is comparable across firms and 
not diluted with private synergy and over-/underpayment, the final step in creating the value 
ratio is to relate both capital stock measures to target firm’s market value, i.e., market capi-
talization two months prior to deal announcement19. 
 Reasons why BTFs are negotiated and included in merger agreements typically include 
concerns threatening deal closure under acquirer’s area of control as well as exogenous reasons. 
First, the bidder may fail to obtain (debt) financing and/or fail to obtain shareholder approval. 
The latter could happen if the deal is planned to be paid with newly issued acquirer stock and 
the new stock issue exceeds 20% of prior shares outstanding. Second, a breach of representa-
tions, warranties and/or covenants by the bidder might occur which triggers the payment of a 
BTF. Third, a fee can be implemented to terminate the deal if the acquirer fails to close before 
an ex-ante determined “drop dead date”. Fourth, an exogenous reason for termination and 
under acquirer’s responsibility is the failure to obtain regulatory approval by the Department 
of Justice Antitrust Division (DoJ) or the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Fifth – although 
very rarely – a competing bid with the primary bidder as the target firm (“bid-for-bidder”) 
may arise, and sixth, the exercise of a pure termination option by the bidder (Chen et al. 
(2020b), Afsharipour (2010), and Quinn (2010)). 
3.2.1 Target Firm’s Intellectual Property Value and Bidder Termination Fees 
 Ample research emphasizes that satisfying acquirers’ innovation needs can be achieved 
by selecting successfully innovating targets, leveraging innovation synergies, and realizing gains 
through the commercialization of targets’ intellectual property (e.g., Frésard et al. (2020), 
Phillips and Zhdanov (2013), and Bena and Li (2014)). This intellectual property is sometimes 
the most important asset a firm has, and some firms might exist only because of one specific 
 
19 I use market capitalization since asset prices are forward looking. As shown in Section 3.5, my results 
are robust to other scaling variables, such as deal value and, in untabulated regressions, also total assets 
(whereas this would be a problematic scaling variable, given that book values do not – as outlined above 
– appropriately capture the (full) value of intangibles, and especially the intangibles considered here). 
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idea. A direct implication is that, for the good of society through enabling growth by incentiv-
izing investment in innovation, legislation’s duties should entail the protection of it. This is 
warranted through, e.g., granted patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secret law. On an 
employee-level20, firms can rely on legal protections such as non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) 
and non-compete clauses in employment contracts, though they may be time limited. 
 In merger negotiations, however, bidders gather significant private information about 
the target’s (future) business, its methods and techniques for manufacturing and processes, as 
well as other technological competitive advantages, without  the target being protected by 
above mentioned legally enforcable rules21. I assume that the target has full control over the 
amount and granularity of revealed information, as well as the timing of its disclosure to the 
bidder. E.g., the target usually provides potential acquirers a data room and the latter conduct 
various forms of due diligences. These information are important to determine the acquisition 
price including the deal premium, and to assess post-merger integration, which is vital for 
merger success (Hoberg and Phillips (2019)). The target has an incentive to disclose certain 
private information to the acquirer, resulting in an increase of its bargaining power, and could 
thereby increase the odds of receiving a higher takeover premium, which is beneficial for its 
shareholders, all else equal. I further expect the target to reveal the most sensitive information 
not to all potential bidders, but only to the final acquirer once the merger agreement is signed 
and the bidder termination fee is set. As put forward in the introduction, the revelation of 
sensitive private information to the acquirer is not a first-order problem if deals are closed 
successfully, but if deals ultimately fail.  
Although there exists no legally defined trigger in bidder termination fee provisions to 
induce a “sensitive information revelation payment” to the target by the acquirer if the latter 
abandons the deal, this chapter investigates whether there is a substantial fraction priced into 
the BTF that reflects this indirect cost component not protected by other law. 
 
20 For literature related to employee mobility and protection of trade secrets, see, e.g., Klasa et al. (2018), 
Glaeser (2018), Contigiani, Hsu, and Barankay (2018), and Chen, Gao, and Ma (2020a). 
21 It is common in almost every transaction to sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) already well before 
signing the binding merger agreement, but it is the merger agreement that contains the negotiated BTF. 
Confidentiality agreements (or non-disclosure agreements) do not provide a compensatory payment to 
the target if the deal is abandoned by the acquirer. Therefore, these agreements are then worthless.  
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 Since it is difficult – if not impossible – to directly quantify target firm’s (private) value 
of its intellectual property22, I apply the model above to create a proxy that I claim is highly 
correlated with this value: the value of target firm’s knowledge capital stock based on accumu-
lated and depreciated R&D expenses23. As in Ewens et al. (2020), I also calculate each firms’ 
organizational capital stock based on SG&A expenses as described above and scale both capital 
stock values by target firm’s market capitalization 42 trading days prior to offer announcement 
to enable comparison among deal-level observations. Thus, I obtain two measures: R&D stock 
value per unit of target firm’s value, and SG&A stock value per unit of target firm’s value. 
Theory (e.g., Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013, 2014), and Jovanovic (1979)) has argued that 
organizational capital is bound to the organization itself and to key employees, thus its effi-
ciency is firm-specific and hard to transfer via mergers. Recent empirical literature (e.g., Li, 
Li, Wang, and Zhang (2018)) finds that acquirers benefit more when target firms have higher 
organizational capital, suggesting that it is transferable via mergers. Yet, despite the litera-
ture’s controversial argumentation, I assume that organizational capital has little “secrecy” 
value outside the originating firm. Thus, I expect only target firm’s knowledge capital stock to 
be correlated with both inclusion and size of the bidder termination fee. The central hypothesis 
of this chapter hence is: 
Hypothesis 1:  The higher the value of target firm’s knowledge capital stock, 
   the higher the negotiated bidder termination fee. 
 
22 Including all trade secrets, not yet patented innovation, other business as well as technology secrets, 
and “negative” information as mentioned in the introduction. 
23 In Table 9 and in Figure A2 in the Appendix, I show – similar to Ewens et al. (2020) – that target 
knowledge capital stock is a highly significant predictor of both the market value and the scientific value 
of target’s patents, as well as the number of patents granted to the target in the year prior to deal 
announcement (using data obtained from Kogan et al. (2017)), and total patent stock (all patents that 
are not yet expired at the last fiscal year-end date prior to deal announcement, calculated using patent 
data obtained from the University of Virginia (UVA) Darden Global Corporate Patent Dataset, see 
Bena, Ferreira, Matos, and Pires (2017)). All explanatory variables are lagged, logged and scaled by 
total assets. Beyond that, in regressions in Table 10, I show, similar to Glaeser (2018), that R&D 
intensity, measured with my proposed value ratio based on market values, is a reliable and highly 
statistically significant predictor of both using the word “trade secret”, “trade secrets” and/or “trade 
secrecy” in target’s 10-K filing prior to offer announcement, as well as the frequency, i.e., how often the 
word combinations are mentioned. In both regressions the coefficient is positive and statistically highly 
significant. Figure A3 in the Appendix shows the respective plot of associated predicted probabilities. 
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3.2.2 Short-Term Target Firm Value Effects around Deal Resolution 
 If announced deals are terminated, one central stylized fact is that targets’ share prices 
plummet. The reason behind this is that target firm’s shareholders then don’t receive the 
usually significantly positive control premium offered by the acquirer (e.g., documented in the 
comprehensive survey of Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008)). However, the negative stock 
price reaction might differ with the method of payment offered by the acquirer, as cash bids 
have been found to reveal prior undervaluation of the target: these bids revalue target’s market 
value at deal failure by approximately +15% compared to pre-announcement levels (Malmend-
ier, Opp, and Saidi (2016)). 
If the reason of deal termination falls under the acquirer’s sphere of control and triggers 
the payment of a bidder termination fee, I expect, all else equal, a less negative target stock 
price reaction on the deal termination date24, given that the cash fee is beneficial for the target. 
This leads to the second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: If the acquirer cancels the deal and the higher the bidder termination fee, 
the higher target firm’s cumulative abnormal deal resolution returns.  
 
3.2.3 Interaction between Intellectual Property Protection and Technological Proximity 
 Innovation needs of acquirers are best satisfied by selecting successfully innovating tar-
gets, leveraging the firm’s combined innovation synergies, and realizing gains through the com-
mercialization of the merged firm’s intellectual property (e.g., Frésard et al. (2020), Phillips 
and Zhdanov (2013), and Bena and Li (2014)). A successful post-merger integration and real-
ization of synergies is likely, if the acquirer is well integrated and selects a target complemen-
tary to his own products and research activities (Hoberg and Phillips (2019)). 
Building on their findings as well as the results of Phillips and Zhdanov (2013), I suggest 
that my proposed relation between target firm’s knowledge capital stock value and the size of 
 
24 Compared to the base case where the acquirer abandons the deal without any negotiated BTF and 
thus leaves the target as “damaged goods”. 
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the negotiated BTF increases in the degree of both firms’ technological proximity. The eco-
nomic intuition is that the more technologically close the firm pair’s knowledge base is, the 
more likely the fit of the target for acquirer’s innovation needs and the ex-post realization of 
synergies. Furthermore, I claim that intellectual property is easier to ascertain for close tech-
nology rivals than for firms totally unrelated in their respective technology space. Thus, build-
ing on hypothesis 1, I formulate hypothesis 3a: 
Hypothesis 3a:  The higher the degree of technological proximity between acquirer and target, 
    the more pronounced the relation between target firm’s knowledge capital  
    stock value and the size of the negotiated bidder termination fee. 
 
3.2.4 Interaction between Intellectual Property Protection and Product Market Rivalry 
 Firms that operate in similar product markets are usually their strongest competitors 
and could gain the highest advantage from utilizing each other’s sensitive private technology 
and business knowledge. Yet, on the other side, acquirers may have less incentives in exploiting 
targets’ intellectual property if their product markets are completely unrelated to each other. 
I assert that the proposed relation between target firm’s knowledge capital stock value and the 
size of the negotiated BTF should increase in the degree of both firms’ product market rivalry. 
The economic rationale is that the more likely both firms are product market rivals, the more 
likely can the acquirer derive the highest economic future value from exploiting target’s intel-
lectual property. I.e., secrecy might be highly valuable for both firms, but the relation should 
be stronger if they are direct competitors. Hence, hypothesis 3b finally states: 
Hypothesis 3b:  The higher the degree of product market rivalry between acquirer and target, 
    the more pronounced the relation between target firm’s knowledge capital  
    stock value and the size of the negotiated bidder termination fee. 
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3.3 Sample Overview, Methodology, and Key Variables 
3.3.1 Sample Overview 
 To form the M&A sample, I begin by screening all transactions from Standard & Poor’s 
Capital IQ database announced between January 01, 2004 and December 31, 201725. I apply 
the following filters commonly used in the literature: first, I select all M&A deals that are also 
either completed or withdrawn in the respective period. Second, I identify all M&A transactions 
in which the acquirer and the target are both publicly listed U.S. firms26, the acquirer holds 
less than 50% of target’s outstanding shares prior to offer announcement, and aims for a change 
in control in the target firm (i.e., the acquirer must seek a majority stake). Third, I require the 
deal value, i.e., the total transaction value excluding assumed liabilities, to exceed USD 1 
million to eliminate the many small and economically less significant transactions. Fourth, 
since I need the most accurate data on negotiated bidder and target termination fees, I require 
every transaction-target to have valid merger documents filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) at or shortly after the deal announcement date27. Fifth, to proxy for the 
extent to which the target firm has produced (secret) intellectual property, I further restrict 
the sample to transactions in which the target has valid data on past R&D or SG&A spending28. 
These filters result in a final data sample of 769 unique transactions29. 
 
25 I focus on this sample period, since sophisticated trade secret law (mainly the Uniform Trade Secret 
Act (UTSA) and the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD)) has been widely adopted in all U.S. states 
after 2004 (except Texas (2013), New Jersey (2012), and Wyoming (2006)). Moreover, this is unlikely 
to negatively affect my results, given that these staggered passages of both the UTSA and IDD are a 
shock to trade secrecy on an employee-firm-level. This likely positively affects merger incidence justified 
by information expropriation, because the UTSA and IDD exogenously decreased knowledge-worker 
mobility. See, e.g., Dey and White (2019), Klasa et al. (2018), Contigiani et al. (2018), and Glaeser 
(2018). 
26 This is to ensure that SEC EDGAR merger filings are available from which I retrieve data on the 
exact BTF and the selling method (auction vs. negotiation) in the respective background section. 
27 I manually retrieve the SEC EDGAR filings for the respective transaction since some papers argue 
that termination fee data in both Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ and Refinitiv’s SDC Platinum are not 
convincingly reliable prior to 2007. 
28 Valid data in this case means that I also include all observations in which there is at least one non-
missing (i.e., at least one “0” or another positive value) data point on target firm’s R&D or SG&A 
expenses in Compustat in the last ten years prior to offer announcement. I do this in order to avoid 
sample selection. The results are robust and remain unchanged to including a “missing R&D” dummy. 
29 Table A2 in the Appendix lists the detailed sample selection process with the number of remaining 
observations after applying respective filters. I obtain qualitatively and quantitatively similar results if 
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3.3.2 Methodology and Key Variables 
The baseline specification to measure the effect of target firm’s intellectual property 
value on the size of the negotiated bidder termination fee is the following linear fixed effects 
regression model: 
       BTF Sizei,t  =  αi,t + β1 Tgt Know Cap Stocki,t + β2 Tgt Org Cap Stocki,t 
                  + β3 Tgt Total Intangibles Ratioi,t–22 + β4 Tgt Tangibilityi,t–22  
                + β5 Tgt Market-to-Booki,t–22 + β6 TTF Sizei,t 
                + η Deal Characteristicsi,t + θ Acq Firm Characteristicsi,t 
                + φ Acq Industry × Year FEi,t + ϑ Tgt Industry FEi,t + εi,t 
 where i  indexes the transaction (i.e., the unique acquirer-target-combination), t indexes 
the time (i.e., announcement date of the transaction), α is an intercept, and β 1    is the coefficient 
of primary interest – the estimate of the effect of target firm’s intellectual property value on 
the size of the bidder termination fee. The dependent variable is the dollar value of the nego-
tiated bidder termination fee scaled by target firm’s market capitalization 42 trading days (i.e., 
two calendar months) prior to offer announcement. This scaling makes the dependent variable 
comparable across transactions and captures the potential economic impact on target firm’s 
value should the deal be terminated and triggering a bidder termination fee payment by the 
acquirer to the target. 
Intangible Capital Stock Measures 
 The main variable of interest in this chapter is Tgt Know Cap Stock , the proxy for the 
value of target firm’s intellectual property not yet protected by patents and other law. Applying 
Ewens’ et al. (2020) model for intangible capital stocks, Tgt Know Cap Stock is defined as 
accumulated and depreciated (depreciation factor δG ) R&D expenses over the last ten years 
prior to offer announcement, also scaled by target firm’s market capitalization 42 trading days 
 
I further restrict the sample to excluding both acquirers and targets from the financial sector (SIC codes 
6000–6999) as well as utilities (SIC codes 4900–4999). 
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(two calender months) prior to offer announcement, to ensure that target’s stock prices do not 
reflect run-up movements of the upcoming bid: 
Tgt Know Cap Stocki,t  =  





 Tgt Org Cap Stock  is defined likewise, it is equal to the accumulated and depreciated 
(depreciation factor δS ) SG&A expenses over the last ten years prior to offer announcement, 
scaled by target firm’s market capitalization 42 trading days prior to offer announcement, 
where γ  represents the share of SG&A expenses invested into long-lived organizational capital: 
Tgt Org Cap Stocki,t  =  






 Tgt Total Intangibles Ratio  is the sum of accumulated goodwill and identifiable intan-
gibles30 from its balance sheet, divided by total assets and obtained 22 trading days prior to 
deal announcement. Tgt Tangibility  is net property, plant, and equipment of the target, also 
scaled by total assets 22 days prior, and controls for target’s physical asset intensity. TTF Size  
is – similar to the dependent variable BTF size  – the dollar value of the negotiated target 
termination fee scaled by target firm’s market capitalization 42 trading days prior to offer 
announcement. It is important to also control for TTF Size , because the TTF is also deter-
mined at the end of the private deal negotiation yet comprises legally and economically differ-
ent triggers31. These controls are included to reduce omitted variable bias, because the causal 
interpretation of the variable of interest should be independent of the structure of target’s 
assets. 
 Key Deal Characteristics  variables include, among common M&A controls: Tgt Initia-
tion , a dummy variable variable that equals 1 if the target initiated the deal, and 0 otherwise, 
and is included after considering Masulis and Simsir (2018), who find that targets initiate deals 
 
30 I.e., those intangible assets that can be separated from other assets and even be sold, such as, e.g., 
patents, patent licenses, copyrights, trademarks, trade names, and service marks. 
31 It is important to note that the BTF is not a symmetrical response to the TTF from a legal perspective. 
TTFs are negotiated to compensate the acquirer for out-of-pocket expenses in case the target terminates 
the deal due to, e.g., receiving and accepting a third-party bid or not obtaining shareholder approval. 
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motivated by their economic weakness and financial constraints. Under these circumstances, a 
significant amount of bargaining power is shifted to the acquirer and systematically lowers the 
odds in persuading him to provide a BTF, all else equal. Deal Value  is the USD (bn) value of 
the transaction, i.e., total transaction value excluding assumed liabilities. Cash Only is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the payment by the acquirer is made entirely in cash, and 0 
otherwise. It is well documented in the literature (e.g., Betton et al. (2008)) that cash deals 
are usually smaller, i.e., have smaller deal values, and cluster around high relative sizes of the 
firms involved, meaning that the acquirer is usually much bigger than the target in cash deals. 
Similar to the economic intuition for target-initiated deals, this creates a natural bargaining 
power imbalance where one would expect to less likely observe BTFs (in pure cash deals). 
Tender Offer  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal is classified as a tender offer, and 
0 otherwise. Tender offers are characterized by the acquirer often circumventing target firm’s 
management and directly submitting a takeover bid to target’s shareholders. I thus propose 
that, due to the lack of a direct negotiation between the firms, a BTF is significantly less likely 
in tender offers, on average. Post Closing Highly Conc Industry  is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the planned deal results in the SIC4 industry Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (Post 
Closing Industry HHI) exceeding 0.25, and 0 otherwise. The U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) 
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) define in their 2010 horizontal merger guidelines an 
industry as a highly concentrated market if the HHI increases beyond 0.25. Given that proposed 
deals that would result in a highly concentrated market receive heightened attention from those 
regulating (antitrust) authorities, I expect a BTF to be more likely included in such deals32. 
Acq (Tgt) All Financial Advisor Fees Deal Value , respectively, is the imputed USD (mm) value of 
acquirer (target) financial advisor fees irrespective of the deal outcome, i.e., directly assignable 
out-of-pocket expenses, scaled by Deal Value . These advisor fees are sunk cost if deals are 
terminated and are thus expected to be correlated with both BTF and TTF. Lastly, I control 
for variables capturing acquirer’s bargaining power, financial constraints, and uncertainty over 
its value. Especially concerns of acquirer’s financial soundness are reasons why the acquirer is 
swayed to provide a BTF. Besides market capitalization, stock return volatility, and market 
leverage, I include Acq Dividend Payer , a dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquiring firm 
 
32 Included as a proxy for ex-ante (anticipated) regulatory risk. 
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paid positive dividends33 during the fiscal year preceding the offer announcement, and 0 other-
wise. The intuition for including the dividend payer dummy is, that if the acquirer did pay any 
dividends during the fiscal year prior to deal announcement, he might not be financially con-
strained, thus has a lower risk of obtaining financing, hence a BTF should be less likely34.  
 I also include Acquirer Industry × Year Fixed Effects  and Target Industry Fixed Ef-
fects  , based on the first digit of the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code and the year 
of deal announcement (e.g., Betton et al. (2008), Malmendier et al. (2016)) to control for 
aggregate shocks to takeover activity in certain industries and across years, and further unob-
served heterogeneity (Gormley and Matsa (2014)). All variables are additionally defined in 
Table A1 in the Appendix. 
 
3.4 Empirical Results 
3.4.1 Key Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1 presents summary statistics for the U.S. M&A sample including transactions 
announced between 2004 and 2017. The mean of BTF Dummy  is 0.293, suggesting that about 
29% of merger agreements include a negotiated bidder termination fee provision. To the con-
trary, about 97% of transactions are equipped with a target termination fee provision. These 
values are consistent with the literature, as similar values are obtained in, e.g., Chen et al. 
(2020b), yet databases are known to underreport their incidence, specifically prior to 2007. The 
dollar value range for the bidder termination fee peaks in values in the low billions, with the 
maximum value of USD 3.5 billion paid by the acquirer, Halliburton Company, to the target, 
Baker Hughes, Inc., for the failed deal in 2016. BTF Size  (the main dependent variable) and 
TTF Size  are the respective dollar values scaled by target firm’s market capitalization and 
average in values of around 1.8% and 5.1%, with maximum values exceeding 43% and 34%, 
respectively. This emphasizes their economic significance and value effects for the target if 
 
33 On either common and/or preferred stock. 
34 In additional regressions, I also include commonly known measures of financial constraints for the 
acquiring firm, such as the indices developed in Hadlock and Pierce (2010) (SA-Index ), Whited and Wu 
(2006) (WW-Index ), and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) (KZ-Index ). 
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deals are terminated and fees are paid. The median of Tgt Know Cap Stock is zero, suggesting 
that most of the firms do not invest in R&D, consistent with prior findings as in, e.g., Glaeser 
(2018), and Bena and Li (2014). Yet, on average, target firm’s knowledge capital stock repre-
sents about 13% of its total market value. The average value for Tgt Org Cap Stock  is 35.7%, 
and maximum values are smaller than maximum values for Tgt Know Cap Stock , which peak 
in values exceeding ten times its market valuations35. This suggests a high significance of R&D 
investments for a substantial number of firms. Since deal values usually exceed market valua-
tions, the ratios for Tgt Know Cap Stock Deal Value  and Tgt Org Cap Stock Deal Value  are somewhat 
smaller. Deal values average in the low billions, with a median value of USD 441 million. 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the sample consisting of 769 U.S. M&A transactions announced 
between January 01, 2004 and December 31, 2017. Number indices display the point in time (i.e., trading 
day) relative to the offer announcement (OA) date when the variable was measured. Letter indices refer 
to the variable the non-indexed variable is scaled with, i.e., BTF Size Deal Value  is the USD amount of the 
bidder termination fee scaled (divided) by the USD amount of Deal Value . Cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR ) are measured in symmetric event windows around deal resolution, applying a Carhart (1997) 
four-factor model (C4 ) to model normal returns, respectively. All variables that are not indexed, i.e., 
capital stock data (Cap Stock ), other accounting data, proximity and similarity measures, measures of 
financial constraints, patent data, and Tgt SIC2 Industry R&D Worker Ratio , are measured on the last 
fiscal year end date (or quarter year end, if available) prior to offer announcement. All CARs, Market-
to-Book ratios, and Relative Size Market Cap [OA–22]  are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. All 
variables are defined in detail in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
  Summary Statistics 
 Variables Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Panel A: Termination Fees and Target Intangible Capital Stocks 
 BTF Dummy 769 0.293 0 0.455 0 1 
 TTF Dummy 769 0.970 1 0.170 0 1 
 BTF Dollar Value 769 45.805 0.000 213.445 0.000 3,500.000 
 TTF Dollar Value 769 75.857 13.000 202.684 0.000 1,920.000 
 BTF Size 769 1.729 0.000 3.539 0.000 43.184 
 TTF Size 769 5.069 4.778 2.538 0.000 34.049 
 BTF Size Deal Value 769 1.228 0.000 2.465 0.000 30.214 
 TTF Size Deal Value 769 3.398 3.387 1.539 0.000 30.171 
 Tgt Know Cap Stock Dollar Value 769 74.311 0.000 428.790 0.000 10,856.900 
 Tgt Org Cap Stock Dollar Value 769 302.094 46.494 1,199.158 0.000 19,291.560 
 
35 This extremely research intense target was Icoria, Inc., a pharma/biotech company founded in 1997 
that discovers and develops multiparameter biomarkers which enable developing multianalyte diagnos-
tics used to define and grade pathology or disease states. The firm was successfully acquired by Clinical 
Data, Inc., on December 20, 2005. 
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 Tgt Know Cap Stock 769 0.131 0.000 0.546 0.000 10.074 
 Tgt Org Cap Stock 769 0.357 0.172 0.677 0.000 8.478 
 Tgt Know Cap Stock Deal Value 769 0.079 0.000 0.290 0.000 4.553 
 Tgt Org Cap Stock Deal Value 769 0.231 0.121 0.388 0.000 4.274 
 Tgt 5YR Avrg Yearly Know Cap Growth 324 13.836 10.474 20.655 −40.494 97.176 
 Tgt Know Cap Intensity 697 0.184 0.000 0.264 0.000 1.000 
Panel B: Deal and Industry Characteristics, and Measures of Technological Proximity and Product Market Rivalry 
 Tgt Initiation 769 0.322 0 0.468 0 1 
 Auction 769 0.599 1 0.490 0 1 
 Deal Value 769 2.657 0.441 6.943 0.010 79.406 
 Friendly 769 0.996 1 0.062 0 1 
 Cash Only 769 0.395 0 0.489 0 1 
 Tender Offer 769 0.156 0 0.363 0 1 
 Horizontal Takeover 769 0.489 0 0.500 0 1 
 Relative Size Market Cap [OA–22] 769 40.003 6.576 157.483 0.333 1,792.928 
 Post Closing Industry HHI  769 0.168 0.118 0.162 0.010 0.995 
 Post Closing Industry HHI Increase 769 0.011 0.001 0.042 0.000 0.493 
 Post Closing Highly Conc Industry 769 0.055 0 0.227 0 1 
 Acq All Financial Advisor Fees Dollar Value 769 7.584 3.515 9.613 0.029 60.000 
 Tgt All Financial Advisor Fees Dollar Value 769 10.161 4.300 13.468 0.015 94.700 
 Acq All Financial Advisor Fees Deal Value 769 0.970 0.773 0.801 0.001 9.998 
 Tgt All Financial Advisor Fees Deal Value 769 1.114 0.997 1.111 0.001 13.026 
 Technological Proximity (Tech Prox) 233 0.155 0.154 0.096 0.012 0.520 
 Product Market Similarity (PMS) TNIC1 694 0.190 0.174 0.116 0.000 0.928 
 Product Market Similarity (PMS) TNIC2 603 0.131 0.114 0.109 0.000 0.848 
 Product Market Similarity (PMS) TNIC3 525 0.111 0.088 0.108 0.000 0.811 
 Acq Induced Cancellation 769 0.017 0 0.129 0 1 
 Third Party Competing Bid Cancellation 769 0.008 0 0.088 0 1 
 Deal Completion 769 0.950 1 0.217 0 1 
 Kick-Off vs. AD 398 4.004 3.567 2.254 0.300 12.867 
 First Board Meeting vs. AD 398 3.672 3.167 2.322 0.167 12.800 
 Confidentiality Agreement vs. AD 398 3.262 2.500 2.802 0.067 18.200 
 Kick-Off vs. RD 398 9.859 9.400 3.779 2.467 30.167 
 First Board Meeting vs. RD 398 9.527 8.767 3.958 2.000 30.033 
 Confidentiality Agreement vs. RD 398 9.116 8.267 4.098 2.300 28.267 
 Any Pre-Contact with Acq 398 0.384 0 0.487 0 1 
Panel C: Acquiring Firm Characteristics 
 Acq Market Cap [OA–22] 769 19.293 2.338 46.473 0.014 461.758 
 Acq Market-to-Book [OA–22] 769 3.454 2.121 5.965 0.429 76.642 
 Acq 1YR Stock Return Volatility [OA–1] 769 30.303 26.669 15.389 10.401 122.573 
 ln Acq 1YR Stock Return Volatility [OA–1] 769 3.311 3.283 0.432 2.342 4.809 
 Acq Market Leverage [OA–22] 769 0.139 0.109 0.131 0.000 0.927 
 Acq Dividend Payer 769 0.671 1 0.470 0 1 
 Acq Hadlock-Pierce-Index 751 −4.265 −4.546 0.488 −4.637 −2.228 
 Acq Whited-Wu-Index 697 0.534 0.369 1.431 −8.594 6.356 
 Acq Kaplan-Zingales-Index 632 −9.021 −4.841 11.203 −56.194 3.094 
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Panel D: Target Firm Characteristics 
 Tgt Market Cap [OA–42] 769 1,960.597 301.480 5,411.878 5.262 62,359.610 
 Tgt Market-to-Book [OA–22] 769 2.973 1.833 4.305 0.197 35.653 
 Tgt Total Assets [OA–22] 769 4,071.693 657.784 29,811.820 4.499 782,896.00 
 Tgt Total Intangibles [OA–22] 769 477.932 20.669 2,242.563 0.000 38,935.000 
 Tgt Goodwill [OA–22] 739 356.428 10.657 2,066.050 0.000 27,689.000 
 Tgt Identifiable Intangibles [OA–22] 729 127.606 3.500 649.848 0.000 10,453.000 
 Tgt Net PPE [OA–22] 769 575.996 24.304 2,252.972 0.000 31,281.000 
 Tgt Current Assets [OA–22] 513 682.084 189.113 1,482.475 3.680 14,712.000 
 Tgt Total Intangibles Ratio [OA–22] 769 0.136 0.039 0.187 0.000 0.832 
 Tgt Goodwill Ratio [OA–22] 739 0.096 0.020 0.141 0.000 0.721 
 Tgt Identifiable Intangibles Ratio [OA–22] 729 0.042 0.005 0.077 0.000 0.508 
 Tgt Tangibility [OA–22] 769 0.157 0.058 0.217 0.000 0.953 
 Tgt Current Assets Ratio [OA–22] 513 0.520 0.532 0.261 0.036 0.994 
 Tgt C4 CAR RD [–3;+3] 521 0.503 0.058 8.185 −47.611 128.883 
 Tgt Unique Product Industry 769 0.587 1 0.493 0 1 
 Tgt FF5 HTHC Industry 769 0.372 0 0.484 0 1 
 Tgt Patent Value (market-weighted) 190 411.059 20.288 2,058.386 0.199 22,597.090 
 Tgt Patent Value (citation-weighted) 190 43.398 9.455 118.632 1.000 1,224.381 
 Tgt Patent Count (recently granted) 190 15.911 4 46.098 1 508 
 Tgt Patent Count (total stock) 288 20.892 4 52.657 1 514 
 Tgt Trade Secrecy Mention Count in 10-K 751 1.775 0 2.845 0 27 
 Tgt SIC2 Industry R&D Worker Ratio 753 0.112 0.097 0.075 0.001 0.286 
 Tgt Firm Age 742 41.899 24 41.053 2 234 
(Table 1 continued) 
Approximately 60% of deals are classified as takeover auctions, i.e., transactions in 
which the private sales process is characterized by two or more prospective acquirers signing 
non-disclosure agreements with the target firm, nearly the same share as obtained in, e.g., 
Masulis and Simsir (2018) and Boone and Mulherin (2008). Approximately 16% of all deals are 
tender offers, and almost half of all deals are classified as horizontal takeovers, i.e., acquirer 
and target share the same SIC4 industry. 
The mean value for Post Closing Highly Conc Industry  is 5.5%, suggesting that every 
twentieth deal changes market composition in a way to likely receive extra scrutiny by regu-
lating authorities. When it comes to the resolution of announced deals, nearly 95% of all deals 
are closed successfully within the sample period, whereas in about 2% of the cases the acquirer 
terminates the deal. 
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3.4.2 Baseline Regression Results:       
 Target Firm’s Intellectual Property Value and Bidder Termination Fees 
 According to hypothesis 1, targets with a high ratio of their knowledge capital stock to 
market value are assumed to be highly valuable because of their secret, private intellectual 
property. Acquirers aiming to satisfy their innovation needs could utilize this knowledge by 
purchasing these successfully innovating targets. Thus, the scaled size of the bidder termination 
fee, BTF size , is hypothesized to increase in Tgt Know Cap Stock , since the BTF is providing 
the target a compensation payment for revealing these private information to the acquirer if 
the latter abandons the deal. Hypothesis 1 hence predicts a positive relation between Tgt Know 
Cap Stock  and BTF size . Table 2 depicts the results of linear fixed effects (logit) regressions. 
First of all, column (1) and (2)36 show the logit results where the dependent variable is BTF 
Dummy, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the merger agreement includes a bidder termination 
fee provision, and 0 otherwise. Regressions (3)–(7) then show the results for the baseline re-
gression, the continuous variable BTF size . Consistent with hypothesis 1, the coefficient on 
Tgt Know Cap Stock  is positive and highly statistically significant at the 1% level across all 
specifications37. The relation is also economically significant as a one-standard deviation in-
crease in this target R&D intensity measure is associated with a 0.57% increase in the size of 
the BTF. As I argue in Section 3.2, by building on prior research, organizational capital may 
be transferred through mergers, yet it does not represent a secret component that is highly 
valuable outside the firm. Of course, investment in key employees through training, advertising, 
and brand value is important as well and surely enables a organization to be more efficient, 
 
36 These two regressions only differ in using different measures for acquiring firm’s financial constraints. 
In the first regression, I include general M&A literature controls for the acquirer, such as its market 
capitalization, stock return volatility, market leverage and a dividend payer dummy to control for ac-
quirer’s financial strength that might affect the probability of providing a BTF. In the second regression, 
I remove these variables and include only the Hadlock and Pierce (2010) SA-Index . 
37 Figure A1 in the Appendix plots the relation between the pure values BTF size (USD mm) and Tgt 
Knowledge Capital (USD mm), revealing a positive relation without controlling for other covariates 
affecting bidder termination fee size and target’s knowledge capital stock. Despite the large number of 
control variables I’m not concerned with any multicollinearity problems given that variance inflation 
factors (vifs) are all below three and for the main variables of interest always below 1.6. In untabulated 
regressions, I additionally include more granular fixed effects and additionally cluster standard errors on 
the acquiring firm, finding that my results are qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged. 
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but it cannot be directly exploited by competitors38. Hence, the coefficient on Tgt Org Cap 
Stock  is positive but statistically not different from zero, consistent with above mentioned 
argumentation and assumption. 
Table 2 
Target Firm’s Intellectual Property Value and Bidder Termination Fees 
Table 2 presents the results of fixed effects (FE) logit regressions ((1) and (2)) of BTF Dummy, a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the merger agreement includes a bidder termination fee provision, and 
0 otherwise, on the variable of interest, Tgt Know Cap Stock , a variable that captures the accumulated 
and depreciated R&D expenses of the target firm (in USD mm) over the last ten fiscal years prior to 
offer announcement, scaled by the market capitalization (also in USD mm) of the target firm 42 trading 
days prior to offer announcement (regressions (1) and (2)). I further include control variables as defined 
in Section 3.3. In regressions (3)–(7), the dependent variable is the continuous variable BTF Size , the 
(USD mm) amount of the bidder termination fee divided by the market capitalization (also in USD mm) 
of the target firm 42 trading days prior to offer announcement and expressed in percentage points. All 
regressions include Acquirer Industry × Year Fixed Effects , Target Industry Fixed Effects  as well as an 
intercept but are unreported. All standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
(White (1980)) and within-cluster correlation. Models (1) and (2) include odds ratios [in angular paren-
theses], that relate to the change in the probability of including a bidder termination fee provision for a 
one-unit increase in a continuous variable, or a shift from zero to one for a dummy variable. (7) is a 
Tobit (censored at zero). *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  BTF Dummy  BTF Size 
 Regression Type  Logit FE  Linear FE  Tobit FE 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
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38 Many intangibles that are driven by organizational (SG&A) capital stocks are by law inextricably 
bound to the firm and/or simply not exploitable, such as trademarks, brands and brand identity, copy-
rights, licenses, the firm’s reliable vendor and distribution network, and internal technology systems and 
organizational processes, just to name a few. 
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Acq Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Tgt Industry FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
            
Observations  769 751  769 769 751 697  769 
Pseudo R2  0.302 0.298       0.138 
Adjusted R2     0.103 0.100 0.096 0.111   
(Table 2 continued) 
 The firm’s total intangibles that are capitalized on the balance sheet also comprise 
patents and patent licenses. This intellectual property is protected by law from copying, mak-
ing, and selling by other parties, and may have been externally acquired through target’s prior 
acquisitions and further developed by the firm. Through its direct proximity to intellectual 
property, I thus expect Tgt Total Intangibles Ratio  also to be related to BTF size , which is 
indeed the case, albeit somewhat weaker correlated at the 5% and 10% level (specification (6)). 
Tgt Initiation  is negatively and statistically significantly related to BTF size  in all specifica-
tions, consistent with the notion that target’s intentions to sell itself and proactively initiate 
the deal plays a central role (Masulis and Simsir (2018)): in these cases, a significant amount 
of bargaining power is shifted to the acquirer, which systematically lowers the willingness for 
the latter to provide a BTF, all else equal. (Pure) cash deals are usually smaller, thus, control-
ling for relative size between the firms, represent less risky deals in terms of obtaining regula-
tory approval, acquirer’s uncertainty over its ability to pay for the deal and acquirer’s share-
holder approval. Consistent with this reasoning, the coefficient on the dummy variable Cash 
Only  is negative and statistically significantly related to BTF size . This is also true for tender 
offers, since these type of acquisitions sometimes circumvent target firm’s management, thereby 
also bypass deal negotiations and hence reduce the likelihood to provide a BTF. 
Since BTF size  is left-censored (truncated) at zero, I also estimate a fixed effects tobit 
model (specification (7)). The marginal effect on Tgt Know Cap Stock  becomes even larger 
(3.062 vs. 1.051). Additionally, Table A3 in the Appendix provides a modular regression setup, 
which highlights that the hypothesized positive relation is not a random outcome of an appro-
priately chosen regression model, but rather an association that is valid and economically 
meaningful, independent of selected covariates and fixed effects. 
 Taken together, if looking at off-balance sheet intangibles in M&A, the results suggest 
that only the “secrecy” component, represented through Tgt Know Cap Stock – and not its 
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organizational capital value – is a reliable and significant driver of BTF inclusion in M&A 
contracts as well as BTF size . This suggests that R&D-intense targets can utilize their bar-
gaining power in deal negotiations to convince the prospective acquirer to provide an appro-
priately priced bidder termination fee. Consequently, hypothesis 1 is strongly supported. 
 
3.4.3 Identification: Instrumental Variables Approach 
 A common concern in the empirical finance literature is, that despite controlling for 
many factors explaining the cross-sectional distribution of the dependent variable, there might 
be endogeneity concerns. In my case, this might be particularly true if there would exist a 
reverse causality of BTF size  affecting target firm’s R&D investments39, omitted variables, 
and/or error-in-variables, i.e., if I measure my variable of interest with error. To address these 
concerns and to strenghten the causal interpretation of this chapter, I apply a two-stage least 
squares (2SLS)40 instrumental variables estimation. For my instrument to be valid, it has to 
fulfill two vital conditions: first, the instrument must be relevant, i.e., it must be correlated 
with the (possibly) endogenous variable Tgt Know Cap Stock in the first stage of the regression 
equation41, conditionally on the other covariates, and second, the instrument must be exoge-
nous, i.e., the instrument must not be correlated with the error term in the second stage, the 
structural equation, also conditionally on the other covariates. 
 I suggest two instruments, but focus on one specifically: Tgt SIC2 Industry R&D 
Worker Ratio . This variable is defined as the ratio of knowledge workers in strictly R&D-
related jobs to the total number of surveyed participants in a given SIC2 industry-year. R&D-
related jobs are defined as all jobs (occupations, denoted “occsoc” in the survey data) coded 
between 1510XX and 1940YY in the annual American Community Survey (ACS) of the U.S. 
Census Bureau. These survey data are included in the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series 
 
39 Concerning reverse causality, it seems highly unlikely that the size of the negotiated BTF in a M&A 
deal affects firm-level R&D activity (if empirically existent at all, the effect running from BTF size  to 
Tgt Know Cap Stock  should be negligibly small). 
40 I receive similar results applying LIML or GMM instead of 2SLS. 
41 I.e., it must be a reliable predictor for Tgt Know Cap Stock , with a statistically significant non-zero 
coefficient in the reduced form (first stage) equation. I include Target Industry Fixed Effects , since they 
are based on the first of all four SIC digits, thus sufficient variation remains (instrument is SIC2 level).  
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(IPUMS USA (2020)). Since IPUMS does not directly provide industry definitions in the SIC 
code format, I manually assign each census code industry definition to the most suitable SIC2 
industry42 and cross-check each industry assignment with the NAICS definition codes, which 
are available for both datasets. The R&D worker ratios are mapped on a SIC2 industry-year 
basis to each target firm in the sample on the last fiscal year end date prior to offer announce-
ment. The economic intuition behind this instrument variable is that Tgt SIC2 Industry R&D 
Worker Ratio  represents labor supply in target firm’s industry: higher values create an incen-
tive for the firm to invest in R&D given its availability of skilled workers that can create 
valuable innovation and enables the firm to stay competitive. Therefore, I claim that this ratio 
is by itself likely directly uncorrelated with deal-level BTF size , and only correlated with the 
dependent variable through its correlation with Tgt Know Cap Stock . Although there doesn’t 
seem to exist a theoretical link between the instrument and BTF size  43 and given one cannot 
control for instrument exogeneity directly, I include a second instrument to at least be able to 
test against the null hypothesis that over-identifying restrictions are valid. The second instru-
ment is Tgt Trade Secrecy Mention Count in 10-K , the number of mentions of either “trade 
secret”, “trade secrets” and/or “trade secrecy” in target firm’s most recent 10-K report filed 
with the SEC prior to offer announcement. I expect this variable also to be correlated with Tgt 
Know Cap Stock , since R&D-intense firms are likely to have trade secrets and name it more 
often, the more relevance it has for their firm. Table 3 shows the 2SLS IV regression results. 
 As expected, Tgt SIC2 Industry R&D Worker Ratio  is positively and statistically highly 
significantly related to Tgt Know Cap Stock*, the predicted value for targets knowledge capital 
stock (column (1)). Moreover, the first stage is also strong with an effective F-statistic of 13.701 
(applying the STATA™ routine developed in Montiel Olea and Pflueger (2013)), exceeding 
the rule-of-thumb value of ten. This suggests that the instrument has sufficient explanatory 
power  for  Tgt  Know  Cap  Stock ,  thus  meeting  the  relevance  condition.  In  the second stage 
 
 
42 Granular SIC2-level data with detailed mapping are available upon request. 
43 Additionally, in untabulated regressions I include both instruments in the baseline regression and find 
no significant relation between these instruments and BTF size , while the strong positive relation be-
tween Tgt Know Cap Stock  and BTF size  remains. A pairwise correlation test among these variables 
and BTF size  reveals only a weak and insignificant correlation, not controlling for other factors. The 
number of observations drops slightly due to the availability of respective instrumental variables.  




Instrumental Variables Estimation − Target Firm’s SIC2 Industry R&D Worker Ratio 
This table reports the results of linear fixed effects two-stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental variables 
regressions of BTF Size   on Tgt Know Cap Stock . In models (1) and (2), the first stage (Tgt Know Cap 
Stock* ) is estimated using the target firm’s SIC2 industry R&D worker ratio, Tgt SIC2 Industry R&D 
Worker Ratio , as the instrument. In models (3) and (4), I further include the number that counts how 
often the word group “trade secret”, “trade secrets” and/or “trade secrecy” is mentioned in target firm’s 
most recent 10-K report filed with the SEC prior to offer announcement, Tgt Trade Secrecy Mention 
Count in 10-K, as an instrument. All regressions include Acquirer Industry × Year Fixed Effects and 
Target Industry Fixed Effects   but are unreported. All standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and automatically adjusted in the 2nd stage (applying the STATA™ 
xtivreg2  2SLS command developed in Schaffer (2010)). *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  BTF Size 
   1st Stage  2nd Stage  1st Stage  2nd Stage 
 Independent Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Target Firm Characteristics         
 Tgt Know Cap Stock*    
5.073** 
(2.141) 
   
3.670** 
(1.643) 
 Tgt SIC2 Industry R&D Worker Ratio  
1.419*** 
(0.383) 
































          












          
Other Target Firm Characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Deal Characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Acquiring Firm Characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
          
Acq Industry × Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Tgt Industry FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
Observations  753  753  735  735 
Adjusted R2  0.407  0.102  0.423  0.032 
1st Stage Feff-statistic (MOP) 
{p-value} 



















J-statistic (Sargan-Hansen) {p-value}        
0.780 
{0.377} 
Model p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
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(column (2)), the coefficient on the predicted value, Tgt Know Cap Stock*, is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level, and even larger than the marginal effect obtained in 
the baseline regression in column (3) in Table 244. This finding is consistent with the study of 
Pancost and Schaller (2019), who find that the 2SLS coefficient is in fact larger than the OLS 
coefficient in 86% of their surveyed cases, even if theory suggests that the OLS coefficient 
should be inflated relative to the 2SLS coefficient. Their study also shows that the 2SLS ap-
proach resolves a substantial amount of attenuation bias resulting from classical errors-in-
variables. My inference remains unchanged if I replace the instrument with its lagged values. 
 I receive qualitatively and quantitatively similar results in the regression setup with 
both instruments as presented in columns (3) and (4). Both IVs are strongly correlated with 
the predicted value in the first stage, although exhibit a somewhat weaker effective F-statistic 
of 10.329. Also, the Sargan-Hansen (Sargan (1958)) over-identification test (see, e.g., Hayashi 
(2000)) is unable to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments satisfy the exclusion re-
striction (J-statistic is 0.780 with a p-value of 0.377). Since the Stock and Yogo (2005) weak 
identification F-test 15% critical value is slightly larger with a value of 11.590 and thus slightly 
“worse” – though also reliable – compared to the single IV approach, I focus on the results of 
columns (1) and (2) for causal interpretation. Thus, after exploiting this exogenous source of 
economically meaningful and directly related R&D-intensity variation, I conclude that my 
findings are robust to this method of endogeneity correction. The baseline effect likely under-
estimates the true relation between target’s intellectual property value and the size of the 
negotiated bidder termination fee. 
 
3.4.4 Baseline Regression Results:       
 Short-Term Target Firm Value Effects around Deal Resolution 
 To logically complete my story of the BTF compensating the target for revealing private 
information and important business and technology secrets during negotiations, I also need to 
consider what is happening if acquirers really terminate deals. Although the prospective deal, 
once officially announced, receives public attention and market participants price in and 
 
44 Second stage’s standard errors are adjusted accordingly, applying STATA™’s xtivreg2  command. 
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regularly update their beliefs about the probability of deal completion, acquirer-induced deal 
failure may be a surprise for target shareholders. This makes an event study approach feasible, 
since it is then exogenous to target’s stock price movement. As put forward in Section 3.2, I 
expect it to be beneficial for the target if the acquirer abandons the deal and pays a bidder 
termination fee, in contrast to the benchmark case in which the deal is terminated and no BTF 
is paid. Following hypothesis 2, this relation should increase in the size of the BTF (i.e., the 
received payment scaled by target’s size). Table 4 presents the results of an event study at 
deal resolution. 
 Acq Induced Cancellation  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquirer induced 
the cancellation of the deal, and 0 otherwise. Specification (1) regresses target’s cumulative 
abnormal deal resolution returns on BTF Dummy  and Acq Induced Cancellation alone, which 
does not indicate a significant relation. In regression (2), however, the coefficient on the in-
cluded interaction term Acq Induced Cancellation × BTF Dummy  is positive and statistically 
highly significant at the 1% level. 
The results hold if I repeat these two regressions with the continuous variable BTF Size  
instead of its dummy variable (regressions (3) and (4)). Consistent with hypothesis 2, the 
coefficient on Acq Induced Cancellation × BTF Size  is positive and statistically significant at 
the 5% level. This supports the view that deal termination by the acquirer and the associated 
payment of the bidder termination fee is beneficial for the target, and that this relation in-
creases in the size of the BTF, as compared to the case if the deal is terminated and no BTF 
is agreed on in the merger contract. 
By including the dummy variable Third Party Competing Bid Cancellation , I addition-
ally control for deal termination by third parties. This usually happens if a topping bid from 
another bidder emerges. Since target boards have to consider any bid until successful (target) 
shareholder approval, competing bids, if they arise, are often higher. The positive and statisti-
cally significant coefficient across all specifications is in line with this reasoning. The same 
holds for Deal Completion , where I find the relation to target’s cumulative abnormal deal 
resolution returns also to be positive. I include acquirer and target characteristics according to 
the target cumulative abnormal deal resolution return regressions in Malmendier et al. (2016).




Short-Term Target Firm Value Effects around Deal Resolution 
Table 4 presents the results of linear fixed effects regressions of target firm’s cumulative abnormal deal 
resolution returns on two variables of interest, first, the interaction term Acq Induced Cancellation × 
BTF Dummy (regression (2)), and second, the interaction term Acq Induced Cancellation × BTF Size 
(regression (4)). Acq Induced Cancellation  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquirer induced 
the cancellation of the deal, and 0 otherwise, BTF Dummy  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
merger agreement includes a bidder termination fee provision, and 0 otherwise, and BTF Size  is USD 
(mm) amount of the bidder termination fee divided by the market capitalization (also in USD mm) of 
the target firm 42 trading days prior to offer announcement and expressed in percentage points. C4 CAR  
denote Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model to model normal returns (cumulative abnormal returns). Third 
Party Competing Bid Cancellation  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal was cancelled due to a 
third party bid for the target that led to the cancellation of the original bid, and 0 otherwise. Deal 
Completion  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal was closed successfully, and 0 if cancelled. 
Acq Hadlock-Pierce-Index  is a measure for acquiring firm’s financial constraints, proposed by Hadlock 
and Pierce (2010). I further include Deal Characteristics  as well as market-to-book ratios and stock 
return volatility measures for both the target and the acquirer (as outlined in Section 3.3). All regressions 
include Target Industry × Deal Resolution Year Fixed Effects  as well as an intercept but are unreported. 
All standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster 
correlation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  Tgt C4 CAR 
 Event Window  [–3;+3] 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) 


























Acq Induced Cancellation × BTF Size 
 









































       
Other Deal Characteristics  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acq & Tgt: MTB & Stock Return Volatility  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Tgt Industry × Deal Resolution Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations  497 497 497 497 
Adjusted R2  0.113 0.139 0.109 0.126 
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3.4.5 Interaction between Intellectual Property Protection and Firm Pair Characteristics 
Technological Proximity between Acquirer and Target 
 Building on the theoretical reasoning developed for hypothesis 3a, the relation between 
target firm’s knowledge capital stock value and BTF size should increase in the degree of 
technological proximity between the acquirer and the target. The more close the merger pair’s 
knowledge base is, the more likely they are competing not only in product market space, but 
they also more likely compete among applying and developing technological advances to en-
hance innovation. I furthermore claim that the knowledge capital of the target firm can be 
better ascertained by an acquirer that innovates in a similar technology space. 
 To quantify the degree of technological proximity between merging firms, I propose the 
spillover-adjusted Mahalanobis extension of the Jaffe (1986) technological similarity measure, 
developed in Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen (2013), which has certain advantages over 
the generic measure. Jaffe’s (1986) measure, in the context of merging firms, is defined as the 
following positive correlation coefficient, bound between 0 and 145: 




 Most important, the Bloom et al. (2013) measure allows for spillovers between different 
technology classes46, which are defined by the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) to classify patents. To measure spillovers, they argue that if two technologies are 
often located together in the same firm (e.g., “computer input/output” and “computer pro-
cessing”), spillovers will be greater, because the distance between the technologies is smaller. 
They proxy for this Mahalanobis distance by the share of times the two technology classes are 
 
45 First, all of the firm’s patents between 1970 and 2006 are allocated into the different 426 USPTO 
technology classes, defining the scope-of-innovation-activity-vector Ti = (Ti1, Ti2, Ti3, …, Ti426) for firm i 
where Tiτ is the share of firm i ’s patents in technology class τ, i.e., Tiτ is the ratio of the number of 
awarded patents to firm i  in technology class τ  to the total number of awarded patents in all technology 
classes over the whole period since 1970. The results are robust to using the unadjusted measure instead. 
46 This is ruled out by the Jaffe (1986) measure, which assumes technological spillovers only within the 
same class and no spillovers to and from other classes. 
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patented within the same firm47. In order to make an economically meaningful statement, I 
calculate their adjusted measure for all acquirer-target firm pairs in my sample by using their 
algorithm48, split the sample at the median value for Technological Proximity (Tech Prox ), 
generate a dummy that equals 1 if Tech Prox  is above the sample median, 0 otherwise, and 
interact this dummy (Tech Prox Median ) with my variable of interest, Tgt Know Cap Stock . 
Table 5 presents the regression results. 
Table 5 
Interaction between Intellectual Property Protection and Technological Proximity 
This table shows the results of linear fixed effects regressions of BTF Size  on the variable of interest, 
the interaction term Tgt Know Cap Stock × Tech Prox Median . Tech Prox Median  is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the values for Technological Proximity  are above the sample median, and 0 otherwise. 
Technological Proximity  is defined as the spillover-adjusted correlation coefficient of patenting across 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) technology classes between pairs of firms (i.e., 
acquirer-target pairs in the sample, see Table A1 (Panel B) in the Appendix for a detailed definition). 
Regression (2) is the same as regression (1), except that I include Tech Prox Missing (zero), a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the acquirer-target pair’s value for Technological Proximity  is zero or if either 
the acquirer and/or the target firm hasn’t been granted a patent from the USPTO since 1970. Data on 
Technological Proximity  are obtained from Nicholas Bloom’s website (see Lucking, Bloom, and Van 
Reenen (2018), and Bloom et al. (2013)). As a robustness test, I restrict the sample in regression (3) to 
observations in which the value for Technological Proximity  is strictly larger than zero (in Table A4 in 
the Appendix I additionally fit a Heckman (1979) selection model). All regressions include Acquirer 
Industry × Year Fixed Effects , Target Industry Fixed Effects as well as an intercept but are unreported. 
All standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster 
correlation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  BTF Size 
   Full Sample  Tech Prox > 0 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2)  (3) 
       
 






























47 The result is an adjusted technology closeness measure that weights the overlap in patent shares 
between firms by how close their different patent shares are to each other. “The same patent class in 
different firms is given a weight of 1, and different patent classes in different firms are given a weight 
between 0 and 1, depending on how frequently they overlap within firms […].”, see the detailed descrip-
tion in their updated paper (Lucking, Bloom, and Van Reenen (2018)). 
48 Provided on Nicholas Bloom’s website: https://nbloom.people.stanford.edu/research. 
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Controls  Yes Yes  Yes 
       
Acq Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes  Yes 
Tgt Industry FE  Yes Yes  Yes 
       
Observations  769 769  233 
Adjusted R2  0.108 0.107  0.384 
(Table 5 continued) 
 As suggested by hypothesis 3a, the coefficients on Tgt Know Cap Stock  and the inter-
action term, Tgt Know Cap Stock × Tech Prox Median , are both positive and statistically 
highly significant at the 1% level (specification (1)). The results are qualitatively and quanti-
tatively unchanged if I additionally control for acquirer-target firm pairs having a Tech Prox 
correlation coefficient of zero (column (2)), which is the case if one or both firms haven’t been 
granted a patent since 1970. Regression specification (3) shows the results for Tech Prox values 
strictly larger than zero, i.e., only for patenting firms, where I find the inference to also remain 
unchanged49. These results strongly support hypothesis 3a. 
Product Market Rivalry between Acquirer and Target 
 Hypothesis 3b posits that, all else equal, the baseline relation should increase in the 
degree of competition between the merging firms. The reason is that a directly competing 
acquirer could gain the most from exploiting target’s private information and innovation by 
successfully capitalizing them and increasing his market share by simultaneously weakening 
the target as a competitor. On the other hand, if the merging firm pair has no common relation 
in product market space, incentives to exploit information should be smaller. 
 Quantifying a comparable degree of product market rivalry at the detailed firm-firm-
level is difficult. Well-known industry classifications such as the SIC or NAICS definitions fail 
to provide firm-firm-specific measures, are somewhat rigid since they are slow to update over 
time, and are based on production processes and not necessarily the products and services 
 
49 Although at a somewhat weaker statistical significance level, since the number of observations drop 
from 769 to 233. Table A4 in the Appendix provides additional support for the results after controlling 
for sample selection with respect to successfully patenting firm pairs, applying a Heckman (1979) cor-
rection model. 
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finally offered by the firm (Frésard et al. (2020)). To overcome these pitfalls of old classifica-
tions, I apply the textual product market similarity score based on firms’ 10-K filings, devel-
oped by Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2016), to measure the degree of firm-firm-year-specific 
competition. Their Text-based Network Industry Classifications (TNIC) are generated by pars-
ing the product descriptions from the firms’ 10-Ks and forming word vectors for each firm to 
compute continuous measures of product similarity for every pair of firms in the CRSP/Com-
pustat universe in each year (a pairwise similarity matrix). This correlation coefficient has the 
advantage of quickly reacting to changes in product descriptions50. The higher their score, the 
closer the two firms are product market rivals. I match their firm-firm-year-level pairwise sim-
ilarity score with the merging acquirer-target firm pairs in the sample and define tercile dum-
mies based on their values which are then interacted with Tgt Know Cap Stock . TNIC1, 
TNIC2, and TNIC3 represent calibrations similar to different industry definition granularities: 
TNIC1 is the complete version and most detailed of the standard TNIC network developed by 
Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2016) with all firm pairs included (even those that are very weakly 
related). TNIC2 matches the granularity of SIC2-level industries, and TNIC3 the granularity 
of SIC3-level industries. Table 6 depicts the results of regressions including these similarity 
measures. 
 As claimed by hypothesis 3b, the coefficient on the interaction term Tgt Know Cap 
Stock × Top Tercile PMS TNIC1 is positive and highly statistically significant at the 1% level 
for the baseline BTF size  regression (specifications (4)–(6), depending on the granularity of 
industry definitions). Columns (1)–(3) show the results for the fixed effects logit regressions of 
BTF Dummy, an indicator variable that equals 1 if a BTF is negotiated between the merging 
parties, and 0 otherwise, where the coefficient is also significant at the 5% level. The results 
from both regression types suggest that the relation between target firm’s knowledge capital 
stock value and the size of the bidder termination fee is increasing in the firm pair’s degree of 
product market rivalry, independent of the ex-ante determined industry granularities, and thus 
 
50 Hoberg and Phillips state on their data website: “These product descriptions are legally required to 
be accurate, as Item 101 of Regulation S-K legally requires that firms describe the significant products 
they offer to the market, and these descriptions must also be updated and representative of the current 
fiscal year of the 10-K.” This is to make sure that the descriptions are reliable. Misuse can be enforced 
by the SEC, hence firms have a strong ex-ante incentive to report truthfully. 
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strongly support hypothesis 3b. Taken together, the results indicate that new innovation – 
generated through R&D – can be most valuable for firms with a similar technology base and 
firms that are direct competitors. 
Table 6 
Interaction between Intellectual Property Protection and Product Market Rivalry 
Table 6 presents the results of linear fixed effects regressions of BTF Size  on a set of variables of interest, 
the interaction terms between Tgt Know Cap Stock and different quantiles of Product Market Similarity 
(PMS). Top Tercile PMS  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the value of Product Market Similarity 
(PMS) is in the top (highest) tercile of its distribution, and 0 otherwise. Product Market Similarity 
(PMS) is a yearly firm-by-firm pairwise product market similarity score (real number in the interval 
[0,1]) calculated for each firm-firm-fiscal-year combination by parsing the product descriptions from the 
firms’ annual 10-Ks and forming word vectors for each firm to compute continuous measures of product 
similarity for every pair of firms in the sample in each year (a pairwise similarity matrix). A higher score 
relates to a higher word similarity (i.e., the text of the two firms’ business descriptions has more common 
vocabulary than a pair of firms with a lower score), used as a proxy for product similarity and thus 
product-market rivalry, i.e., firm pairs with a higher score are “nearer” rivals. The index (TNIC1, TNIC2, 
and TNIC3) refer to the granularity between the two firms with TNIC1 being of highest (most detailed) 
granularity which explains the decrease in observations from regression (1) to regression (3), and (4) to 
(6), respectively (see Table A1 (Panel B) in the Appendix for a detailed definition). All Text-based 
Network Industry Classifications (TNIC) data are obtained from the Hoberg-Phillips Data Library 
(Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2016)). All regressions include Acquirer Industry × Year Fixed Effects , 
Target Industry Fixed Effects   as well as an intercept but are unreported. All standard errors (in paren-
theses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster correlation. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  BTF Dummy  BTF Size 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
          
 
Top Tercile PMS TNIC1  
−0.205 
(0.311) 





Med Tercile PMS TNIC1  
−0.080 
(0.301) 





Tgt Know Cap Stock × Top Tercile PMS TNIC1  
2.985** 
(1.485) 





Tgt Know Cap Stock × Med Tercile PMS TNIC1  
−0.823 
(1.224) 





Top Tercile PMS TNIC2   
−0.585 
(0.360) 





Med Tercile PMS TNIC2   
−0.378 
(0.372) 





Tgt Know Cap Stock × Top Tercile PMS TNIC2   
3.055** 
(1.466) 





Tgt Know Cap Stock × Med Tercile PMS TNIC2   
1.176 
(1.566) 





Top Tercile PMS TNIC3    
−0.345 
(0.367) 




Med Tercile PMS TNIC3    
−0.535 
(0.409) 




Tgt Know Cap Stock × Top Tercile PMS TNIC3    
3.511* 
(1.851) 
   
1.772* 
(1.038) 
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Tgt Know Cap Stock × Med Tercile PMS TNIC3    
3.463 
(2.209) 

































          
Controls  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
          
Acq Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Tgt Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
          
Observations  694 603 525  694 603 525 
Pseudo R2  0.339 0.422 0.415     
Adjusted R2      0.115 0.195 0.203 
(Table 6 continued) 
 
3.5 Robustness Tests 
 The following results aim to underpin the story developed in this chapter by first dis-
cussing subsample regressions where I find the effect between target’s intellectual property 
value and BTF size to be more pronounced. Second, I provide evidence that my regression 
results are robust to different scaling, i.e., by relating the dollar values of both BTF and target’s 
knowledge capital stock to different reference values, emphasizing the economic magnitude of 
the relation. Third, I show that target firm’s knowledge capital stock is a reliable and highly 
significant determinant of both its patenting activity as well as the likelihood to mention trade 
secrets in its 10-K report. Including these innovation outcome variables directly in the main 
regression would raise a bad control concern (Angrist and Pischke (2008)). Lastly, I show that 
my results are robust to including proxies controlling for the degree of information diffusion 
from the target to the acquirer. 
3.5.1 Subsample Tests 
 Table 7 presents a set of subsample regressions that highlight where the effect is 
stronger or weaker, if not existent at all. First, in regressions (1) and (2), the sample is split 
by the median value of Tgt 5YR Avrg Yearly Know Cap Growth . This growth rate is defined 
as the average annualized growth rate of Tgt Know Cap Stock within the target firm calculated 
over the last five fiscal years prior to offer announcement. I hypothesize that the effect between 
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Tgt Know Cap Stock  and BTF size  should be more pronounced, if the target belongs to the 
pioneers in its technology sector, as proxied by above average investment increases in R&D. 
At the beginning of a technology wave, innovation is likely not yet protected by patents, and 
firms should have the highest incentive to increase their R&D investments, since there might 
only exist – if at all – a limited number of competitors. In turn, the target’s private intellectual 
property then has the highest value for the acquirer in securing significant market shares. As 
hypothesized, the coefficient is positive and highly statistically significant only in the high 
growth rate regression (rate above sample median, (1)), and also positive, yet insignificant, in 
specification (2). This suggests that the relation remains positive during the saturation phase 
of the innovation wave, though less strong, since the marginal value of innovation effort to add 
new technology features typically decreases over time, consistent with Frésard et al. (2020). 
 Next, I expect the effect to be more pronounced for targets that rely very heavily on 
R&D in general. To gauge this dependency, I define Tgt Know Cap Intensity as the percentage 
share of Tgt Know Cap Stock on both intangible capital stocks (knowledge and organizational 
capital). Regression (3) and (4) depict the results, showing that the effect is positive and highly 
significant only for firms in the top quartile of the distribution of Tgt Know Cap Intensity (3). 
 Tgt Unique Product Industry  is a dummy variable that equals 1 (Yes) if the target 
firm’s industry is in the top quartile of all Fama-French 49 industries annually sorted by 
industry-median product uniqueness, 0 (No) otherwise, where product uniqueness is defined as 
all selling expenses scaled by sales51. According to Titman and Wessels (1988), firms that sell 
products with close substitutes are hypothesized to do less R&D since their innovations can be 
more easily duplicated. In addition, successful R&D projects are hypothesized to lead to new 
products that differ from those existing in the market. Consistent with this reasoning, the 
coefficient on Tgt Know Cap Stock  is positive and statistically highly significant only in re-
gression (5), i.e., for targets assigned to industries selling unique products. 
 Furthermore, if targets operate in industries where innovation may be one of the most 
important driving force, the main association claimed in this chapter should also be strongest. I 
define Tgt FF5 HTHC Industry  as a dummy variable that equals 1 if the target is assigned to 
 
51 Calculated following Titman and Wessels (1988) and Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007). 




Robustness − Subsample Tests 
The following table depicts the results of linear fixed effects regressions of BTF Size  on Tgt Know Cap Stock  and all control variables used in the baseline regression 
in Table 2, column (3), except that the full sample is split by various measures. In regressions (1) and (2), the sample is split by the median value of Tgt 5YR Avrg 
Yearly Know Cap Growth , which is the average annualized growth rate of Tgt Know Cap Stock  within the target firm calculated over the last five fiscal years prior 
to offer announcement (given that I require the target firm to have at least full five years of valid R&D data prior to offer announcement, the sample is restricted to 
324 observations). Regressions (3) and (4) are split by Tgt Know Cap Intensity , which is defined as Tgt Know Cap Stock  divided by the sum of Tgt Know Cap Stock  
and Tgt Org Cap Stock . Regression (3) shows the results for the top quartile, regression (4) shows the results for the other remaining observations. Tgt Unique Product 
Industry  (regressions (5) and (6)) is a dummy that equals 1 (Yes) if the target firm’s industry is in the top quartile of all Fama-French 49 industries annually sorted 
by industry-median product uniqueness, 0 (No) otherwise, where product uniqueness is defined as all selling expenses scaled by sales. Regressions (7) and (8) are 
divided by Tgt FF5 HTHC Industry , a dummy variable that equals 1 if the target is assigned to the Fama-French 5 industry classification in either hightech (HT) or 
healthcare (HC), and 0 otherwise. In regressions (9) and (10), the sample is split by Tgt Trade Secrecy Mention Count in 10-K , which is the number of mentions of 
either “trade secret”, “trade secrets” and/or “trade secrecy” in target firm’s most recent 10-K report filed with the SEC prior to offer announcement. The reason I 
chose to split the sample by values strictly larger than (smaller or equal to) 1 is that in some cases the above mentioned words appear only in (standard) headlines in 
10-K filings with no further explanantion if trade secrets really exist. All regressions include Acquirer Industry × Year Fixed Effects , Target Industry Fixed Effects  as 
well as an intercept but are unreported. All standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster correlation. *, **, 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  BTF Size 
 
  
Tgt 5YR Avrg Yearly 
Know Cap Growth 
 
Tgt Know Cap 
Intensity 
 
Tgt Unique Product 
Industry 
 
Tgt FF5 HTHC 
Industry 
 
Tgt Trade Secrecy 
Mention Count in 10-K 
   High Low  High Low  Yes No  Yes No  > 1 ≤ 1 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
Target Firm Characteristics                
 








































































































































                 
Deal Characteristics  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Acquiring Firm Characteristics  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
                 
Acq Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Tgt Industry FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
                 
Observations  162 162  195 574  451 318  286 483  273 478 
Adjusted R2  0.301 0.117  0.381 0.078  0.126 0.093  0.206 0.084  0.184 0.109 
(Table 7 continued)
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the Fama-French 5 industry classification in either hightech (HT) or healthcare (HC), and 0 
(No) otherwise. I hypothesize that the coefficient is positive and highly significant in these 
industries, which is supported, as shown in columns (7) and (8). 
 Lastly, since it is inherently difficult to quantify the secret value of a single trade secret, 
there exists at least a possibility to gauge the degree to which firms are relying on them. 
Following Glaeser (2018), I define Tgt Trade Secrecy Mention Count in 10-K  as the number 
of mentions of either “trade secret”, “trade secrets” and/or “trade secrecy” in target firm’s 
most recent 10-K report filed with the SEC prior to offer announcement. Firms that use these 
words frequently are hypothesized to heavily rely on them, and often mention trade secrets in 
the context of discussing measures they take to protect them. Follwing that notion, I expect 
the effect to be stronger for firms that mention it more than once in their 10-Ks, since further 
investigation of these filings revealed that in some cases the word “trade secret” or a wildcard 
is used in headlines only. The last columns in Table 7, (9) and (10), clearly underpin this 
reasoning. The coefficient is positive and statistically highly significant only if the word group 
is used more than once (specification (9)), but also positive, yet insignificant in regression (10). 
3.5.2 Different Scaling and Economic Magnitude 
 As a robustness, I scale all deal-level and intangible capital stock variables with Deal 
Value  instead of target’s market capitalization. For brevity, the table is deferred to the Ap-
pendix (Table A5). The number of observations slightly decreases due to the availability of 
valid data for acquirer’s financial constraints indices. I do this to show that the inferences I 
draw in this chapter are robust to different scaling methods52. The regressions deviate from 
each other only in the variables included to control for acquirer’s financial constraints. Marginal 
effects are comparable to the baseline specifications in Table 2. 
 Table 8 regresses the pure dollar value of the BTF on capital stock measures and other 
deal-level variables in various specifications with and without deal advisor fees, with and with-
out deal-level dummy variables, and a distinction of target’s other total intangibles (regression 
 
52 In untabulated regressions, I additionally scale all capital stocks and termination fees by all off- and 
on-balance sheet assets, i.e., by the sum of knowledge, organizational, and total assets. 
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(4))53. The intuition behind this table is to receive a real dollar value for the economic magni-
tude of the claimed relation between target’s knowledge capital stock value and BTF size . The 
full specification (column (4)) suggests that, on average, for every dollar worth of target firm’s 
R&D capital stock, 16.3 cents of protective share is priced in the BTF, controlling for all other 
factors affecting BTF size  in this chapter. This final result emphasizes the economic relevance 
of bidder termination fees as incentive-compatible contract clauses in M&A negotiations. 
Table 8 
Robustness − Unscaled U.S. Dollar Values 
Table 8 shows the results of linear fixed effects regressions of BTF Size Dollar Value on Tgt Know Cap 
Stock Dollar Value  and all control variables used in the baseline regression in Table 2, column (3). The only 
difference is, that in this table, all key variables (BTF Size , Tgt Know Cap Stock , Tgt Org Cap Stock , 
TTF Size , Acq All Financial Advisor Fees , and Tgt All Financial Advisor Fees ) are not scaled, i.e., are 
“pure” U.S. dollar values. Regressions (1)–(3) vary by the inclusion of Financial Advisor Fees, in regres-
sion (3), I split target firm’s total intangibles into the two main components: goodwill and identifiable 
intangibles. Regression (4) adds all other controls as a robustness check. All regressions include Acquirer 
Industry × Year Fixed Effects , Target Industry Fixed Effects as well as an intercept but are unreported. 
All standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster 
correlation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  BTF Size Dollar Value 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Target Firm Characteristics      
 

















































Tgt Market-to-Book [OA–22]     
−4.346 
(3.617) 
Deal Characteristics      
 




























53 Observations drop from 769 to 729 given that some firms do not differentiate between goodwill and 
other identifiable intangible assets, and only report total intangibles instead. 
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Acquiring Firm Characteristics      
 






















Acq Market-to-Book [OA–22]     
−1.813 
(1.544) 
       
Acq Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tgt Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations  769 769 729 729 
Adjusted R2  0.557 0.532 0.570 0.583 
(Table 8 continued) 
3.5.3 Relation between Knowledge Capital Stock and Patenting Activity 
 As developed in Ewens et al. (2020), intangible stocks are important production factors 
for intellectual capital in the form of patents. To show that my results are consistent with 
theirs, I also regress Kogan’s et al. (2017) patent valuation measures obtained from market 
reactions to patent grants on Tgt Know Cap Stock , Tgt Org Cap Stock , and controls for 
already acquired intangibles and firm size. The results are shown in Table 9, suggesting that 
only Tgt Know Cap Stock  is a significant driver of patent production in all specifications. All 
variables are scaled by total assets, given that firm size is a significant factor affecting the 
number and value of patents. All x-variables are lagged one year and logged. The inclusion of 
knowledge stocks significantly increases the within-R2 (up to three to ten times), indicating 
that they explain a meaningful amount of variation in both patent valuation and patent count. 
As argued in Kogan et al. (2017), the distinction into market and scientific values is important,




Robustness − Relation between Target Firm’s Patents and Knowledge Capital Stock 
This table presents the results of linear fixed effects regressions of measures of target firm’s patents on target firm’s knowledge capital stock. The dependent variable 
in regressions (1)–(3) is ln Target Patent Value (market-weighted), the natural logarithm of target firm’s market-weighted patent value, the dependent variable in 
regressions (4)–(6) is ln Target Patent Value (citation-weighted), the natural logarithm of target firm’s citation-weighted patent value, both obtained from Kogan et 
al. (2017) and their data website. ln Target Patent Count (recently granted) is the number of patents recently (i.e., in the whole fiscal year prior to offer announcement) 
granted to the target firm, and ln Target Patent Count (total stock) is the total number of patents the target firm are granted until the fiscal year end prior to offer 
announcement, i.e., yearly counts of target firm’s granted United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) patents. Patents must not be expired in order to be 
included in ln Target Patent Count (total stock). The data on total stocks are obtained from the University of Virginia (UVA) Darden Global Corporate Patent 
Dataset (https://patents.darden.virginia.edu/get-data (permanent link)). All variables are scaled by target firm’s total assets and logged, all explanatory variables are 
also lagged one year. All regressions include Target Industry × Year Fixed Effects  as well as an intercept but are unreported. All standard errors (in parentheses) are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster correlation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
   Target Patent Value  Target Patent Count 
 
Dependent Variable  
ln Target Patent Value 
(market-weighted) 
 
ln Target Patent Value 
(citation-weighted) 
 
ln Target Patent Count 
(recently granted) 
 
ln Target Patent Count 
(total stock) 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) 
                  
 





















Lag ln Tgt Org Cap Stock    
0.024 
(0.037) 
   
0.103 
(0.081) 
   
0.039 
(0.026) 





























































                  
Tgt Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
                  
Observations  158 158 158  158 158 158  158 158 158  246 246 246 
Adjusted R2  0.012 0.055 0.051  0.027 0.085 0.096  0.055 0.280 0.299  0.033 0.364 0.367 
Within R2  0.025 0.073 0.076  0.040 0.102 0.119  0.067 0.294 0.317  0.041 0.372 0.378 
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because a patent may represent only a small scientific advance, yet generate large profits and 
thus private returns to the firm through restricting competition. The obtained coefficients are 
similar to Ewens et al. (2020), with a 1% increase in target’s knowledge capital stock resulting 
in a 0.122% increase in patent market value, on average54. Figure A2 in the Appendix plots the 
respective bivariate relations between targets’ patent values, patent count, and knowledge cap-
ital stocks. 
3.5.4 Relation between Knowledge Capital Stock and Mentioning Trade Secrets in 10-Ks 
 Based on the inferences drawn in the preceding subsection, it is also obvious to assume 
that there should exist a relation between knowledge capital value and the existence of trade 
secrets. Albeit one cannot directly observe and confirm the presence of trade secrets within a 
firm, one can at least infer that they likely exist if they are mentioned in official reports. 
Therefore, as outlined in the paragraph above, I parse the most recent 10-K report of the target 
firm prior to offer announcement by searching the word group “trade secret” or a respective 
wildcard. Firms that often mention trade secrets in their SEC reports are hypothesized to rely 
on them55, and often describe and discuss safety mechanisms established in the firm to protect 
them. Table 10 shows the results for logit and linear fixed effects regressions of a dummy coded 
1 if trade secrets are mentioned (specification (1)) as well as the number of mentions (contin-
uous measure, specification (2)) on target’s knowledge capital stock value, scaled by total assets 
for comparison. In both regressions, the coefficient is positive and statistically highly signifi-
cant. In the logit model, I include x-standardized odds ratios [in angular parentheses] that 
relate to the change in the probability of including the word group “trade secre*” for a one-
standard deviation increase in the independent variable. Thus, a one-standard deviation in-
crease from the sample mean of Tgt Know Cap Stock [TA]  increases the odds of mentioning 
trade secrets in the 10-K report by the factor of 25, on average. Also, firms that mention them 
seem to have low leverage and are younger firms, confirming the results of Glaeser (2018). 
 
54 The results hold if all variables are scaled by target firm’s market capitalization instead of total assets. 
The number of observations drops to 158 and 246, respectively, given that the data from Kogan et al. 
(2017) cover firms until 2010 (regressions (1)–(9)) and firms that have valid data on patent total stocks 
obtained from the UVA Darden Global Corporate Patent Dataset (regressions (10)–(12)). 
55 Although mentioning them in 10-Ks do not make them legally enforceable (especially in lawsuits 
against misappropriation), it is obvious that they fulfill at least a highly indicative function. 




Robustness − Determinants of Disclosure-based Mentions of Target Firm’s Trade Secrets 
This table depicts the results of logit (1) and linear (2) fixed effects regressions of proxies of target firm’s 
trade secrecy on target firm’s knowledge capital stock and other controls. The dependent variable in 
specification (1) is the dummy variable Tgt Trade Secrets Mentioned in 10-K  which equals 1 if the word 
group “trade secret” or a wildcard [*] are mentioned in target firm’s most recent 10-K report filed with 
the SEC prior to offer announcement. In specification (2), the dependent variable, Tgt Trade Secrecy 
Mention Count in 10-K , is the exact count, i.e., how many times the word groups are mentioned. The 
first four independent variables with the index [TA] are scaled by target firm’s total assets and are 
lagged one year. Target firm’s stock return volatility, market-to-book, and market leverage are defined 
as for the acquiring firm and measured 42 trading days prior to the 10-K report date. All regressions 
include Target Industry Fixed Effects and Year Fixed Effects as well as an intercept but are unreported. 
All standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster 
correlation. Model (1) includes x-standardized odds ratios [in angular parentheses] that relate to the 
change in the probability of including the word group “trade secre*” for a one-standard deviation increase 
in the independent variable. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  
Tgt Trade Secrets 
Mentioned in 10-K 
 
Tgt Trade Secrecy 
Mention Count in 10-K 
 Independent Variables  (1)  (2) 
      
























































      
Tgt Industry FE  Yes  Yes 
Year FE  Yes  Yes 
      
Observations  522  522 
Pseudo R2  0.579   
Adjusted R2    0.395 
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Figure A3 in the Appendix additionally plots the predicted probabilities of mentioning 
trade secrets against Tgt Know Cap Stock [TA] , visualizing the strong positive association 
(steeply increasing S-shape of the fitted function). 
3.5.5 Degree of Information Diffusion from Target to Acquirer  
 Although it is not possible to directly assess the degree to which the negotiating firms 
“qualitatively” exchange information, i.e., how intense negotiations proceed, it is at least pos-
sible to proxy for the quantitative component. In an additional test in Table 11, I include deal 
length measures for both the private takeover process only (regressions (1)–(3)), as well as the 
whole takeover process, including the public phase (columns (4)–(6)). The start dates are man-
ually parsed from the background sections of the merger agreements filed with the SEC. I 
define three different start dates for private negotiations between acquirer and target: first, 
Kick-Off date refers to the first date the target and an interested party (i.e., the deal announc-
ing acquirer or a third party) get in contact with each other on deal related matters. This date 
marks the first date of the coherent private takeover process. Second, First Board Meeting date  
refers to the date when the first board meeting on deal related matters between the deal 
announcing acquirer and target management board takes place. Third, Confidentiality Agree-
ment date  refers to the date when the deal announcing acquirer signs a confidentiality (non-
disclosure) agreement with the target firm. 
As depicted in Table 11, only the deal lengths starting at the confidentiality agreement 
date are positively and highly statistically significantly related to BTF size , suggesting that 
these measures capture the period in which significant information flows between the parties, 
and especially from the target to the prospective acquirer. Any Pre-Contact with Acq  is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the background section of the merger agreement mentions any 
contact between the final bidding acquirer and target prior to the start of the coherent private 
takeover process, and 0 otherwise, and is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level 
in all specifications. Given that one can hypothesize that this acquirer has collected more 
information about the target, all else equal, this is what one would expect. Including these 
deal-level controls do not change the inference over and significance of Tgt Know Cap Stock . 
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Table 11 
Robustness − Measures of the Length of the Private Takeover Process 
Table 11 presents the results of linear fixed effects regressions of BTF Size  on Tgt Know Cap Stock  and 
different measures of deal length (all measured in months). Private Takeover Process Lengths Only 
shows three different deal length measures with different start dates which are all measured until the 
announcement date (AD) of the deal. Whole Takeover Process Lengths  depicts three different deal 
length measures with the same three different starting dates as described above, but are now all measured 
until the resolution date (RD) of the deal, i.e., the date where the deal was either successfully closed or 
withdrawn. The sample size is reduced from 769 to 398 observations in order to form a sample where I 
am able to collect all dates for respective deal length measures. All standard errors (in parentheses) are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster correlation. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  BTF Size 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
         
 



























Private Takeover Process Lengths Only        
 
Kick-Off vs. AD  
0.029 
(0.089) 
     
 
First Board Meeting vs. AD   
0.011 
(0.080) 
    
 
Confidentiality Agreement vs. AD    
0.162** 
(0.066) 
   
Whole Takeover Process Lengths        
 










Confidentiality Agreement vs. RD       
0.144*** 
(0.043) 
         
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Acq Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tgt Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations  398 398 398 398 398 398 
Adjusted R2  0.202 0.202 0.222 0.211 0.209 0.232 
 
Despite the fact that private targets are not obliged to file merger documents with the 
SEC, and many do not even disclose R&D expenditures – are hence not part of the sample in 
this chapter, I claim my results to also hold for private transactions, as the possibility to include 
termination fee provisions in M&A contracts does not depend on the associated firm’s listing 
status. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
 This chapter establishes a robust link between target firms’ intellectual property value 
and the size of negotiated bidder termination fees (BTFs) in M&A contracts, that provide 
targets with a compensation payment for revelation of secret information if acquirers abandon 
deals due to reasons under their control. Applying Ewens’ et al. (2020) model to estimate the 
capitalized value of target firm’s intangible stocks, my findings suggest that, on average, for 
every dollar of target firm’s R&D capital stock, roughly 16 cents of protective share is incor-
porated in the BTF, controlling for a wide array of factors deemed to affect BTF size. This 
relation is economically significant. 
 By utilizing an instrumental variables approach that exploits non-deal-related exoge-
nous variation, I am able to show that my results are robust to endogeneity concerns. The 
relation between target’s R&D intensity and the size of the BTF is more pronounced, if the 
target invests heavily in R&D, is a pioneer in its technology space, produces unique products, 
belongs to the hightech or healthcare industry, and frequently uses the term “trade secret” or 
a wildcard in its 10-K report filed with the SEC prior to deal announcement. The effect is 
moreover increasing in the degree of technological proximity as well as product market rivalry 
between the acquirer-target firm pair, suggesting that new innovation, generated through R&D, 
can be most valuable for firms with a similar technology base and firms that are also direct 
competitors. An event study at deal resolution indicates that target returns are increasing in 
the size of the BTF if acquirers abandon deals and pay the fee, underlining the compensating 
character of bidder termination fees. 
 Taken together, this chapter suggests that BTFs serve as a contract mechanism that 
provide target firms compensation for revelation of sensitive information in M&A negotiations 
if acquirers terminate deals. These fees thereby increase targets’ incentives to reveal these 
information and increase acquirers’ incentives to close the deal. 
 Valuing intangible assets, especially in the form of private trade secrets, remains a 
inherently difficult phenomenon to study empirically. This chapter hightlights the increasing 
importance of intellectual property in M&A negotiations, not only for practitioners, but also 
for future finance research.
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3.8 Appendix   Appendix − Table A1 
Variable Definitions 
Table A1 presents the definitions of all variables used throughout this chapter, including the source. 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Termination Fees and Target Intangible Capital Stocks 
BTF Dummy Dummy variable that equals 1 if the merger agreement includes a bidder termination fee 
provision, and 0 otherwise (Source: SEC Merger Filings ). 
TTF Dummy Dummy variable that equals 1 if the merger agreement includes a target termination fee 
provision, and 0 otherwise (Source: SEC Merger Filings ). 
BTF Dollar Value USD (mm) amount of the bidder termination fee (Source: SEC Merger Filings ). 
TTF Dollar Value USD (mm) amount of the target termination fee (Source: SEC Merger Filings ). 
BTF Size 
USD (mm) amount of the bidder termination fee divided by the market capitalization 
(also in USD mm) of the target firm 42 trading days prior to offer announcement and 
expressed in percentage points (Source: SEC Merger Filings, S&P Capital IQ ). 
TTF Size 
USD (mm) amount of the target termination fee divided by the market capitalization 
(also in USD mm) of the target firm 42 trading days prior to offer announcement and 
expressed in percentage points (Source: SEC Merger Filings, S&P Capital IQ ). 
BTF Size Deal Value 
USD (mm) amount of the bidder termination fee divided by Deal Value (also in USD 
mm) and expressed in percentage points (Source: SEC Merger Filings, Thomson Reuters 
SDC Platinum ). 
TTF Size Deal Value 
USD (mm) amount of the target termination fee divided by Deal Value (also in USD 
mm) and expressed in percentage points (Source: SEC Merger Filings, Thomson Reuters 
SDC Platinum ). 
Tgt Know Cap Stock Dollar Value 
Knowledge Capital Stock (in USD mm) in the target firm, defined as accumulated and 
depreciated R&D expenses in the target firm over the last 10 fiscal years before offer 
announcement, using the perpetual inventory method: 




where 𝛿G is the intangible depreciation rate of R&D. I use the industry-specific estimates 
for 𝛿G obtained in Ewens et al. (2020) (Source: Compustat ). 
Tgt Org Cap Stock Dollar Value 
Organizational Capital Stock (in USD mm) in the target firm, defined as accumulated 
and depreciated SG&A expenses in the target firm over the last 10 fiscal years before 
offer announcement, using the perpetual inventory method: 




where 𝛿S is the intangible depreciation rate (set to 𝛿S = 20% following the literature 
consensus, see, e.g., Li, Qiu, and Shen (2018) and Falato, Kadyrzhanova, Sim, and Steri 
(2020)) and γ  the fraction of SG&A to be capitalized. I use the industry-specific esti-
mates for γ  obtained in Ewens et al. (2020). I further measure SG&A net of R&D expense 
and Research and Development in Process (Source: Compustat ). 
Tgt Know Cap Stock 
Tgt Know Cap Stock divided by the market capitalization (also in USD mm) of the 
target firm 42 trading days prior to offer announcement (Source: Compustat, S&P Cap-
ital IQ ). 
Tgt Org Cap Stock Tgt Org Cap Stock divided by the market capitalization (also in USD mm) of the target 
firm 42 trading days prior to offer announcement (Source: Compustat, S&P Capital IQ ). 
Tgt Know Cap Stock Deal Value Tgt Know Cap Stock divided by Deal Value (also in USD mm). 
Tgt Org Cap Stock Deal Value Tgt Org Cap Stock divided by Deal Value (also in USD mm). 
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Tgt 5YR Avrg Yearly Know Cap 
Growth 
Average annualized growth rate of Tgt Know Cap Stock  within the target firm calcu-
lated over the last five fiscal years prior to offer announcement. 
Tgt Know Cap Intensity 
Tgt Know Cap Stock divided by the sum of Tgt Know Cap Stock and Tgt Org Cap 
Stock : 
Tgt Know Cap Intensity  =  
Tgt Know Cap Stock
Tgt Know Cap Stock  + Tgt Org Cap Stock 
Panel B: Deal and Industry Characteristics, and Measures of Technological Proximity and Product Market Rivalry 
Tgt Initiation Dummy variable that equals 1 if the target initiated the deal, and 0 otherwise (Source: SEC Merger Filings ). 
Auction 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the private sales process is characterized as an auction, 
and 0 otherwise. As in Boone and Mulherin (2008), I classify the private sales process as 
an auction, if the target signs confidentiality agreements with more than one prospective 
acquirer. To the contrary, I classify the sales process as a (1:1) negotiation, if the target 
firm focuses on a single acquirer throughout the whole private takeover phase, i.e., ne-
gotiations are deals with one formal contact, one signed confidentiality agreement, and 
one private (and later public) bid for the target by the original acquirer (Source: SEC 
Merger Filings ). 
Deal Value USD (bn) value of the transaction, i.e., total transaction value excluding assumed liabil-
ities (Source: Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum ). 
Friendly Dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal attitude is friendly on the announcement day 
of the deal, and 0 otherwise (Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
Cash Only Dummy variable that equals 1 if the payment by the acquirer is made entirely in cash, 
and 0 otherwise (Source: Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum ). 
Tender Offer Dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal is classified as a tender offer, and 0 otherwise 
(Source: SEC Merger Filings ). 
Horizontal Takeover 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if both the acquiring and the target firm are primarily 
assigned to the same industry as defined by all four SIC digits, and 0 otherwise (Source: 
S&P Capital IQ ). 
Relative Size Market Cap [OA–22] Acq Market Cap [OA–22]  divided by Tgt Market Cap [OA–22] . 
Post Closing Industry HHI  
Value of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of the primary industry the acquirer is 
operating in after completing the planned deal and calculated for horizontal takeovers 
only. The HHI is calculated every fiscal year by summing the squared market shares of 
each firm in the respective SIC4 industry based on the firms’ reported gross sales. Post 
Closing Industry HHI  is equal to zero for non-horizontal deals (Source: Compustat ). 
Post Closing Industry HHI 
Increase 
Merger-induced change in SIC4 industry HHI, i.e., increase in concentration through the 
combination of both the acquiring and target firms’ sales. The increase in the HHI is 
equal to twice the product of the market shares of the merging firms (Source: Compustat). 
Post Closing Highly Conc Industry 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the planned deal results in the SIC4 industry HHI (Post 
Closing Industry HHI ) exceeding 0.25, and 0 otherwise. The U.S. Department of Justice 
(DoJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) define an industry as a highly concen-
trated market if the HHI increases beyond 0.25. 
Acq All Financial Advisor 
Fees Dollar Value 
Imputed USD (mm) value of acquirer financial advisor fees irrespective of the deal out-
come, i.e., directly assignable out-of-pocket expenses (Source: Thomson Reuters SDC 
Platinum ). 
Tgt All Financial Advisor 
Fees Dollar Value 
Imputed USD (mm) value of target financial advisor fees irrespective of the deal out-
come, i.e., directly assignable out-of-pocket expenses (Source: Thomson Reuters SDC 
Platinum ). 
Acq All Financial Advisor 
Fees Deal Value 
Acq All Financial Advisor Fees Dollar Value  scaled by Deal Value . 
Tgt All Financial Advisor 
Fees Deal Value 
Tgt All Financial Advisor Fees Dollar Value  scaled by Deal Value . 




Technological Proximity (Tech Prox) is calculated by applying the Mahalanobis gener-
alization method introduced in Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen (2013) to the 
Jaffe (1986) proximity measure. The measure describes the correlation of patenting 
across United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) technology classes between 
pairs of firms (i.e., acquirer-target pairs in the sample). First, all of the firm’s patents 
between 1970 and 2006 are allocated into the different 426 USPTO technology classes, 
defining the scope-of-innovation-activity-vector Ti = (Ti1, Ti2, Ti3, …, Ti426) for firm i 
where Ti τ  is the share of firm i ’s patents in technology class τ, i.e., Ti τ  is the ratio of 
the number of awarded patents to firm i  in technology class τ  to the total number of 
awarded patents in all technology classes over the whole period since 1970. Specifically, 
technological proximity between acquirer (Acq) and target (Tgt)  is defined as the fol-
lowing correlation coefficient: 




The applied Mahalanobis distance metric extension allows for spillovers between differ-
ent technology classes, which is ruled out by the Jaffe (1986) metric (which assumes full 
spillovers within the same class and nothing otherwise). In summary, Mahalanobis 
measures cross technology class spillovers by using revealed preference. If two technolo-
gies are often located together in the same firm (e.g., “computer input/output” and 
“computer processing”) then they infer the distance between the technologies to be 
smaller, so spillovers will be greater. They proxy this by the share of times the two 
technology classes are patented within the same firm. See Lucking, Bloom, and Van 
Reenen (2018) for the extended description and notation. I apply the STATA™ code 
available on Nicholas Bloom’s website (https://nbloom.people.stanford.edu/research) to 
generate the spillover-adjusted correlation coefficient Technological Proximity (Tech 
Prox). 
Product Market Similarity 
(PMS) TNIC1 
Yearly firm-by-firm pairwise product market similarity score (PMS , real number in the 
interval [0,1]) calculated for each firm-firm-fiscal-year combination by parsing the prod-
uct descriptions from the firms’ annual 10-Ks and forming word vectors for each firm to 
compute continuous measures of product similarity for every pair of firms in the sample 
in each year (a pairwise similarity matrix). A higher score relates to higher word simi-
larity (i.e., the text of the two firms’ business descriptions has more common vocabulary 
than a pair of firms with a lower score), used as a proxy for product similarity and thus 
product-market rivalry, i.e., firm pairs with a higher score are “nearer” rivals. A score 
near zero indicates that the given pair of firms use effectively unrelated product market 
text. All Text-based Network Industry Classifications (TNIC1) data obtained from the 
Hoberg-Phillips Data Library (Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2016): http://hobergphil-
lips.tuck.dartmouth.edu/). TNIC1 is the highest possible granularity: the score is calcu-
lated for every firm-firm-fiscal-year combination during the 1996-2017 period for publicly 
traded firms (U.S. domestic firms traded on either NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ) with a 
valid GVKEY in Compustat that filed 10-K reports with the SEC at the respective fiscal 
year end and with valid data in CRSP. The data are then mapped to the M&A sample 
by using an algorithmically generated one-to-one mapping method with AcqGVKEY-
TgtGVKEY-FiscalYear for each individual transaction. 
Product Market Similarity 
(PMS) TNIC2 
Calculated in the same way as Product Market Similarity (PMS) TNIC1 ,  but calibrated 
to match the granularity of two-digit SIC codes. All Text-based Network Industry Clas-
sifications (TNIC2) data obtained from the Hoberg-Phillips Data Library (Hoberg and 
Phillips (2010, 2016): http://hobergphillips.tuck.dartmouth.edu/). 
Product Market Similarity 
(PMS) TNIC3 
Calculated in the same way as Product Market Similarity (PMS) TNIC1 ,  but calibrated 
to match the granularity of three-digit SIC codes. All Text-based Network Industry 
Classifications (TNIC3) data obtained from the Hoberg-Phillips Data Library (Hoberg 
and Phillips (2010, 2016): http://hobergphillips.tuck.dartmouth.edu/). 
Acq Induced Cancellation Dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquirer induced the cancellation of the deal, and 
0 otherwise (Source: Official Press Releases ). 
Third Party Competing Bid 
Cancellation 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal was cancelled due to a third party bid for the 
target that led to the cancellation of the original bid, and 0 otherwise (Source: Official 
Press Releases ). 
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Deal Completion Dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal was closed successfully, and 0 if cancelled 
(Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
Kick-Off vs. AD 
Length of the private takeover process, starting at the Kick-Off date  until announcement 
date (AD) of the deal and measured in months. Kick-Off date  refers to the first date 
the target and an interested party (i.e., the deal announcing acquirer or a third party) 
get in contact with each other on deal related matters. This date marks the first date of 
the coherent private takeover process (Source: SEC Merger Filings, S&P Capital IQ ). 
First Board Meeting vs. AD 
Length of the private takeover process, starting at the First Board Meeting date  until 
announcement date (AD) of the deal and measured in months. First Board Meeting date 
refers to the date where the first board meeting on deal related matters between the deal 
announcing acquirer and target management board takes place (Source: SEC Merger 
Filings, S&P Capital IQ ). 
Confidentiality Agreement vs. AD 
Length of the private takeover process, starting at the Confidentiality Agreement date 
until announcement date (AD) of the deal and measured in months. Confidentiality 
Agreement date  refers to the date where the deal announcing acquirer signs a confiden-
tiality (non-disclosure) agreement with the target firm (Source: SEC Merger Filings, 
S&P Capital IQ ). 
Kick-Off vs. RD 
Defined as Kick-Off vs. AD  but instead measured until resolution date (RD) of the deal, 
i.e., the date where the deal was either successfully closed or withdrawn: Kick-Off vs. 
RD  = Kick-Off vs. AD  + Public Takeover Length.  
First Board Meeting vs. RD 
Defined as First Board Meeting vs. AD  but instead measured until resolution date (RD) 
of the deal, i.e., the date where the deal was either successfully closed or withdrawn: 
First Board Meeting vs. RD  = First Board Meeting vs. AD  + Public Takeover Length. 
Confidentiality Agreement vs. RD 
Defined as Confidentiality Agreement vs. AD  but instead measured until resolution date 
(RD) of the deal, i.e., the date where the deal was either successfully closed or withdrawn: 
Confidentiality Agreement vs. RD  = Confidentiality Agreement vs. AD  + Public Take-
over Length. 
Any Pre-Contact with Acq 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the background section of the merger agreement men-
tions any contact between the final bidding acquirer and target prior to the start of the 
coherent private takeover process, and 0 otherwise (Source: SEC Merger Filings ). 
Panel C: Acquiring Firm Characteristics 
Acq Market Cap [OA–22] 
Last sale price of acquiring firm’s stock (adjusted for stock splits) multiplied with the 
latest number of shares outstanding, measured 22 trading days prior to offer announce-
ment and expressed in billions of USD (Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
Acq Market-to-Book [OA–22] 
Market-to-book ratio of acquirer’s stock, calculated as Acq Market Cap [OA–22]  divided 
by the latest available value of total common equity (= common stock & additional paid 
in capital + retained earnings + treasury stock & other) 22 trading days prior to offer 
announcement (Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
ln Acq 1YR Stock Return 
Volatility [OA–1] 
Natural logarithm of 1 plus the standard deviation of weekly log-normal price returns of 
the acquiring firm’s stock over the year preceding the offer announcement, annualized 
with a factor of 52 for the 52 trading weeks in a year and measured one trading day 
prior to offer announcement (Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
Acq Market Leverage [OA–22] 
Book value of total debt divided by the market value of the acquiring firm’s total assets. 
Market value of total assets is calculated in the following way: Acq Total Assets  + Acq 
Market Cap [OA–22]  − Acq Total Common Equity, all measured 22 trading days prior to 
offer announcement. Total Common Equity is defined in the following way: common 
stock & additional paid in capital + retained earnings + treasury stock & other (Source: 
S&P Capital IQ ). 
Acq Dividend Payer 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquiring firm paid positive dividends on either 
common and/or preferred stock during the fiscal year preceding the offer announcement, 
and 0 otherwise (Source: Compustat ). 
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Acq Hadlock-Pierce-Index 
Measure for acquiring firm’s financial constraints, proposed by Hadlock and Pierce 
(2010), and calculated in the following way: 
Hadlock-Pierce-Index  =  – 0.737 ∙ Size  +  0.043 ∙ Size 2  –  0.040 ∙ Age 
where Size  equals the natural logarithm of inflation-adjusted book assets (in USD mm), 
and Age  is the number of years the firm is listed with a non-missing stock price on 
Compustat. In calculating this index, Size  is winsorized (i.e., capped) at (the ln of) USD 
4,500 million, and Age  is winsorized at 37 years. All variables are measured at the last 
fiscal year end date prior to offer announcement (Source: Compustat ). 
Acq Whited-Wu-Index 
Measure for acquiring firm’s financial constraints, developed by Whited and Wu (2006), 
and calculated in the following way: 
           Whited-Wu-Index  =  – 0.091 ∙ CF  –  0.062 ∙ DIVPOS  +  0.021 ∙ TLTD 
                                          – 0.044 ∙ LNTA  +  0.102 ∙ ISG  –  0.035 ∙ SG 
where CF  is the ratio of cash flow to total assets (CF  = (income before extraordinary 
items + depreciation and amortization) / total assets), DIVPOS  is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the firm pays positive dividends on either common and/or preferred stock, 
0 otherwise, TLTD  is the ratio of total long term debt to total assets, LNTA  is the 
natural logarithm of total assets (in USD mm), ISG  is the firm’s SIC3 industry sales 
growth, and SG  is firm sales growth, whereas sales growth is the percentage growth 
relative to the preceding fiscal year. All variables are measured at the last fiscal year 
end date prior to offer announcement (Source: Compustat ). 
Acq Kaplan-Zingales-Index 
Measure for acquiring firm’s financial constraints, suggested by Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997), and calculated in the following way: 
Kaplan-Zingales-Index  =  – 1.001909 ∙ CF  –  39.3678 ∙ TDIV  +  3.139193 ∙ TLTD 
                                     – 1.314759 ∙ CASH  +  0.2826389 ∙ Q 
where CF  is the ratio of cash flow to total net property, plant, and equipment of the 
preceding fiscal year, Net PPE t–1 (CF  = (income before extraordinary items + depreci-
ation and amortization) / Net PPE t–1), TDIV  is total dividends scaled by Net PPE t–1 , 
TLTD  is the ratio of total long term debt to total capital (TLTD  = (total long term 
debt + debt in current liabilities) / (total long term debt + debt in current liabilities + 
stockholders equity)), CASH  is cash and short term investments scaled by Net PPE t–1, 
and Q  is firm’s Tobin’s Q (Q  = (total assets + fiscal year end share price ∙ number of 
shares outstanding − book value of common equity − deferred taxes) / total assets). All 
variables are measured at the last fiscal year end date prior to offer announcement 
(Source: Compustat ). 
Panel D: Target Firm Characteristics 
Tgt Market Cap [OA–42] 
Last sale price of target firm’s stock (adjusted for stock splits) multiplied with the latest 
number of shares outstanding, measured 42 trading days prior to offer announcement 
and expressed in millions of USD (Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
Tgt Market-to-Book [OA–22] Defined as Acq Market-to-Book [OA–22] , but instead measured for target firm’s stock. 
Tgt Total Assets [OA–22] 
Total Assets of the target firm measured 22 trading days prior to offer announcement 
(Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
Tgt Total Intangibles [OA–22] 
Total Intangible Assets of the target firm measured 22 trading days prior to offer an-
nouncement (Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
Tgt Goodwill [OA–22] 
Goodwill of the target firm measured 22 trading days prior to offer announcement 
(Source: Compustat ). 
Tgt Identifiable Intangibles [OA–22] 
Identifiable Intangible Assets of the target firm measured 22 trading days prior to offer 
announcement (Source: Compustat ). 
Tgt Net PPE [OA–22] 
Net Property, Plant, and Equipment of the target firm measured 22 trading days prior 
to offer announcement (Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
Tgt Current Assets [OA–22] 
Current Assets of the target firm measured 22 trading days prior to offer announcement 
(Source: Compustat ). 
Tgt Total Intangibles Ratio [OA–22] Tgt Total Intangibles [OA–22]  scaled by Tgt Total Assets [OA–22] . 
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Tgt Goodwill Ratio [OA–22] Tgt Goodwill [OA–22]  scaled by Tgt Total Assets [OA–22] . 
Tgt Identifiable Intangibles 
Ratio [OA–22] 
Tgt Identifiable Intangibles [OA–22]  scaled by Tgt Total Assets [OA–22] . 
Tgt Tangibility [OA–22] Tgt Net PPE [OA–22]  scaled by Tgt Total Assets [OA–22] . 
Tgt Current Assets Ratio [OA–22] Tgt Current Assets [OA–22]  scaled by Tgt Total Assets [OA–22] . 
Tgt C4 CAR RD [–3;+3] 
Seven-trading-day cumulative abnormal return (in percentage points) of target firm’s 
stock calculated using the Carhart (1997) four-factor model to model normal returns. 
The model parameters are estimated over the period −250 to −23 trading days (prior) 
to deal resolution date. Security prices are dividend adjusted day close prices, further 
adjusted for stock splits, cash dividends, rights offerings, and spin-offs (Source: CRSP ). 
Tgt Unique Product Industry 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the target firm’s industry is in the top quartile of all 
Fama-French 49 industries annually sorted by industry-median product uniqueness, 0 
otherwise, where product uniqueness is defined as all selling expenses scaled by sales. 
Calculated following Titman and Wessels (1988) and Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) 
(Source: Compustat ). 
Tgt FF5 HTHC Industry 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the target is assigned to the Fama-French 5 industry 
classification in either hightech (HT) or healthcare (HC), and 0 otherwise (Source: Com-
pustat ). 
Tgt Patent Value 
(market-weighted) 
Total USD (mm) value Θi,t
sm of innovation produced by the target firm in the fiscal year 
prior to offer announcement, by summing up all the values of patents ξj that were 




sm  = ξj
j ∈ Pi,t
          with          ξj  =  
1
1 –  π  
1
Nj
 E vj | Rj  Mj 
where Pi,t denotes the set of patents issued to the target firm i  in year t, π is the 
unconditional probability of a successful patent application (π is set to 56%, see Carley, 
Hedge, and Marco (2015)), vj is the fraction of the idiosyncratic stock return Rj that is 
attributable to the patent grant, and Mj is the market capitalization of the target firm 
i that issued patent j on the trading day prior to the announcement of the patent issu-
ance. If multiple patents Nj are issued to the same firm on the same patent issuance 
announcement day as patent j, each patent is assigned a fraction 1 Nj⁄  . If the target 
firm i  is issued no patent in year t, the variable Θi,tsm is set to 0 (see Kogan et al. (2017)). 
Tgt Patent Value 
(citation-weighted) 
Target firm’s citation weighted (scientific) patent value Θi,t
cw (obtained from Kogan et al. 
(2017), and downloaded from their website: https://paper.dropbox.com/doc/U.S.-Pa-
tent-Data-1926-2010-t5nuNWnTH1InM0gyxkizL): 
Θi,t




where Pi,t denotes the set of patents issued to the target firm i  in year t, Cj is the number 
of future citations by patent j until the end of the sample period, and Cj is the average 
number of future citations received by patents granted in the same year as patent j . If 
the target firm i  is issued no patent in year t, the variable Θi,tcw is set to 0 (see Kogan et 
al. (2017)). 
Tgt Patent Count 
(recently granted) 
Number of patents the target firm are granted in the whole fiscal year prior to offer 
announcement. Data come from Kogan et al. (2017), obtained from their website: 
https://paper.dropbox.com/doc/U.S.-Patent-Data-1926-2010-t5nuN-
WnTH1InM0gyxkizL 
Tgt Patent Count 
(total stock) 
Total number of patents the target firm are granted until the fiscal year end prior to 
offer announcement, i.e., yearly counts of United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) patents. Patents must not be expired in order to be included. The data on 
total stocks are obtained from the University of Virginia (UVA) Darden Global Corpo-
rate Patent Dataset (https://patents.darden.virginia.edu/get-data). 
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Tgt Trade Secrecy Mention Count 
in 10-K 
Number of (wildcard) mentions of either “trade secret”, “trade secrets” and/or “trade 
secrecy” in target firm’s most recent 10-K report filed with the SEC prior to offer an-
nouncement (Source: SEC EDGAR 10-K filings ). 
Tgt SIC2 Industry R&D Worker 
Ratio 
Ratio of knowledge workers in R&D-related jobs divided by the total number of surveyed 
participants in a given SIC2 industry-year. R&D-related jobs are defined as all jobs 
(occupations, denoted “occsoc” in the data, definition online available on: 
https://usa.ipums.org/usa/volii/acsoccsoc.shtml) coded between 1510XX and 1940YY 
in the annual American Community Survey (ACS) of the U.S. Census Bureau. The 
survey size of the ACS is approximately 3.5 million households per year. The ACS data 
are included in the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS USA, 2020). IPUMS 
USA collects, preserves and harmonizes U.S. census microdata and provides easy access 
to this data with enhanced documentation. Data includes decennial censuses from 1790 
to 2010, the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) since 1962, and yearly American 
Community Surveys (ACS) from 2000 to the present (Source: https://usa.ipums.org/ 
usa/ ). IPUMS does not directly provide industry definitions in the SIC code format. 
Instead, I manually assign each census code industry definition to the most suitable SIC2 
industry and cross-check each industry assignment with the NAICS definition codes, 
which are available for both datasets. The R&D worker ratios are mapped on a SIC2 
industry-year basis to each target firm in the M&A sample on the last fiscal year end 
date prior to offer announcement. 
Tgt Firm Age Age of the target firm. Measured in years since foundation and obtained at the last fiscal 
year end date prior to offer announcement (Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 





Appendix − Table A2 
Sample Selection 
This table depicts the selection criteria of the final M&A sample with the respective remaining number 
of observations. After applying filters 1–6, 8,466 observations are left over. The availability of SEC 
filings, control variables as well as valid data on target firms’ past R&D and SG&A spending further 
restrict the sample to 769 observations. 
Selection criteria Number of observations 
1. All M&A deals announced between 01/01/2004 and 12/31/2017 475,458 
2. Deal status either “closed” or “withdrawn” 460,243 
3. Acquirer and Target headquartered in the U.S. 98,647 
4. Acquirer and Target publicly listed firms 9,980 
5. Acquirer seeks majority stake and change of control in the Target 8,884 
6. Deal value exceeds USD 1 mm 8,466 
7. Availability of SEC filings and control variables 935 
8. Valid data on Target firm’s past R&D and SG&A spending 769 
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Appendix − Table A3 
Modular Regression Setup 
Table A3 presents the results of a modular regression setup of linear fixed effects regressions of BTF Size  on the variable of interest, Tgt Know Cap Stock . On a step-
by-step basis, I include control variable sets as defined in Section 3.3. As reported, the regressions (except regression (1)) include Acquirer Industry × Year Fixed 
Effects  as well as an intercept but are unreported. Regressions (3)–(10) include Target Industry Fixed Effects . All standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster correlation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  BTF Size 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Target Firm Characteristics            
 


































































































             
Other Deal Characteristics  No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financial Advisor Fees  No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquiring Firm Characteristics  No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
             
Acq Industry × Year FE  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tgt Industry FE  No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
             
Observations  769 769 769 769 769 769 769 769 729 493 
Adjusted R2  0.012 0.011 0.012 0.021 0.020 0.087 0.088 0.103 0.112 0.122 
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Appendix − Table A4 
Robustness − Heckman Selection Model: Technological Proximity 
The table reports fixed effects Heckman (1979) selection models for the selection (i.e., non-randomly 
selected sample) whether I observe firms’ patenting decisions and thus Technological Proximity . In the 
first stage (selection equation), I instrument with both Tgt SIC2 Industry R&D Worker Ratio  and Tgt 
Trade Secrecy Mention Count in 10-K. Regression sets (1) with (2), and (3) with (4) only differ in the 
included fixed effects. The Inverse Mills Ratios λ, Wald χ2-tests of independent equations (ρ = 0), and 
the estimated empirical corrlations of the error terms (1st and 2nd stage) are reported at the bottom of 
the table. All standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and 
within-cluster correlation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 









   1st Stage  2nd Stage  1st Stage  2nd Stage 
 Independent Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Target Firm Characteristics         
 























































          
 


















          
Other Target Firm Characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Deal Characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Acquiring Firm Characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
          
Acq Industry × Year FE  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Tgt Industry FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Acq Industry FE  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  No  No 
          
Observations (selected; non-selected)  735 (233; 502)  735 (233; 502) 
Pseudo R2  0.531    0.624   
Adjusted R2    0.239    0.471 
Model p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
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Appendix − Table A5 
Robustness − Variables scaled by Deal Value 
Table A5 presents the results of linear fixed effects regressions of BTF Size Deal Value  on Tgt Know Cap 
Stock Deal Value  and all control variables used in the baseline regression in Table 2, column (3). The only 
difference is, that in this table, all key variables (BTF Size , Tgt Know Cap Stock , Tgt Org Cap Stock , 
TTF Size , Acq All Financial Advisor Fees , and Tgt All Financial Advisor Fees ) are scaled by Deal 
Value instead of target firm’s market capitalization. Regression (1) includes the same set of other control 
variables as in Table 2, column (3), and regressions (2)–(4) are modified by including different measures 
of acquiring firm’s financial constraints. All regressions include Acquirer Industry × Year Fixed Effects , 
Target Industry Fixed Effects  as well as an intercept but are unreported. All standard errors (in paren-
theses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster correlation. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  BTF Size Deal Value 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Target Firm Characteristics      
 

















































Acquiring Firm Characteristics      
 
Acq Market Cap [OA–22]  
−0.003 
(0.003) 
   
 
ln Acq 1YR Stock Return Volatility [OA–1]  
0.248 
(0.288) 
   
 
Acq Market Leverage [OA–22]  
0.753 
(0.857) 
   
 
Acq Dividend Payer  
−0.641** 
(0.298) 
   
 



















Acq Kaplan-Zingales-Index     
−0.000 
(0.003) 
       
Deal Characteristics  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Acq Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tgt Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations  769 751 697 632 
Adjusted R2  0.104 0.097 0.109 0.102 
 
 










Appendix − Figure A1 
Relation between BTF Size and Target Firm’s Knowledge Capital Stock − Bivariate Plot 
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Appendix − Figure A2 
Relation between Target Firm’s Patents and Knowledge Capital Stock 
This figure shows the plots of various measures of target firm’s patent value (market-weighted  (A) and citation-weighted  (B)) and patent count (recently granted  (C) 
and total stock  (D)) to its knowledge capital stock. All four patent measures are obtained at the last fiscal year end date prior to offer announcement. Target Knowledge 
Capital Stock  is lagged one year and all variables are scaled by target firm’s total assets and are logged. All variables are additionally defined in Table A1. 
 
 









Appendix − Figure A3 
Plot of Predicted Probabilities of Mentioning Trade Secrets in Target Firm’s 10-K Report 
This figure plots the predicted probabilities of mentioning trade secrets in target’s annual 10-K report 
obtained at the last fiscal year end filing date prior to offer announcement, against target firm’s 
knowledge capital stock scaled by total assets, Tgt Know Cap Stock [TA] , as defined in the text in Table 
10. The hollow black circles represent the simple bivariate plot of realized observations. The blue trian-
gles represent associated predicted probabilities after estimating the fixed effects logit model in Table 
10, specification (1), whereas all other independent variables are held at their respective sample mean. 
The red circles represent associated predicted probabilities after estimating a simple univariate logit 
model with Tgt Know Cap Stock [TA]   as the only predictor (i.e., without other controls). 
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Appendix − Figure A4 
Market-to-Book Ratios with and without Intangible Capital Stocks (1975–2017) 
Figure A4 depicts the plot of the average (2.5% tail winsorized) market-to-book ratios for all Compustat 
firms during the 1975-2017 period (289,889 firm-years). The numerator in all series is the sum of market 
value of equity at the end of the firm’s fiscal year, total liabilities and book preferred stock. For the 
black dot series (A), the denominator is total assets (including acquired intangibles, i.e., “classical”). 
For the orange dot series (A), the denominator also includes the knowledge and organizational capital 
stocks (“KC & OC”) estimated using the parameters obtained in Ewens et al. (2020). The two dashed, 
black and orange lines present the simple linear fit of each series. The green dashed line represents the 
hypothetical market-to-book ratio of 1. In (B), the plot shows the series for firms assigned to the Fama-
French 5 industries of both hightech (HT – FF3) and healthcare (HC – FF4). The hollow dots represent 
market-to-book ratios calculated in the “classical” way (in the same way as the black dots in (A)), and 
the solid dots are calculated including the knowledge and organizational capital stocks (“KC & OC”) in 
the denominator. The black, orange, and green dashed lines in (B) are copied from (A) for comparison. 
 





Measuring Competition in M&A Negotiations † 
 
 
This chapter provides insights about competition among bidders during the private takeover process, its 
effect on offered deal premiums, bidder announcement returns, and post-bid dynamics. Exploiting a 
representative sample of 780 public U.S. transactions, extended with comprehensive hand-collected data 
from SEC filings, I find that takeover premiums are higher, the higher pre-announcement competition 
among bidders is. I measure competition during the private sales process with a ratio that relates the 
number of bids submitted to the target to the number of signed confidentiality agreements with the 
target, the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio. A one-standard deviation increase of this ratio corresponds to a 
statistically and economically significant 5.99% increase of the deal initiation premium (Eaton, Liu, and 
Officer (2020)), 0.87% lower announcement returns for the winning bidder in auctions, a 130% increased 
probability of receiving a rival bid prior to closing, and a 44.5% increased probability of cancelling the 
originally announced deal (measured relative to the unconditional probability). The results are robust 
to endogeneity concerns. The advantages of this competition measure are that (1) it relies on data as 
reported in target firm’s official merger documents filed with the SEC, which creates a strong incentive 
to report truthfully, and (2) it takes the evolution of bidding into account, controlling for the number 
of submitted bids. I conclude that competitive private negotiations stay competitive during the public 
phase of the deal, and that target boards fulfill their fiduciary duties by selecting the highest-bidding 
acquirer. 
Keywords: Takeovers, Mergers and Acquisitions, Private Takeover Process, Bidding Competition, 
Auction, Negotiation, Takeover Premium, Announcement Returns. 
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4.1 Introduction 
 Ample research focuses on explaining bidding behavior in and competition dynamics of 
mergers and acquisitions, and how this affects economic outcomes, such as takeover premiums, 
bidder returns, (post-)announcement reactions of industry competitors, deal completion rates, 
and observed post-bid competition (e.g., Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2010), Boone and Mulherin 
(2007, 2008), Jennings and Mazzeo (1993), Calcagno and Falconieri (2014), Eckbo (1983), 
Ruback (1983), Derrien, Frésard, Slabik, and Valta (2020)). Since the introduction of the event 
study as one of the main workhorses in empirical finance (Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll 
(1969)), announcement effects of takeovers have been extensively studied in the literature, 
motivated by their usually large impact on the economic value of involved firms. The official 
communication to try to gain control over a target firm is often seen as an event that not only 
captures public attention, but also as an occasion that lures competing bidders that might have 
even higher reservation values for the target1. 
Prior research deemed the 1980s as a very competitive, often hostile takeover decade 
which was fueled by the emergence of the high-yield (junk) bond market as a means to ease 
the financing of transactions, such as LBOs2. In the 1990s, however, perceived competition 
seems to have been decreased, with Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) characterizing the 
prototypical takeover as a friendly transaction with only one bidding firm. In a similar manner, 
Schwert (2000) argues that anti-takeover devices, such as poison pills and state antitakeover 
laws, might have contributed to this “de-hostilization”. If one employs a traditional measure 
of competition, namely the number of bidders that publicly attempt to acquire the target, this 
might indeed be true. 
 
1 Depending on its bargaining power, the target could even negotiate a clause in the merger agreement, 
signed with the original bidder, enabling it to proactively solicit competing bids during a so-called “go-
shop period” (Wang (2017)). This provision defines a period (usually 1–2 months after announcement) 
during which other proposals can be obtained and generally allows the original bidder to match any 
competing bid. If negotiated, accepting a competing bid often triggers the payment of a target termina-
tion fee: a cash payment from the target to the original bidder to compensate the latter for its costs. 
2 One of the most prominent cases in the history of (hostile) corporate takeovers is the November 1988 
LBO of the tobacco and food products conglomerate RJR Nabisco, Inc., by private equity firm Kohlberg 
Kravis Roberts & Co. (KKR), valued at USD 24.53 bn. The story later even turned into a movie and 
the 1989 book “Barbarians at the Gate: The Fall of RJR Nabisco” by Bryan Burrough and John Helyar. 
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Yet, as more recent studies show, public bids only represent the tip of the iceberg. The 
private phase of a takeover, i.e., the period between deal initiation and public announcement, 
is remarkably competitive, and research interest in the details of this process has dramatically 
increased over the last two years. Analyzing a comprehensive sample spanning the time period 
from 1981 to 2015, Liu, Mulherin, and Brown (2018) show, that over time, deal negotiations 
have moved from the public sphere to behind the scenes, target boards are much more likely 
to initiate them, and that the length of the private takeover phase has increased. 
This chapter sheds light on the competitiveness of this “black box of merger negotia-
tions” (Liu and Officer (2020)), and contributes to the extant literature by suggesting a reliable 
measure to quantify the degree of competition among potential acquirers during this private 
phase: the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio . This ratio relates the number of potential acquirers that 
privately submitted binding written offers (bids) to the target firm, shortly before the deal is 
publicly announced (i.e., at the end of the private takeover process, with a price proposed to 
buy target shares), to the number of potential acquirers that signed confidentiality (non-dis-
closure) agreements with the target firm. The data to construct this competition measure are 
obtained from official merger documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), and are publicly available via their Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval 
System (EDGAR)3. Accessing this proprietary data source has two major advantages over 
classical M&A databases, such as Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ or Refinitiv’s Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) Platinum: first, the SEC merger filings contain rich data over the whole 
private takeover process that these providers do not collect. Since machine-readable databases 
only include information about the outcome of private negotiations, i.e., acquirer and target 
firm, offer per share, method of payment, termination fees, accounting and valuation data, and 
financial and legal advisors, among many others, one needs to thoroughly hand-collect addi-
tional information from a reliable source to characterize the private process. I.e., to better 
understand “behind the curtain” M&A negotiations, competition dynamics and the final out-
come, it is crucial to know (1) who initiated the deal and when, (2) what were the reasons to 
do so, (3) how (and why, as such) the private sales process is structured (i.e., as a classical 
one-to-one negotiation or a takeover auction including multiple potential acquirers), and (4) 
 
3 https://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (permanent link). 
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how competition and bidding – especially in auctions with multiple bid revisions – evolved 
during this phase. Second, SEC data are highly accurate. Misreporting by the issuing firm is 
enforcable by the SEC and can lead to severe fines4. This creates a high ex-ante incentive for 
firms to report accurately and does not leave substantial leeway. 
Main Findings 
Analyzing hand-collected, novel data from a sample of 780 public U.S. transactions 
between 2004 and 2017, I find that higher relative competition among bidders leads, on average, 
to higher takeover premiums and higher cumulative abnormal deal announcement returns for 
the target. Controlling for the number of submitted proposals as a level control, a one-standard 
deviation increase in the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio  is associated with a statistically and econom-
ically significant 9.29% increase of the one-month target share price premium, and a 5.99% 
increase of the initiation premium (Eaton, Liu, and Officer (2020)). Higher relative competition 
further leads to lower cumulative abnormal deal announcement returns for the winning bidder, 
and a higher probability of receiving a competing bid from a different bidder post-announce-
ment. The latter result is especially more pronounced, if the stock market reaction of the 
original bidder is positive around deal announcement. Such a reaction usually proxies, all else 
equal, for a value-creating – rather than value-destroying – acquisition decision for the bidder, 
and indicates that competing bidders might learn from this decision and react accordingly 
through a rival bid5. 
My results are robust to the inclusion of a large set of other covariates that might 
explain competition among bidders and/or takeover prices. Besides standard deal- and firm-
 
4 The SEC is highly active and transparent in detecting misreporting firms and proceeding against 
responsible key people (see the latest enforcement news online at: https://www.sec.gov/page/enforce-
ment-section-landing and https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/financial-reporting-and-audit-task-force.shtml, 
leading law firms additionally inform clients on their websites, e.g.: https://www.jonesday.com/en/in-
sights/2020/01/sec-enforcement-2019-yearend-update). 
5 I am wary, however, since the reaction around deal announcement strongly depends on the individual 
acquirer-target firm pair (given that the value exceeding the stand-alone value of the target consists of 
both a common value and a private value component). However, untabulated regressions show that the 
results hold for horizontal deals as well, where synergy gains from the takeover are generally better 
transferable among these (more similar) bidders, i.e., where the common value component is significantly 
higher, and acquirers’ announcement stock price reactions are on average higher (Eckbo (1983, 2009)). 
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level controls commonly used in empirical M&A literature, I include a proxy for latent compe-
tition in every regression (Aktas et al. (2010)) in addition to fixed effects on both target indus-
try-year- and acquirer industry-level. I do this to control for merger waves, economic recessions, 
and associated overall capital liquidity shocks that might be correlated with merger premiums. 
Following the argumentation in Comment and Schwert (1995) and the empirical application 
in Boone and Mulherin (2008), I further include a variable that controls for targets headquar-
tered in states with strong anti-takeover laws. Comment and Schwert (1995) provide evidence 
that the more stringent is a state’s anti-takeover law, the greater is the target’s bargaining 
power, and this could lead to higher negotiated premiums. 
More recent research (Eaton et al. (2020)) argues that traditional measures for the deal 
premium, such as the one-, two-, and even three-month target share price premium (Schwert 
(1996, 2000)), lead to a likely underestimation of “real” premiums, i.e., premiums paid above 
the true stand-alone value of the target firm. The stand-alone value should be unaffected by 
any early M&A-related event6 causing share price run-ups. This provides the rationale to ad-
ditionally test my hypothesis in regressions with the initiation premium as the dependent var-
iable, for which my results continue to hold. 
By applying a Heckman (1979) two-stage selection model with instrumented regressors 
for deal initiation and the sales procedure, I show that my inferences are robust to endogeneity 
concerns between the degree of relative competition, deal initiation, the sales procedure, and 
takeover premiums (Aktas et al. (2010)). Besides a propensity score matching approach (tab-
ulated in the Appendix, Table A7), I further conduct additional robustness tests. First, I show 
that my findings remain qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged when measuring competi-
tion for the target with the Proposals-to-Contacts-Ratio . Contacts  is the number of contacted 
bidders at the beginning of the takeover process. Second, I repeat my baseline regression for a 
subset of auctions that explicitly exclude tender offers, which does not change my results. I 
run this test as the sales process for tender offers is usually quicker and not as structured 
compared to non-tender offer transactions (Hansen (2001), Offenberg and Pirinsky (2015)). 
 
6 These events can be takeover rumors, news articles, media speculation, 13D filings by a potential 
bidder, press releases by the target to seek strategic alternatives, and/or the hiring of an investment 
bank (Eaton et al. (2020)). 
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Contribution to the Literature 
This chapter complements and contributes to the growing literature analyzing the pri-
vate takeover process, the sales method, announcement effects for participating shareholders, 
and post-announcement competition. First of all, I add to the growing body of M&A literature 
that focuses on pre-announcement deal negotiations, competition dynamics, and outcomes for 
targets (e.g., Boone and Mulherin (2007, 2008), Aktas et al. (2010), Gorbenko and Malenko 
(2014, 2019), Wang (2017), and Eckbo, Malenko, and Thorburn (2019)). I extend the findings 
in Aktas et al. (2010) by suggesting target firm- and industry-specific characteristics that seem 
to determine the decision of firms to sell via auctions. My proposed ratio, based on verifyable 
information in SEC filings – especially the number of signed confidentiality agreements and 
the number of finally submitted proposals – more reliably measures competition compared to 
the number of contacted bidders (as put forward by Schlingemann and Wu (2015)). In the case 
of contacted bidders, there are several times no individual bidding firm names mentioned in 
the filings, which makes misreporting unenforcable. This is less credible than naming firms that 
sign confidentiality agreements or even submit proposals, because doing the latter implies a 
significantly higher commitment of the willingsness to negotiate and to bid for the target. I.e., 
I assume less data reliability and more leeway for targets if they report contacted bidders. 
Second, my findings indicate that high competition leads to significantly negative an-
nouncement returns for the winning bidder. This is particularly more pronounced, if the deal 
is classified as a diversifying takeover. These types of takeovers might, all else equal, not only 
exhibit less synergy potential compared to horizontal takeovers, but could also more easily lead 
to overbidding, as the acquiring firm stems from a different industry. Although I do not claim 
that winning bidders are cursed7, it might point in this direction (complementing de Bodt, 
Cousin, and Roll (2018)). 
Third, my findings help to explain why competitive private negotiations stay competi-
tive after public deal announcement. If private competition is high and if the announcement of 
 
7 Empirical evidence on the existence of the winner’s curse problem in M&A is mixed. Some studies fail 
to detect overbidding (e.g., Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) and Boone and Mulherin (2008)), 
others report its existence (e.g., Eckbo and Thorburn (2009), de Bodt et al. (2018), and Giliberto and 
Varaiya (1989)). 
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the deal leads to positive stock price reactions of the acquiring firm, I find that the probability 
of receiving an additional competing bid from a different bidder increases significantly. Simul-
taneuosly, the probability of completing the original announced deal decreases. 
 Fourth, my suggested competition measure is distinct from prior ones, as it additionally 
accounts for the “depth” of bidding, i.e., how bidding has evolved during the entire private 
takeover process. Giliberto and Varaiya (1989) find, as predicted by theory, that winning bids 
tend to increase as the number of competitors increases. I find their inferences to also hold for 
my sample, but it also plays a role to consider “where we started from”8. Put together, I am 
not the first to analyze shareholder wealth effects of the sales method, but I contribute by 
taking the evolution of bidding into account. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, I illustrate three 
cases of varying takeover competition. I then present stylized facts about the pre-public phase 
of the deal. I develop the main hypotheses in Section 4.3. I describe the sample, the empirical 
methodology, and main variables in Section 4.4. In Section 4.5, I present the baseline regression 
results of the effect of competition during private negotiations on takeover outcomes. Section 
4.6 includes robustness tests to mitigate endogeneity concerns. I conclude in Section 4.7. 
 
4.2 Private M&A Negotiations: Exemplary Cases and Stylized Facts 
4.2.1 Three Exemplary Cases of Private Takeover Competition 
To better understand and measure competition among bidders during the private take-
over process, the following three cases might provide some tangible insights. Even though all 
three targets each have received three proposals at the end and one officially announced bid, 
the way how bidding evolved during this phase shielded from public scrutiny has been remark-
ably different: 
 
8 With the lax expression “where we started from” I mean the starting point and evolvement of the 
bidding process: from the number of contacted potential bidders, to the number of potential bidders 
that signed confidentiality agreements (NDAs), to the number of submitted proposals to the target at 
the end of the private takeover process. I include the number of proposals in all regressions to control 
for this level effect. A rationale for this is given in Figures A3 and A4 in the Appendix. 
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(1) Low Competition – Takeover of Stratos International, Inc. by Emerson Electric Co. in 2007 
“On September 19, 2006, we [the target – Stratos International, Inc.] publicly an-
nounced that we expected to postpone our annual meeting while we devoted our attention to 
the process of exploring strategic alternatives. […] Following the announcement of the strategic 
alternatives process, approximately 47 potential buyers were contacted. […] Twenty-two poten-
tial buyers executed a confidentiality agreement and were provided a confidential offering 
memorandum. […] In response to the confidential offering memorandum, three potential buyers 
submitted indications of interest during October 2006. […] On May 14, 2007, Stratos executed 
the merger agreement with Emerson [the acquirer – Emerson Electric Co. (NYSE:EMR)] and 
issued a press release publicly announcing that it had agreed to be acquired by Emerson.” 
In this case9, the target-initiated deal led to a Proposals-to-CA-Ratio  of 0.136 (= 3/22), 
the final one-month-premium was 4.99%, and the deal initiation premium10 was 19.05%. 
(2) Medium Competition – Takeover of Hyperion Solutions Corp. by Oracle Corp. in 2007 
“On December 8, 2006, Charles E. Phillips, Jr., Co-President of Oracle [the acquirer – 
Oracle Corporation (NYSE:ORCL)], called Mr. Sullivan [CEO of the target – Hyperion Solu-
tions Corp.] to express their interest in the possibility of a business combination. […] On De-
cember 14, 2006, at a special meeting of the Board, Mr. Sullivan advised the Board of the call 
he had received from Oracle. He also reviewed the possibility of more substantive discussions 
with another company (referred to as Company X) and a third Company (referred to as Com-
pany Y). [… All three potential acquirers then signed non-disclosure agreements with Hype-
rion …] During this period, Mr. Sullivan and members of the Company’s management also held 
discussions with the Company’s legal and financial advisors on the terms of the proposals from 
Oracle, Company X and a possible proposal from Company Y. [… Company Y also submitted 
a proposal …] Later that night, before open of market on March 1, 2007, the Company 
 
9 https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1111721/000095013707008629/n15490dmdefm14a.htm. 
10 The deal initiation premium is measured as the increase of the offer per share relative to target’s stock 
price one trading day prior to (private) initiation of deal discussions between target and (the) potential 
bidder(s) (following Eaton et al. (2020)). 
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[Hyperion] and Oracle executed the Merger Agreement. […] A joint press release announcing 
the transaction was issued immediately after the signing of the Merger Agreement.” 
Here11, the acquirer initiated the deal. The Proposals-to-CA-Ratio  was 1.000 (= 3/3), 
the final one-month-premium was 25.39%, and the deal initiation premium was 36.02%. 
(3) High Competition – Takeover of Bancorp Rhode Is., Inc. by Brookline Bancorp, Inc. in 2011 
“On March 14, 2011, the strategic committee met to discuss the proposed targeted 
third-party solicitation process. At this meeting, the strategic committee authorized Jefferies, 
on behalf of BancorpRI [the target – Bancorp Rhode Island, Inc.], to contact the four potential 
acquirers to solicit initial indications of interest in a possible business combination. [… two 
firms signed non-disclosure agreements with BancorpRI …] In its initial indication of interest, 
Brookline [the acquirer – Brookline Bancorp, Inc. (NasdaqGS:BRKL)] proposed a purchase 
price range of $44–$48 per share. […] One of the other potential acquirers ("Company A") 
proposed […] $45 per share. […] The third potential acquirer ("Company B") proposed $40 per 
share. […] Brookline [then] had increased its proposed purchase price to $48.25 per share. […] 
Both Company A's and Brookline's draft merger agreements restricted BancorpRI from solic-
iting a competing proposal, subject to a "fiduciary out" for an unsolicited superior proposal as 
well as a [target] termination fee payable by BancorpRI equal to 3.8% (which BancorpRI had 
negotiated down from 4%) of the transaction value in the event BancorpRI terminated the 
merger agreement to pursue such a proposal. Both Company A and Brookline also agreed to a 
"walk away" provision [i.e., bidder termination fee] in the event of a material decline in their 
respective stock price (on an absolute basis and relative to a bank index) prior to closing. […] 
The BancorpRI board determined that the Brookline offer represented the superior proposal. 
[…] Following the April 14, 2011 BancorpRI board meeting, BancorpRI and Brookline and their 
respective legal counsels continued to work to complete negotiations with respect to the defin-
itive merger agreement and to prepare related disclosure schedules. […] The parties issued a 
joint press release publicly announcing the transaction on Wednesday, April 20, 2011, prior to 
the opening of the stock market.” 
 
11 https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1001113/000089161807000145/f28093orsc14d9.htm. 
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In this third case12, the target-initiated deal led to a series of bid revisions, and a Pro-
posals-to-CA-Ratio  of 1.500 (= 3/2), the final one-month-premium was 54.88%, and the deal 
initiation premium was 55.34%. 
 
4.2.2 Stylized Facts of the Private Takeover Process 
Even though these are just three cases, they represent some stylized facts of the private 
takeover process: first, there is substantial competition among potential acquirers behind the 
curtain. Most of this competition cannot be measured with standard, machine-readable da-
tasets provided by commonly known vendors such as Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ or Refini-
tiv’s Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum. These datasets only include publicly an-
nounced transactions with their associated characteristics, but no columns containing data 
about pre-announcement bidding, the number of prospective acquirers, the number of signed 
confidentialiy agreements, bid revisions, and so forth. Thus, researchers rely on carefully hand-
collecting such information. 
Second, there is a substantial target share price run-up, often starting months prior to 
deal announcement. In empirical M&A, researchers are often interested in the prices paid for 
targets, which includes the deal premium. The question then is to which reference value the 
final offer price per target share should be measured. Ideally, the reference share price perfectly 
reflects the target firm’s stand-alone value, unaffected by any early M&A-related events, such 
as, e.g., rumors, news articles, media speculation, or 13D filings by a potential bidder. Premium 
measures commonly used in the literature are the one-week, one-, and two-month premium, 
with the latter motivated by Schwert (1996), who notes that target firms’ stock prices “[…] 
start to rise around day −42 (about 2 months before the first bid announcement).” That 
literature is now a couple of decades old and analyses data from the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. 
Since then, the length of the pre-announcement merger negotiation period (i.e., the number of 
days between the date where the deal was initiated and the date of public deal announcement) 
has significantly increased, as Liu et al. (2018) show in their paper. If deal premiums are 
measured in the traditional way, their magnitude is likely underestimated. As mentioned in 
 
12 https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1049782/000104746911006583/a2204712zs-4a.htm. 
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the three example cases, the initial premium is substantially larger than the more conserva-
tively calculated one-month premium13. The increased run-up period is observable for both one-
to-one negotiations, i.e., where only one acquirer and the target exclusively negotiate with each 
other, as well as for auctions, i.e., bidder contests in which at least two prospective acquirers 
sign confidentiality (non-disclosure) agreements with the target14, as Figure 1 shows. 
Figure 1 
Pre-Announcement Target Stock Price Run-up by Sales Procedure 
Figure 1 shows the pre-announcement target stock price movement, based on last sale prices for every 
trading day, and indexed to 100 at trading day −126 (six calendar months) prior to public offer an-
nouncement. For every trading day, the last sale price on that day is divided by the last sale price on 
day −126 to enable comparisons with deal premiums (which are raw percentage markups rather than 
modeled abnormal returns). The returns for all observations (i.e., targets) are winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentile on each tranding day to minimize the influence of outliers. The observations are then 
grouped into negotiations and auctions (following the BM 2008 definition as well as my “strict” classifi-
cation, i.e., target sales with at least two contacts, two signed confidentiality agreements, and two final 
proposals). Means are reported. Each column represents one calendar month (approx. 21 trading days). 
 
 
13 Summary statistics (unwinsorized) show that the initiation premium is on average 5.88% larger than 
the one-month premium. 
14 This definition was originally established in Boone and Mulherin (2007, 2008), in the following denoted 
as “BM 2008”. I also suggest a more strict definition for auctions (denoted as “strict” in the rest of this 
chapter): to make sure that all involved parties know about the competitiveness of the sales process at 
any time during the private phase, I define a strict auction as a firm’s sale where at least two potential 
bidders are contacted, at least two potential bidders sign confidentiality agreements, and at least two 
bidders submit an offer to the target. 
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Based on the findings in Liu et al. (2018), Liu and Officer (2020), and Eaton et al. 
(2020) about the length of the private takeover process, I start on trading day −126 (prior) to 
deal announcement as the reference to plot target firm’s raw markups for each trading day 
until eleven days after announcement15. Together with the detailed information and descrip-
tions in the 780 hand-collected “Background of the Merger/Tender Offer” sections of SEC 
filings, one can try to explain some stock price movements and developments in Figure 1: 
(a) Both sales procedures exhibit a significant run-up, but the run-up in auctions seems to 
start earlier (approx. on day −105) than the run-up in one-to-one negotiations (approx. 
on day −84). This might be due to early M&A-related events that appear to occur 
more frequently in takeovers structured as auctions, such as, e.g., the announcement of 
the target to seek strategic alternatives/hiring of an investment bank, and 13D filings 
by a potential bidder16. Analyzing the deal process lengths in full detail17, I find that 
the starting point for target’s (internal) kick-off of the auction process is on average on 
day −104. Day −79 is the average starting point in negotiations to conduct the kick-
off meeting. Contrary to auctions, this usually takes place between both parties. 
(b) Around three calendar months prior to announcement, one can observe a kink in the 
markup plot for negotiations, and a steeper increase in the plot for auctions. The aver-
age point in time when the confidentiality agreement is signed with (the single) poten-
tial acquirer in negotiations is on day −64. Moreover, day −60 represents the average 
day on which the first indications of interest are submitted to the target. These findings 
– together with the observations in (a) – are consistent with information being leaked 
into the market, and upward price movements reflect the anticipation of a takeover. 
 
15 Eaton et al. (2020) find that the target price run-up begins to increase roughly around trading day 
−105 (five calendar months), on average. I add one more calendar month as an additional safety margin. 
16 The SEC dictates for 13D filings: “When a person or group of persons acquires beneficial ownership 
of more than 5% of a voting class of a company’s equity securities registered under Section 12 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, they are required to file a Schedule 13D with the SEC. (Depending 
upon the facts and circumstances, the person or group of persons may be eligible to file the more abbre-
viated Schedule 13G in lieu of Schedule 13D.) Schedule 13D reports the acquisition and other information 
within ten days after the purchase.” (see https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answerssched13htm.html) 
17 I have drafted a comprehensive overview of key milestones and detailed takeover process lengths in 
the Appendix of this chapter (Figure A5). In this overview chart, the time periods are denoted in 
calendar days. 
Chapter 4   Measuring Competition in M&A Negotiations 
206 
(c) Comparing the average target stock price shortly after deal announcement (day 0) with 
the price on day −21, −42, and −63, respectively, one can directly read off the average 
one-, two-, and three-month premium18. Auctions seem to result in higher six-month 
premiums: the difference to negotiations is positive, but due to the large standard de-
viations in both sales procedure groups, not statistically significant. Premiums for the 
three-month window are also higher for auctions with the difference to negotiations not 
being statistically significant, consistent with the findings in Boone and Mulherin 
(2007). Given that auctions exhibit a steeper run-up, particularly shortly after the −63 
day mark, resulting one- and two-month premium differences between the sales proce-
dures cancel out, and might even be negative (for the one-month premium), yet are 
still not statistically significant19. 
Third, if deals are structured as auctions, they are often initiated by the target. In one-
to-one negotiations, however, the deal is usually initiated by the acquirer (in approx. 80–95% 
of the cases, depending on the year). This suggests that targets are trying to stimulate compe-
tition and acquirers trying to suppress it. Figure 2 plots the relative share of selling procedure 
(deal type) and initiating party for the sample period from 2004–2017. There seems to be a 
slight upward trend of auctions as a share of all deals during the last two decades, although a 
sharp drop occurred in the aftermath of the Great Recession.  
Fourth, as Liu and Officer (2020) report, bid revisions are very common in the pre-
public phase of a deal, especially if there is significant competition among potential acquirers. 
The suggested Proposals-to-CA-Ratio  thus tries to capture the degree of relative competition: 
As the above mentioned takeover cases have shown, all three targets received three proposals 
each, but the way how competition evolved was significantly different, with significantly dif-
ferent outcomes, i.e., offered share price premiums. 
 
18 This can be done easily since the figure plots last sale prices relative to the last sale price on day −126 
and represents – like takeover premiums – raw returns. 
19 In Table A7 in the Appendix, I show that, after considering potential endogeneity by applying a 
propensity score matching procedure, premiums between auctions and negotiations are not statistically 
significantly different. These results hold for different definitions for auctions (classification of BM 2008 
vs. “strict” auctions), for different premium measures (six-, three-, and one-month premium), and for 
different propensity score matching procedures (nearest two neighbor matching, caliper matching, and 
kernel matching (Epanechnikov)). A simple t-test (differences of sample means) delivers the same results. 
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Figure 2 
Relative Share of Selling Procedure and Initiating Party by Announcement Year (2004−2017) 
This figure depicts the relative share of selling procedure (deal type: auction vs. negotiation, based on 
the definition in BM 2008) and initiating party (acquirer vs. target) based on a sample of 780 public 
U.S. takeovers over the period from 2004–2017. 
 
Fifth, as the difference-in-means tests in Table 1 suggest, acquirer-initiated auctions are 
significantly different from target-initiated auctions when focussing on competition measures. 
Acquirer-initiated auctions exhibit a smaller number of contacted bidders (10.546 vs. 19.891 
for target-initiated auctions), fewer signed confidentiality agreements (5.149 vs. 9.864) and 
fewer submitted proposals (2.562 vs. 3.420). However, when looking at the conversion ratios, 
acquirer-initiated auctions represent a higher degree of relative competition: the Proposals-to-
CA-Ratio  is significantly higher, and even the one-month premium is approximately 6.5% 
higher than in target-initiated deals, although weaker statistically significant at the 10% level. 
This is consistent with the findings in Masulis and Simsir (2018), who note that target economic 
weakness, financial constraints, and negative economy-wide shocks are important motives for 
targets initiating the deal, a selection necessary to consider when analyzing deal premiums. 
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Table 1 
Competition Measures and One-Month Target Share Price Premiums in Auctions 
Table 1 presents different measures of private takeover competition in auctions, further split by the 
initiating party. The average one-month premium is also reported. Auctions are defined based on Boone 
and Mulherin (2008), i.e., deals where at least two prospective bidders sign confidentiality agreements 
with the target. Means are reported, median values are in angular parentheses (premium in %-points). 

































































4.3 Theoretical Foundations and Hypothesis Development 
4.3.1 Pre-Announcement Competition and Target Share Price Premiums 
 A common perception in economics is that increased competition for scarce resources 
results in higher market prices for these resources. This general assumption can be transferred 
to the market for corporate takeovers as well: the higher competition among bidders for a given 
target – especially in auctions, the higher the offered bid premium, all else equal.  
Theoretical work modeling bidding behavior in corporate takeovers is abundant. Fish-
man (1988, 1989) shows that a high initial bid premium signals a high bidder valuation and 
deters competing bids in an environment where bidding is costly (i.e., sunk costs such as infor-
mation acquisition or entry fees for auctions). Discouraging other bidders through this preemp-
tive bidding strategy is also predicted by the model in Bulow and Klemperer (2009). This work 
can explain why one-to-one negotiations are not rare and why they do not appear competitive 
to the outside world. Fishman’s model is extended in Dimopoulos and Sacchetto (2014) by 
another source of high premiums: target resistance. Their model of takeover competition also 
considers costly sequential entry as established in French and McCormick (1984) and Fishman 
(1988). They find that even small entry costs are sufficient to rationalize high preemption rates, 
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but that takeover premiums are, to a large extent, determined by target resistance instead of 
preemptive bidding. Hansen (2001) highlights and theoretically analyzes stylized facts observed 
in auctions of companies. Sellers sometimes restrict the number of bidders and accept preemp-
tive bids. He explains these phenomena with the assumption that some information about the 
target can, if released, reduce firm value. In equilibrium, however, when deciding on the sales 
process and number of potential bidders, targets outweigh the benefits of getting more bidders 
with the (indirect) costs of information revelation20. Hansen’s (2001) work helps to explain why 
we not always observe auctions, especially in the public phase of the takeover. 
The empirical findings of Liu and Officer (2020) build on this theoretical framework. 
The authors indicate, that the higher the competition, the higher the probability of upward 
price revisions – assuming no information detrimental to target firm’s value is revealed – and 
the higher target’s reservation price in each round of bidding. Exploiting a representative sam-
ple of public U.S. takeovers from 1994 to 2016, they find that target firms are able to improve 
the merger consideration by 8.5% on average through private negotiations. This considerable 
increase comes on top of an average 34.8% initial premium, resulting in a relative increase of 
24.4%. Consistent with prior studies, they find that the price revision during the public phase 
of the deal, i.e., bid revisions observable by the market, is a mere 1.1%, and only 10% of 
announced deals receive a public price revision. They conclude that target managers’ behavior 
appears congruent with shareholder wealth maximization, and inconsistent with systematic 
agency problems. 
My central hypothesis is based on the notion that the existence of a competing bidder 
is a general indication of the desirability of the target. The degree of relative competition is 
higher, the more potential acquirers from the bidder pool, who already signed confidentiality 
agreements, also submit their ultimate proposal to buy target shares. Put simply, my hypoth-
esis can be expressed as “premiums are higher, the higher the share of bidders who stay in the 
game”. It assumes that bidding is costly and becomes even more expensive, the longer the 
potential acquirer remains in the negotiation process. This ex-ante known sunk cost character 
of bidding ensures that participation of the bidder is driven by its real demand for the target: 
 
20 I.e., targets trade off the upward potential for higher premiums with competitive information cost. 
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a positive selection. Hence, the higher premium is the result of higher demand for the target 
by bidders, reflecting high competition, because the gains from controlling it could be transfer-
able to a larger pool of bidders. As standard theory predicts and as target board fiduciary 
duties dictate, the winning bidder is the bidder with the highest offer per share. The central 
testable hypothesis of this chapter thus is: 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio,                                        
the higher the offered target share price premium. 
I make one important assumption, namely that participating bidders know of the ex-
istence of each other. If one supposes the signing of confidentiality agreements by bidders and 
the conduction of due diligences for the target as events for which their occurrence is known 
to respective counterparts, this assumption seems appropriate. 
 
4.3.2 Pre-Announcement Competition and Acquirer Wealth Effects 
 Auction theory in corporate takeovers (e.g., Hansen (2001)) suggests that bidders only 
participate in auctions if their expected profit from the bid is positive. Bidders may opt out of 
the auction at any time, i.e., they self-select to quit, when they perceive the costs of partici-
pating as being greater than the benefits from bidding. 
Yet some researchers have suggested that, if pressured by competition, managers of 
potential acquirers over-bid for a target (rational but entrenched CEOs, e.g., de Bodt et al. 
(2018)), and some even exhibit “hubris” (overconfidence) when competing to win (Roll (1986)). 
This overbidding phenomenon is generally known as the “winner’s curse” (Giliberto and 
Varaiya (1989)) and has been widely studied in financial economics21. 
The winner’s curse is applicable to common value, sealed bid, first price auctions. It 
states that the winning bidder – who bids the highest price – is “cursed” by paying too much. 
This suboptimal outcome may arise if this bidder does not properly adjust his bidding strategy 
for the degree of competition and the degree of uncertainty over the true value of the target 
 
21 Dasgupta and Hansen (2007) present a broader review of auctions in corporate finance, and also 
discuss the winner’s curse in M&A. 
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firm. Following the review in Boone and Mulherin (2008), the incidence and magnitude of the 
winner’s curse then is a direct function of the number of bidders and magnitude of uncertainty. 
Given that the sales procedure in M&A has multiple stages, i.e., from contacting via signing 
confidentiality agreements and indicating interest to submitting proposals, the total number of 
bids might only be a noisy measure of obvious competition, as the three exemplary cases in 
Section 4.2 indicate. Hence, I advocate using the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio  to gauge the degree 
of competition, since it better accounts for the latter’s evolution during the whole private phase 
of the deal. 
Although the classical M&A selling procedure certainly does not reflect the idealized 
common value auction mentioned above22, the current view in empirical research is that if 
competition is high, overbidding might likely occur (de Bodt et al. (2018), Eckbo and Thorburn 
(2009)). On average, acquirer shareholders should react negatively if their managers’ overbid. 
Based on prior theoretical predictions and empirical findings, I propose that, if the Proposals-
to-CA-Ratio measures competition, winning bidder’s deal announcement returns should be 
inversely related to this ratio. This leads to the second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio,                                        
the lower acquirer cumulative abnormal deal announcement returns. 
 
4.3.3 Post-Bid Competition 
 Although empirical evidence indicates that the private sales process already seems to 
“set the stage” in a way that it filters out the highest-valuing bidder – at least in auctions, 
there is little reason to believe that announcing the bid itself (1) deters prior competitors (i.e., 
rivals of the announcing bidder during the private phase) from making a topping bid, and (2) 
deters rival bidders newly informed of target’s selling intention in the first place. A competing 
bid should even be more likely, if the market learns from observing winning bidder’s stock price 
 
22 Reasons are, e.g., its multistage character, private values of bidders that play a key role (e.g., Schwert 
(1996)), bidders likely observe each other’s bids and can react accordingly (information leakage), and 
the existence of informed and uninformed bidders (bidders likely do not have symmetric information).  
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reaction on announcement, that the bid is probably value-creating for the acquirer. Consist-
ently, hypothesis 3a predicts: 
Hypothesis 3a: The higher the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio,                                        
the more likely the emergence of a competing bid for the target,          
if original bidder’s announcement returns are positive. 
 Eckbo et al. (2019) note, that under U.S. law governing corporate control transactions, 
directors of the target board have a fiduciary duty to consider any rival bids that occur before 
the final (target) shareholder vote. In this way, competing bids might lead to a lower proba-
bility of closing the originally announced bid, not only because the competing bid offer per 
share usually exceeds the original offer price23, but also because bid consideration and review 
by target’s board significantly increases the time-to-completion. Thus, hypothesis 3b states: 
Hypothesis 3b: The higher the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio,                                        
the less likely the comsummation of the announced bid,                    
if original bidder’s announcement returns are positive. 
 
4.4 Sample Description, Empirical Design, and Key Variables 
4.4.1 Sample Description 
 To construct the sample, I begin with all M&A deals in Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ 
database announced between January 01, 2004, and December 31, 2017. In order to observe 
the final outcome, deals must have either been closed or withdrawn within this time period. I 
then impose the following sample filters, commonly used in empirical M&A literature (e.g., Liu 
and Officer (2020), Aktas et al. (2010), Offenberg and Pirinsky (2015)): first, both the acquirer 
and the target are publicly traded companies and are headquartered in the U.S.24 Second, the 
 
23 In 76% of my observations the competing offer per share is higher than the offer per share of the 
original announced bid. Yet this has to be taken with caution since a direct comparison between these 
two values suffers because of information (positive or negative) that has become known in the meantime. 
24 I require the firms to be based in the U.S. to ensure that U.S. takeover law applies to the deal (one 
jurisdiction only). 
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acquirer aims for a change in control and seeks a majority stake in the target firm (i.e., the 
acquirer owns less than 50% of target’s outstanding shares prior to deal announcement). Third, 
to focus on economically meaningful transactions, I set the minimum transaction value (item 
“Deal Value”, excluding assumed liabilities) to USD 1 mm. These three filters result in a sample 
of 8,466 transactions. I then merge this dataset with stock price data from the Center of Re-
search in Security Prices (CRSP) to calculate (abnormal) announcement returns for the firms. 
Finally, I require that merger documents are available on the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission’s EDGAR website. This is to make sure that I am able to hand-collect all relevant 
detailed information25 on the private sales process related to pre-public deal competition (i.e., 
initiator of the deal, number of potential acquirers contacted by the target firm, number of 
potential acquirers signing non-disclosure agreements, number of binding, privately submitted 
bids to the target with a price to purchase target shares, size of the termination fees, and type 
of transaction (classical negotiated deals vs. tender offers)). After mapping this dataset with 
accounting and industry-level data from Compustat, 780 final transactions remain26. 
 
4.4.2 Empirical Design and Key Variables 
The base specification to measure the effect of pre-public competition on target firm’s 
announcement returns and stock price premiums is the following linear fixed effects regression 
model: 
Tgt Premium[–k;OPS]i,t = αi,t + β1 Proposals-to-CA-Ratioi,t + β2 Number Proposalsi,t 
               + β3 Tgt Initiationi,t + β4 Auctioni,t + β5 Tgt Anti-takeover Statei,t 
               + β6 Acq Industry Counti,t + β7 Tgt Run-up CAR[–m;–(k+1)]i,t 
               + η Deal Characteristicsi,t + θ Acq and Tgt Firm Characteristicsi,t 
               + φ Tgt Industry × Year FEi,t + ϑ Acq Industry FEi,t + εi,t 
 
25 These filings are mainly of the following type: S-4 (business combination or exchange offers: deals in 
connection with the issuance of acquirer shares for the merger), 14D-9 (tender offer solicitation/recom-
mendation statements), and DEFM14A (definitive proxy statement relating to a merger or an acquisi-
tion; issued by the target to invite its shareholders to vote on the merger agreement). 
26 Table A2 in the Appendix lists the detailed sample selection process with the number of remaining 
observations after applying respective filters. 
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Where i  indexes the transaction (i.e., the unique acquirer-target-combination), t  in-
dexes the time (i.e., announcement date of the transaction), α is an intercept, and β 1 is the 
coefficient of primary interest – the estimate of the effect of pre-public takeover competition 
on target firm’s share price premium and cumulative abnormal deal announcement returns. 
The dependent variable (Tgt Premium ) is defined as the relative increase of the announced 
offer price per target share (OPS) to the target’s last sale share price one month prior to offer 
announcement27, and expressed in percentage points. As a robustness, I also regress target 
cumulative abnormal deal announcement returns (Tgt CAR ) on my variable of interest and 
all other controls. CARs are calculated applying Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model, including 
the momentum factor, to model normal returns, and the model parameters are estimated over 
the period −250 to −23 trading days (prior) to offer announcement. Choosing the premium 
over abnormal returns hast two key advantages (Eckbo (2009)): first, it is the direct outcome 
of the bidding behavior; second, bid premiums are less prone to be affected by rumors shortly 
before announcement28; third, it is not affected by the market’s assessment of deal completion.  
Proposals-to-CA-Ratio  is the main variable of interest and is defined as the number of 
proposals (Number Proposals ) for the target firm divided by the number of signed confidenti-
ality agreements (Number Signed Confidentiality Agreements ) with the target. Number Pro-
posals  is the number of potential acquirers that privately submitted written offers (bids) to 
the target firm, shortly before the deal is publicly announced, i.e., at the end of the private 
takeover process, with a price proposed to buy target shares. Number Signed Confidentiality 
Agreements  is the number of potential acquirers that signed confidentiality (non-disclosure) 
agreements with the target firm after indicating their interest in buying the firm. These detailed 
data are hand-colletcted from the background section of official SEC merger filings issued by 
either the target, the acquirer, or both, on or shortly after publicly announcing the proposed 
takeover. To control for the level of proposals, every regression includes Number Proposals  as 
 
27 Besides the one-day, three-day, one-week, one-month, and deal inititation premium (Eaton et al. 
(2020)), as depicted in the regression equation, I also regress the cumulative abnormal announcement 
returns (CARs) for the symmetric event windows [–5;+5], [–3;+3], and [–1;+1] around (public) deal 
announcement on the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio  as well as all other controls. In untabulated specifications, 
I also regress the two-month-premium on the same set of variables, for which I find the results to remain 
unchanged.  
28 In every specification for premiums or abnormal returns I include a tailored run-up control (rumors). 
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its anchor value29. This is important since relative competition might be very different, even if 
the number of submitted proposals to the target is the same, as the examplary cases in Section 
4.2 with three proposals each represent. 
I further include Tgt Initiation , a dummy variable that equals 1 if the target initiated 
the deal, 0 otherwise, to control for this likely endogenous decision. Masulis and Simsir (2018) 
report that targets initiate deals in response to exploring strategic alternatives and find that 
they often show signs of financial and economic distress and binding financial constraints prior 
to their initiation. They state consistency with the hypotheses that (1) financially distressed 
targets seek to avoid expected bankruptcy costs through their sale, and (2) financially con-
strained targets seek to merge with cash-rich or financially strong partners. Since this very 
likely changes the bargaining power and associated expected premiums considerably, I include 
Tgt Initiation  in every regression throughout this chapter. 
Auction  is a dummy variable representing the sales procedure. I follow the literature 
consensus, established in the work of Boone and Mulherin (2007, 2008, 2009), and code Auction 
with a value of 1, if at least two potential acquirers sign a confidentiality (non-disclosure) 
agreement with the target30. Auction  is included in the baseline regressions, given that this 
selling method is significantly different from a one-to-one negotiation (Gentry and Stroup 
(2019)). 
Tgt Anti-takeover State is a dummy variable set to 1, if the target firm is headquartered 
in a state with strong anti-takeover laws, and 0 otherwise. Comment and Schwert (1995) find 
that the more strict a state’s anti-takeover law, the greater the bargaining power of the target. 
Following Bebchuk and Ferrell (2002), and applied in Boone and Mulherin (2008), states with 
strong anti-takeover laws are Idaho (ID), Indiana (IN), Maryland (MD), Nevada (NV), Ohio 
(OH), Pennsylvania (PA), South Dakota (SD), Tennessee (TN), and Wisconsin (WI). A greater 
 
29 I receive qualitatively and quantitatively similar results if I include Number Signed Confidentiality 
Agreements as the anchor variable instead. Figures A3 and A4 in the Appendix provide strong graphical 
evidence highlighting different premium levels for various values for the number of proposals. 
30 In M&A, not every selling procedure defined as Auction  is in similar vein of a classical, open, first 
price (sealed) bid auction. Therefore, I introduce and include (in untabulated regressions) a dummy 
variable Auction (strict)  that equals 1 if there exist at least two interested potential bidders on every 
stage of the private takeover process (i.e., at least two contacts, two signed confidentiality agreements, 
and two privately submitted proposals). This does not change the overall results. 
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bargaining power might lessen the likelihood that the target sells itself via an auction and 
enables the target to negotiate higher premiums, all else equal. I thus expect the coefficient on 
Tgt Anti-takeover State  to be positively related to target announcement returns and premiums. 
Since my goal is to distill the effect of real, observable competition during the pre-public 
phase of the deal, I include a variable proxying for the degree of latent  competition. Aktas et 
al. (2010) find that latent competition increases the bid premium. This potential correlation 
with both my variable of interest and the outcome variable itself renders Acq Industry Count 
as an important control variable. It is defined as the number of firms in the same SIC4 industry 
as the acquirer with a market capitalization larger than the acquirer31, and proxies for unob-
served, potential purchasing power of likely acquirers. This variable gauges the potential depth 
of the demand side of the takeover market to a certain extent. Following this argumentation, 
I expect the relation between Acq Industry Count  and target premiums to be positive. 
Other variables consist of controls for deal and firm characteristics. Tender offers are 
usually quicker than negotiations, sometimes circumvent target’s management board, and have 
been found to pay, on average, higher premiums (Offenberg and Pirinsky (2015)). This is 
explained by a raise in target’s reservation price through the acquirer signalling his higher 
demand for target shares. Horizontal deals have found to be value-creating, which makes it an 
important control when analyzing bidder returns. Pre-announcement cumulative abnormal re-
turns control for information leakage and are thus expected to be significantly negatively re-
lated to announcement returns32. Target announcement returns have been found to be higher 
in cash deals (Eckbo (2009))33. I also include Acq Toehold , the percentage of target’s total 
common shares outstanding owned by the acquirer. Betton and Eckbo (2000) and Betton, 
Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008) find that it leads to lower premiums for the winning bidder 
 
31 One caveat of this literature definition is that it only accounts for firms assigned to the same SIC4 
industry, i.e., it does not capture potential purchasing power arising from other industries. I remedy this 
concern by testing with broader measures (on SIC3, SIC2, and SIC1 level) as well (untabulated).   
32 The more information is leaked into the market prior to announcement, the less the surprise effect on 
announcement, all else equal. 
33 Explanations range from the tax hypothesis (implied immediate capital gains tax penalty for target 
shareholders forces acquirers to pay higher premiums as a refund for paid taxes) and corporate control 
concerns (cash is selected by the acquirer to avoid diluting their private benefits of control in the merged 
firm) to behavioral motives, market timing, and asymmetric information (adverse selection: bidder uses 
overpriced stock as the method of payment to lock in this financial advantage). 
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through its effect as an entry deterrence for rivals. Offenberg and Pirinsky (2015) also find that 
acquirers are more likely to choose a tender offer when they have made some prior relationship-
specific investment in the target. A relative size control is included to address potential effects 
of unequal bargaining power, and termination fee measures are also added to control for antic-
ipated value effects if deals are abandoned after announcement. All remaining covariates (mar-
ket capitalization of the acquirer, market-to-book ratios, stock return volatility, and institu-
tional ownership) are included to partial out their effect on deal announcement returns. Espe-
cially target undervaluation could also lead to higher competition. 
All regressions include industry-year fixed effects (Gormley and Matsa (2014)) based 
on the first SIC digit and announcement year to control for unobserved heterogeneity that 
could affect my variable of interest, the dependent variable, and all other controls (e.g., Betton 
et al. (2008)). This reduces endogeneity concerns in the form of omitted variable bias in that 
it removes the influence of unobserved covariates that are constant across industry-years and 
potentially correlated with all variables. This could take the form of, e.g., certain shocks to 
competition, deal premiums, and other controls in different industries and over time: economic 
recessions, e.g., are known to tighten financing conditions (Harford (2005)). This could reduce 
the number of potential bidders and decrease overall competition. All variables are defined in 
detail in Table A1 in the Appendix, which also includes the respective source of the data. 
 
4.5 Empirical Results 
4.5.1 Summary Statistics 
 Table 2 presents summary statistics of the sample consisting of 780 public-public U.S. 
transactions over the time period from January 01, 2004 to December 31, 2017. The average 
one-month premium is 37.18%, with a somewhat smaller median value (30.83%). This posi-
tively skewed distribution is typical for all measures of M&A premiums (e.g., Betton et al. 
(2008), Liu and Officer (2020)). The average initiation premium (Eaton et al. (2020)) is larger 
than the average one-month premium, consistent with stock price run-ups starting already at 
early stages of deal negotiations. Target cumulative abnormal deal announcement returns 
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amount to 25% on average, similar to other studies, such as, e.g., Boone and Mulherin (2007). 
Acquirer returns mimic a stylized fact of shareholder wealth changes through M&A: they are 
negative yet small for public deals (Eckbo (2009)). 95% of deals are completed and 3% receive 
competing bids from a different bidder during the public phase of the (pending) takeover. 
Similar to Table 1 in Section 4.2, the number of participating bidders decreases from stage to 
stage. The average number of contacted bidders is 8.7, 4.5 sign confidentiality agreements, and 
2.1 bidders submit proposals to the target, on average. It is important to mention that these 
values are higher in auctions compared to one-to-one negotiations, since one-to-one negotiations 
receive by definition only one confidentiality agreement and one offer. The main variable of 
interest, the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio , has a mean of 0.768, suggesting that approximately three 
out of four potential acquirers who sign confidentiality agreements also submit bids. The alter-
native measure, the Proposals-to-Contacts-Ratio , is smaller, consistent with the notion that 
some contacted bidders drop out of the negotiation process. 
Table 2 
Summary Statistics 
Table 2 reports summary statistics of the sample consisting of 780 public-public U.S. transactions an-
nounced and either closed or withdrawn between January 01, 2004 and December 31, 2017. Number 
indices display the point in time (i.e., trading day) relative to the offer announcement (OA) date when 
the variable was measured. Letter indices refer to the variable the non-indexed variable is scaled with, 
i.e., BTF Size Deal Value is the USD amount of the bidder termination fee scaled (divided) by the USD 
amount of Deal Value . Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR ) are measured in symmetric event windows 
around deal announcement, applying a Carhart (1997) four-factor-model to model normal returns. The 
model parameters are estimated over the period −250 to −23 trading days (prior) to offer announcement. 
All deal competition measures are obtained by parsing the background section of the merger agreements 
(S-4, 14D-9 and/or DEFM14A SEC filings). All CARs, Premiums, Market-to-Book ratios, and Relative 
Size Market Cap [OA–22]  are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. All variables are defined in detail in 
Table A1 in the Appendix. 
  Summary Statistics 
 Variables Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Announcement Returns, Target Share Price Premiums, and Deal Competition Measures 
 Tgt CAR [–1;+1] 780 24.942 20.640 22.778 −19.906 124.937 
 Tgt CAR [–3;+3] 780 25.418 21.935 23.275 −23.914 129.171 
 Tgt CAR [–5;+5] 780 26.194 22.511 24.002 −26.272 132.542 
 Premium 1 Day 780 30.795 25.668 27.781 −25.507 238.866 
 Premium 3 Day 780 32.034 27.359 28.621 −25.507 260.825 
 Premium 1 Week 780 32.638 27.989 29.492 −29.996 255.073 
 Premium 1 Month 780 37.180 30.826 35.282 −59.253 378.516 
 Premium Initiation 406 38.281 34.060 34.306 −64.126 165.748 
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 Acq CAR [–1;+1] 677 −1.265 −0.843 6.108 −20.719 23.916 
 Acq CAR [–3;+3] 677 −1.403 −1.173 6.980 −26.889 27.097 
 Acq CAR [–5;+5] 675 −1.549 −1.096 7.902 −29.097 31.458 
 Deal Completion 780 0.954 1 0.210 0 1 
 Competing Bid 780 0.028 0 0.166 0 1 
 Number Contacts 763 8.692 2 17.006 1 180 
 Number Signed Confidentiality Agreements 732 4.463 2 7.370 1 77 
 Number Proposals 780 2.144 1 1.821 1 15 
 Proposals-to-CA-Ratio 732 0.768 1 0.307 0.026 1.500 
 Proposals-to-Contacts-Ratio 763 0.663 1 0.373 0.009 1.000 
Panel B: Deal Characteristics and Cumulative Abnormal Run-up Returns 
 Tgt Initiation 780 0.297 0 0.457 0 1 
 Auction 780 0.588 1 0.492 0 1 
 Tgt Anti-takeover State 780 0.182 0 0.386 0 1 
 Acq Industry Count 780 40.844 8 68.268 0 487 
 Tgt Industry Count 764 74.610 23 111.930 0 566 
 Deal Value 780 2.786 0.519 6.987 0.010 79.406 
 Friendly 780 0.996 1 0.062 0 1 
 Cash Only 780 0.408 0 0.492 0 1 
 Tender Offer 780 0.159 0 0.366 0 1 
 Horizontal Takeover 780 0.485 0 0.500 0 1 
 Relative Size Market Cap [OA–22] 780 46.580 6.624 167.217 0.333 1,792.928 
 Relative Size Market Cap [OA–126] 777 39.099 6.336 114.727 0.569 935.260 
 Acq Toehold [OA–1] 780 0.320 0.000 3.460 0.000 45.386 
 Acq Toehold [OA–126] 780 0.026 0.000 0.243 0.000 4.214 
 BTF Size Deal Value 780 1.226 0.000 2.454 0.000 30.214 
 TTF Size Deal Value 780 3.327 3.347 1.478 0.000 30.171 
 Tgt Run-up CAR [–42;–2] 780 4.888 3.377 17.585 −56.075 89.633 
 Tgt Run-up CAR [–42;–4] 780 4.414 3.407 17.045 −56.558 86.435 
 Tgt Run-up CAR [–42;–6] 780 3.694 2.345 16.242 −57.144 81.719 
 Tgt Run-up CAR [–252;–23] 752 −3.070 −2.157 53.476 −215.808 206.447 
 Acq Run-up CAR [–42;–2] 675 0.227 0.102 10.454 −33.601 45.635 
 Acq Run-up CAR [–42;–4] 675 0.298 0.325 10.010 −37.145 43.978 
 Acq Run-up CAR [–42;–6] 675 0.290 −0.053 9.833 −35.638 44.146 
Panel C: Acquiring Firm Characteristics 
 Acq Market Cap [OA–22] 780 22.073 3.091 50.803 0.014 534.879 
 Acq Market Cap [OA–126] 780 21.208 2.880 49.220 0.021 441.492 
 Acq Market-to-Book [OA–22] 780 3.519 2.221 5.691 0.429 76.642 
 Acq 1YR Stock Return Volatility [OA–1] 780 29.673 26.034 15.024 4.322 122.573 
 ln Acq 1YR Stock Return Volatility [OA–1] 780 3.289 3.259 0.437 1.464 4.809 
 Acq Institutional Own Sum [OA–1] 780 49.088 49.093 19.007 0.481 95.761 
Panel D: Target Firm Characteristics 
 Tgt Market-to-Book [OA–22] 780 2.967 1.886 4.083 0.197 35.653 
 Tgt Market-to-Book [OA–126] 777 2.719 1.867 2.831 0.401 19.362 
 Tgt 1YR Stock Return Volatility [OA–1] 780 40.597 34.951 25.007 8.231 229.343 
 ln Tgt 1YR Stock Return Volatility [OA–1] 780 3.561 3.554 0.519 2.108 5.435 
 Tgt Institutional Own Sum [OA–1] 780 56.641 59.062 26.077 0.355 99.729 
 Tgt Institutional Own Sum [OA–126] 771 52.115 54.271 26.782 0.000 99.994 
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 Tgt Institutional Own Herf [OA–1] 780 0.033 0.024 0.049 0.000 0.710 
 Tgt Institutional Own Herf [OA–126] 771 0.031 0.023 0.048 0.000 0.681 
 Tgt Return on Assets [OA–126] 780 −0.009 0.011 0.136 −0.750 0.219 
 Tgt Sales Growth 716 12.735 6.544 46.853 −99.327 882.622 
 Tgt R&D Intensity [OA–126] 780 0.110 0.000 0.604 0.000 10.709 
 Tgt Sales Herfindahl 762 0.171 0.131 0.156 0.010 1.000 
(Table 2 continued) 
In about 30% of the cases the target initiates the deal. This rate is significantly higher 
in auctions compared to one-to-one negotiations, and similar to the initiation rate obtained in 
Masulis and Simsir (2018) and Heitzman (2011). The share of auctions in the sample is 58.8%, 
consistent with Schlingemann and Wu (2015), and slightly larger than the corresponding share 
in Boone and Mulherin (2008). About 18% of targets are headquartered in anti-takeover states 
as defined in Bebchuk and Ferrell (2002). The average deal size is USD 2.8 bn, a value typical 
for public-public transactions (e.g., Dimopoulos and Sacchetto (2014) and de Bodt et al. 
(2018)). All other deal characteristics, in particular Friendly, Cash Only , Tender Offer , Hori-
zontal Takeover , Relative Size Market Cap [OA–22] , and termination fees are consistent with 
empirical M&A literature. Target run-up returns are significantly positive over the two months 
preceding deal announcement, but are negative if measured from one year prior to one month 
before announcement (Tgt Run-up CAR [–252;–23] ). This is congruent with the literature indicat-
ing that targets are often firms that underperformed before being taken over. 
 
4.5.2 Private Takeover Competition, Deal Premiums, and Target Announcement Returns 
 Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive relation between pre-announcement competition and 
takeover premiums. This relation is based on the notion that bidding is costly, resulting in only 
credible bids made for the target (positive selection). If the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio is high, the 
stronger the obvious demand for the target, because all else equal, the gains from controlling 
the target then seem to be transferable to a larger pool of bidders. The more bidder stay in the 
negotiation process, the more likely are bid revisions, and the higher is the expected offer per 
share (i.e., premium). 
 Table 3 presents the baseline results of linear fixed effects regressions of various 
measures of target share price premiums on the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio . Controlling for a large 
vector of covariates, the coefficient on the variable of interest is positive and statistically highly 
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significant at the 1% level. The results hold for cumulative abnormal deal announcement re-
turns as well, except for the initiation premium, for which the coefficient is significant at the 
5% level34. Multiplying the marginal effect with the standard-deviation of the ratio underlines 
its economical significance: a one-standard deviation increase of this ratio corresponds to a 
9.29% increase of the one-month premium and a 5.99% increase of the deal initiation premium. 
Consistent with theoretical predictions in Section 4.3, the coefficients for both Tgt Anti-take-
over State  and Acq Industry Count  are positive and significant. Targets from anti-takeover 
states receive, on average, 7.6% higher one-month premiums, and each additional firm in ac-
quirer’s SIC4 industry larger than the acquirer corresponds to an one-month premium increase 
of 6.8 basis points, all else equal. This suggests that increased bargaining power of the target 
and latent competition among potential acquirers seem to have a positive effect on deal premi-
ums, which is in line with the results obtained in Aktas et al. (2010). As expected, the run-up 
returns are highly significantly negatively related to announcement returns and premiums. This 
is what one would expect, since if information about a likely takeover is already leaked (i.e., 
priced) into the market, the surprise effect on announcement should be comparatively smaller. 
Another stylized fact of announcement returns is that reactions are more positive if the 
deal currency consists entirely of cash (e.g., Betton et al. (2008), Boone and Mulherin (2007, 
2008, 2011)). Accordingly, paying purely with cash increases the seven-day symmetric abnor-
mal announcement returns for target’s stock by approximately 7.7% on average, compared to 
deals including at least a portion paid with stock. Another reason for these significantly positive 
returns could be explained by taking on a price risk perspective: paying with acquirer’s stock 
makes target shareholders’ expected value from the deal dependent on acquirer’s stock price 
reactions during the pricing period. This risk is completely avoided when receiving cash only. 
Offenberg and Pirinsky (2015) show that tender offers are often structured as cash offers. Their 
model predicts faster completion times for tender offers compared to non-tender offers, and 
they show that premiums are higher because tendering signals acquirer’s higher demand for 
target  shares.  This  is  consistent  with  my  findings  of  a  positive  and  statistically  significant 
 
34 Not every filing contains the exact deal initiation date, the reason why the number of observations 
drops, which might explain weaker significance. Following the suggestions in Eaton et al. (2020), I receive 
highly statistically significant results when using the six-month premium as default (i.e., when there is 
no initiation date mentioned in the respective filing). 




Private Takeover Competition, Target Announcement Returns, and Takeover Premiums 
Table 3 presents the results of linear fixed effects regressions of Target Cumulative Abnormal Returns (regressions (1)–(3)) and Target Share Price Premium (regressions 
(4)–(8)) on the variable of interest, the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio , which is defined as the ratio between the number of privately submitted proposals to the target firm 
at the end of the private takeover process divided by the number of signed confidentiality (non-disclosure) agreements. I further include control variables as defined in 
Section 4.4. All regressions include Target Industry × Year Fixed Effects , Acquirer Industry Fixed Effects  as well as an intercept but are unreported. All standard 
errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster correlation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  Target Cumulative Abnormal Returns  Target Share Price Premium 
 Event Window  [–1;+1] [–3;+3] [–5;+5]  1 Day 3 Day 1 Week 1 Month Initiation 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 




















































































































Tgt Run-up CAR [–42;–2]  
−0.209*** 
(0.055) 
   
−0.297*** 
(0.074) 
    
 
Tgt Run-up CAR [–42;–4]   
−0.220*** 
(0.069) 
   
−0.303*** 
(0.073) 
   
 
Tgt Run-up CAR [–42;–6]    
−0.222*** 
(0.065) 
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Target Firm Characteristics           
 
























































            
Tgt Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acq Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            
Observations  732 732 732  732 732 732 704 406 
Adjusted R2  0.208 0.195 0.193  0.206 0.193 0.199 0.187 0.215 
(Table 3 continued)
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coefficient on Tender Offer . However, given their different course of the selling procedure, I 
additionally test hypothesis 1 for the subsample of auctions excluding tender offers. The results 
are deferred to the Appendix (Table A5). The coefficient on Horizontal Takeover  is positive 
but only weakly significant at the 10% level. Explaining positive target returns with higher 
premiums paid because of a higher synergy potential has thus to be taken with caution. In line 
with the literature (e.g., Boone and Mulherin (2007)), the coefficient on relative size is also 
positive and significant in every specification. This suggests that merging with a relatively large 
acquirer is good news for the target. Reflecting the result in Betton and Eckbo (2000), having 
a toehold in the target firm results in lower premiums paid for the target, and subsequently 
lower announcement returns. Toehold’s entry deterrence effect might lead to less aggressive, 
less preemptive bidding behavior. In addition, all variance inflation factors (vifs) are below 2.5, 
suggesting that multicollinearity35 is very likely not at play. By successively adding control 
variables to the univariate regression depicted in Table A3 in the Appendix (modular regression 
setup), I show that the relation between competition and target premiums holds independently 
of the inclusion of certain controls. This is to mitigate concerns that the effect is the simple 
byproduct of a specifically fitted regression model. 
Taken together, controlling for factors explaining announcement effects, deal premiums 
and latent competition, I find strong empirical support for hypothesis 1. 
 
4.5.3 Private Takeover Competition and Acquirer Announcement Returns 
 Strong competition among bidders is generally linked to a more negative outcome for 
the winning acquirer due to overbidding (Roll (1986), de Bodt et al. (2018)). I argue that the 
richness of the typical M&A selling procedure is not captured by pure auction models which 
assume that acquirers should expect a positive value from the bid. The assumptions of the 
winner’s curse do not perfectly hold in reality, but empirical literature also cannot reject the 
 
35 It is important no note that even if multicollinearity would exist, coefficients will still be unbiased. 
The sample distribution of the coefficients will still be centered on the true values. The only thing that 
changes is the chance of a Type II error (i.e., failure to reject a false null hypothesis of no effect of the 
explanator due to inflated standard errors), which generally increases if multicollinearity is at play. 
Chapter 4                                                   Measuring Competition in M&A Negotiations 
225 
existence of overbidding. Hypothesis 2 thus predicts that the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio  is in-
versely related to acquirer deal announcement returns. 
Table 4 
Private Takeover Competition and Acquirer Announcement Returns 
The following table depicts the results of linear fixed effects regressions of Acquirer Cumulative Abnor-
mal Returns on the variable of interest, the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio , which is defined as the ratio between 
the number of privately submitted proposals to the target firm at the end of the private takeover process 
divided by the number of signed confidentiality (non-disclosure) agreements. Specifications (5) and (6) 
show the results for diversifying and horizontal takeovers, respectively. A deal is classified as horizontal 
if the acquirer and the target share the same SIC4 industry, and classified as diversifying if not. I further 
include control variables as defined in Section 4.4. All regressions include Acquirer Industry × Year 
Fixed Effects , Target Industry Fixed Effects  (as denoted) as well as an intercept but are unreported. 
All standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster 
correlation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  Acquirer Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 Sample  Full Sample  Auctions Only 
 Event Window  [–1;+1] [–3;+3] [–5;+5]  [–3;+3] 
 Subsample        Diversify. Horizont. 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6) 
Deal Characteristics          




















































     






























 Acq Run-up CAR [–42;–2]  
−0.034 
(0.025) 
       











 Acq Run-up CAR [–42;–6]    
−0.027 
(0.035) 
     

























   






























           
Controls  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
           
Acq Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
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Tgt Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes No 
           
Observations  732 732 732  421  217 204 
Adjusted R2  0.087 0.085 0.069  0.090  0.149 0.040 
(Table 4 continued) 
 Table 4 shows the results of the analysis of acquirer announcement returns. The coeffi-
cient on the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio  is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level for 
the [–1;+1] and [–3;+3] window, and somewhat weaker significant for the [–5;+5] window. All 
specifications are adjusted to control for acquirer-related covariates. The results hold for the 
full sample controlling for one-to-one negotiations, as well as for the subsample of auctions, 
where the relation should exist by definition. Deal Value  is negatively related to acquirer 
announcement returns, consistent with Liu and Officer (2020). Paying purely with cash is 
positively and significantly correlated with returns, following theoretical predictions of adverse 
selection (overvaluation). Specifications (5) and (6) split the subsample of auctions in diversi-
fying and horizontal takeovers. Interestingly, the inverse relation of competition and acquirer 
announcement returns seems to be mainly driven by competition in diversifying deals36. 
Untabulated regressions and literature consensus highlight that horizontal deals are generally 
considered as value-creating transactions, where higher synergy potentials between the merging 
parties rationalize higher premiums. Conversely, if synergy potential is on average lower in 
diversifying deals, high competition among bidders might explain this result – if overbidding 
is at work – and lowers the winning bidder’s share of remaining synergy gains. The higher 
likelihood of overbidding in diversifying deals could be the result of acquirers being less skilled 
in evaluating the target’s business and industry, resulting in less precise valuations for the 
target (i.e., acquirers’ valuations for the target have a higher standard deviation in diversifying 
transactions). Thus, the empirical evidence in Table 4 supports the prediction of hypothesis 2. 
 
4.5.4 Post-Announcement Competition and Takeover Outcomes 
 Making a public bid for the target likely does not decrease competition. Hypothesis 3a 
states that high pre-announcement competition should be correlated with post-announcement 
 
36 In untabulated regressions, I also include an interaction term (Diversifying × Proposals-to-CA-Ratio), 
which delivers similar results. 
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competition, and that this effect should be more pronounced, if the market learns from observ-
ing positive bidder returns that the deal is likely value-creating. This stock price reaction could 
lure rival bidders after public announcement: a competing bid made either by a bidder who 
slightly lost during the private phase or by a bidder newly informed that the target is on sale. 
In most of the cases, a rival bid is made if there exists a bidder who has an even higher 
reservation value for the target. Table 5 presents the results of fixed effects logit regressions of 
Competing Bid , a dummy variable that equals 1 if a public bid is made by a bidder different 
to the original announcing bidder37 during the public phase of the pending deal, and 0 other-
wise. The coefficient on the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio  is positive, but only weakly statistically 
significant (regression (1)). This changes if I interact the ratio with Pos. Acq OA Reaction , a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if acquirer’s [–5;+5] abnormal announcement returns are positive, 
and 0 otherwise. The coefficient becomes statistically more significant (regression (2)). The 
results hold if I split the sample by the median value of acquirer announcement reactions as a 
robustness test. Specification (3) shows the results for the subsample of values above the sample 
median. Consistent with hypothesis 3a, the positive relation between pre-public competition 
and the probability of receiving a competing bid is particularly strong. To the contrary, spec-
ification (4) yields an insignificant, even negative correlation, also supporting hypothesis 3a. 
 If competing bids are made, the probability of completing the originally announced bid 
generally decreases. Since target boards, following their Revlon duties38, have to consider any 
bid made prior to successful shareholder approval, competing bids usually result in a longer 
public phase of the pending takeover. Hypothesis 3b predicts that deal completion should be 
less likely, if competition is high and rival bidders are lured through observing positive acquirer 
announcement returns. Specifications (5) and (6) show the results for the total sample, i.e., 
including negotiations. The coefficient on the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio  is negative and statisti-
cally significant. The marginal effect increases if I focus on the subsample of auctions. As 
predicted by hypothesis 3b, the inverse relation between pre-public competition and deal com-
pletion seems to be more pronounced, if acquirer returns are positive (regression model (7)).
 
37 This is to make sure that my algorithm does not include public bid revisions by the original acquirer. 
38 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), available online: 
https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/1986/506-a-2d-173-1.html (permanent link). 




Private Takeover Competition, Post-Bid Competition, and Takeover Outcomes 
Table 5 shows the results of fixed effects logit regressions of Competing Bid , a dummy variable that equals 1 if the announced deal receives at least one another bid 
from a bidder different to the original acquirer before the original announced deal is either closed or withdrawn, 0 otherwise, on the variable of interest, the Proposals-
to-CA-Ratio  , which is defined as the ratio between the number of privately submitted proposals to the target firm at the end of the private takeover process divided 
by the number of signed confidentiality (non-disclosure) agreements (regressions (1)–(4)). I further include control variables as outlined in Section 4.4. In the last six 
columns (regressions (5)–(10)), I regress Deal Completion , a dummy variable that equals 1 if the announced transaction was closed successfully within the sample 
period, and 0 otherwise, on the same set of variables. Specifications (2) and (7) include an interaction term of the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio and Pos. Acq OA Reaction , 
which is a dummy variable set to 1 if cumulative abnormal deal announcement returns of the acquiring firm (Acq CAR [–5;+5] ) are strictly positive, and 0 otherwise. 
Regressions (3) and (9) restrict the sample to observations in which the cumulative abnormal deal announcement returns of the acquiring firm (Acq CAR [–5;+5] ) are 
above the sample median (Above Med. Acq OA Reaction ), whereas in regressions (4) and (10) the sample is restricted to the observations below the sample median 
(Below Med. Acq OA Reaction ), respectively. All regressions include Acquirer Industry × Resolution Year Fixed Effects , Target Industry Fixed Effects  as well as an 
intercept but are unreported. All standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster correlation. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  Competing Bid  Deal Completion 
 

















 Independent Variables  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7)  (8)  (9) (10) 















































Pos. Acq OA Reaction   
−5.283** 
(2.273) 











































































































































































































                 
Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
                 
Acq Industry × Resolution Year FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Tgt Industry FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
                 
Observations  780 690  304 304  780 780 690  359  327 327 
Pseudo R2  0.358 0.429  0.558 0.538  0.320 0.315 0.344  0.709  0.509 0.251 
(Table 5 continued)
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In the logit model without interaction terms, I include x-standardized odds ratios [in 
angular parentheses] that relate to the change in the probability of the dependent variable 
taking on the value of one for a one-standard deviation increase in the independent variable. I 
do this to show the relative importance of covariates: a one-standard deviation increase of the 
Proposals-to-CA-Ratio  hence corresponds to a statistically and economically significant 130% 
increased probability of receiving a rival bid prior to closing, and a 44.5% increased probability 
of cancelling the originally announced deal (measured relative to the unconditional probabil-
ity). Due to their nature as being non-linear models, the coefficients and their economic mag-
nitudes are hard to interpret in logit (and probit) models39. The coefficients in Table 5 are 
average effects, but it depends on the x-axis value how strong the effect on the dependent 
variable is. I.e., the rate of change in the predicted probability of receiving a competing bid or 
successfully closing the deal is not constant over the full range of the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio . 
To make this non-linear relation between pre-public competition and post-bid dynamics more 
tangible, I plot the graphs of predicted probabilities for Competing Bid  and Deal Completion  
in Figure A1 in the Appendix. Figure A2 likewise depicts the relation for the subsamples sorted 
by acquirer announcement reactions. 
Taken together, the logit regressions in Table 5 suggest that competitive private nego-
tiations stay competitive after public deal announcement, and that rival bidders seem to be 
lured by noticing value-creating transactions and compete more likely with a bid for the target. 
 
4.6 Robustness Tests: Endogeneity and Alternative Competition Measure 
4.6.1 Endogeneity between Deal Initiation, Deal Premiums, and Selling Procedure 
 Selling a firm is very likely not a random corporate event: initiating a deal and the 
structure of the subsequent selling procedure (i.e., auctioning among multiple bidders vs. ne-
gotiating exclusively with only one prospective acquirer) are usually well-conceived, deliberate 
decisions by target firm’s management. Aktas et al. (2010) argue that the target, if initiating 
the deal, clearly signals its willingsness to sell and thereby lowers its bargaining power during 
 
39 Yet sign and statistical significance are. 
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the following negotiations. Masulis and Simsir (2018) determine that average takeover premi-
ums, target announcement returns, and valuation multiples are significantly lower in target-
initiated deals. In addition, firms might set up a (structured) auction led by an investment 
bank, because they expect higher revenues from increased competition (Bulow and Klemperer 
(1996)). If so, the subsets of target-initiated deals and auctions do not represent a random 
sample drawn out of the takeover population, and results obtained via OLS might be biased. 
 To remedy potential endogeneity concerns between deal initiation, the sales method, 
and takeover premiums, I first apply an instrumental variables approach to estimate instru-
mented regressors for initiation and selling procedure. Since I am interested in the effect of 
relative competition on takeover premiums in this chapter, I then concentrate on a subset of 
takeovers where the competition measure, the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio , exhibits substantial var-
iation across observations, namely pure auctions40. I therefore estimate various specifications 
of Heckman (1979) selection models to account for the likely self-selection41 of target firms to 
sell themselves via auctions. 
Determinants of Deal Initiation and Selling Procedure 
 After taking the different characteristics of deals initiated by targets and the subsequent 
selling procedure into consideration (Section 4.2), I instrument, in the first step, the two 
dummy variables Tgt Initiation  and Auction for the whole sample. I do this to exploit exoge-
nous variation stemming from firm characteristics that are already fixed ex-ante, and might, 
based on economic theory, affect the decision to initiate and to auction, respectively. The 
instrumented variables Tgt Initiation*  and Auction*   correspond to the predicted values ob-
tained from probit regressions of the realized values. 
 
40 The Proposals-to-CA-Ratio  in negotiations defined following Boone and Mulherin (2007, 2008) me-
chanically results in a value of one. This is not a concern in the regressions in Section 4.5 since I 
additionally control for the selling procedure (with a dummy variable for auctions). 
41 This is the case if unobserved private information by target managers is an important determinant of 
choosing to auction (Li and Prabhala (2007)). Then, the motivation to self-select most likely is the 
expectation of a “more positive outcome” for the firm, i.e., better fulfilling fiduciary duties through 
higher expected revenues (premiums) made possible by increased competition (Bulow and Klemperer 
(1996, 2009)). Since I include estimated regressors in the second stage, standard errors are adjusted. 
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Following Aktas et al. (2010), I select the sum and the concentration of target’s insti-
tutional ownership, its market-to-book ratio, return on assets, and sales growth, all obtained 
six months prior to deal announcement, as explanatory variables for target initiation. Targets 
with high growth opportunities or under tighter control by institutional investors might less 
likely inititate deals. The same could apply for targets experiencing strong growth in sales and 
firms with profitable, revenue generating assets. Column (1) in Table 6 presents the results of 
the probit regression including year fixed effects to control for aggregate shocks.  
Table 6 
Determinants of Target Deal Initiation and Selling Procedure 
Table 6 presents the results of fixed effects probit regressions of Tgt Initiation (column (1)) and Auction 
(column (2)) on determinants of deal initiation and the selling procedure, respectively. All variables are 
measured six months, i.e., on day −126, prior to offer announcement. Tgt Sales Growth  is the change 
in sales relative to the second last fiscal year prior to announcement. Tgt Industry Count  is the number 
of firms in the same SIC4 industry as the target with a market capitalization larger than the target 
itself. Tgt Sales Herfindahl  reflects the market concentration in target’s SIC4 industry, measured as the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index of sales (sum of squares of each firm’s market share in a given industry-
year). Acq Toehold  is the percentage of target’s total common shares outstanding that are owned by 
the acquirer. All regressions include fixed effects  (as denoted) as well as an intercept but are unreported. 
All standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster 
correlation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Instrumented:  Tgt Initiation  Instrumented:  Auction 
Independent Variables  (1)  Independent Variables  (2) 
       
Tgt Institutional Own Sum 
 −0.008*** 
(0.002) 
 Tgt Institutional Own Sum 
 0.006*** 
(0.002) 
Tgt Institutional Own Herf 
 2.217* 
(1.157) 






 Tgt Initiation 
 1.179*** 
(0.118) 
Tgt Return on Assets 
 −0.173 
(0.338) 
 Tgt Industry Count 
 0.000 
(0.000) 
Tgt Sales Growth 
 −0.000 
(0.001) 















  Acq Market Cap 
 −0.001 
(0.000) 
       
Year FE  Yes    Yes 
Tgt Industry FE  No    Yes 
       
Observations  656    656 
Pseudo R2  0.048    0.141 
Model p-value  0.000    0.000 
Percentage of correct predictions 71.38%    69.56% 
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As predicted, the coefficients on both institutional ownership and market-to-book are 
negative and highly statistically significant. The coefficients on return on assets and sales 
growth are also negative but not significant. Taken together, the results suggest that targets 
with strong growth opportunities and monitoring by institutional investors are less prone to 
start the selling procedure. 
As outlined above, auctioning is also likely an endogenous choice. Besides target char-
acteristics, I include industry and acquirer controls in the probit model estimating Auction , 
because the selling procedure could be affected by the relative bargaining power of the partic-
ipating firms as well as industry dynamics and supply and demand effects for M&A. The model 
consists of target institutional ownership, target R&D intensity, a dummy for target initiation, 
target’s industry count, target industry sales concentration, relative size of bidder and target, 
acquirer’s holdings in the target firm, and acquirer size. As Figure 2 in Section 4.2 shows, 
auctions are, compared to negotiations, disproportionately more often initiated by targets. 
Firms operating in a concentrated industry might engage in exclusive negotiations rather than 
auctions, and acquirers could increase their expected value from the bid by purchasing target 
stocks prior to materialized run-ups, i.e., through toehold acquisitions. The toehold interest-
ingly generates a positive payoff for the acquirer, especially when he loses to a rival (winning) 
bidder who purchases “his” toehold. This is rational from the acquirer’s perspective if he ex-
pects increased competition in gaining control over the target. 
Column (2) in Table 6 depicts the results of a probit regression of Auction on these 
variables. As in column (1), I measure all variables – except Tgt Initiation , which might be 
somewhat sooner or later – six months prior to offer announcement to preserve their exogenous 
characteristics. I include time and target industry fixed effects to control for associated unob-
served heterogeneity, i.e., shocks affecting all observations in a given year or industry in the 
same way. Following the theoretical argumentation, the coefficients on Tgt Initiation  and Acq 
Toehold are both positive and highly statistically significant at the 1% level. Interestingly, the 
coefficient on institutional ownership is also positive and significant. This suggests that, if 
targets decide to sell themselves, the selling procedure is more likely structured as an auction, 
maybe because of increased monitoring motivated by the expectation of higher revenues in this 
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case. The percentage of correct predictions42 is roughly 70% in both cases, suggesting that 
theoretically reasoned covariates accurately predict the initiation decision and the decision of 
the selling procedure. 
Heckman Selection Models 
 As already argued, auctions do not represent a random subsample of all takeovers. 
Although my multivariate analyses in Section 4.5 control for the selling procedure and initiating 
party, I want to rule out sample selection issues when analyzing the effect of relative competi-
tion on premiums in auctions, where I find competition to be obvious and more tangible43. 
Hence, I adopt the classical Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure with and without the instru-
mented regressor for target initiation (estimated in column (1) of Table 6).  
 In the first step – the selection equation, I estimate the probability of structuring the 
deal as an auction instead of a one-to-one negotiation as a probit model with control vector Z  
from column (2) in Table 6, i.e., using all observations in the sample: 
Selection equation 44:  Prob(Auction = 1 | Z )  =  Φ(Z γ) 
This allows me to compute the inverse Mills ratio (IMR, also called “Heckman’s 
lambda” or “non-selection hazard”) for each individual observation, i.e., the probability to be 
included in the sample of auctions, in the following way to enable controlling for the selection 
bias: 
IMR (λ)  =  
ϕ(Z γ)
Φ(Z γ) 
where ϕ  and Φ denote the Gaussian probability density function (PDF) and the Gauss-
ian cumulative density function (CDF), with mean zero and unit variance, respectively.  
 
42 I include this to the table as a (control) measure of model fit: for each observation, if Pr(Yi = 1 | 
Xi ) > 0.5, then Yi = 1. The percent correctly predicted is the percentage for which Yi matches Yi. 
43 In pure one-to-one negotiations there most likely exists also a certain degree of competitive pressure 
that increases the bid premium, but by definition taking on the form of latent competition, as proxied 
by Acq Industry Count  (i.e., the commonly known “negotiation under the threat of an auction”, as the 
eponymous paper by Aktas et al. (2010)). Additionally, see the subsample of auctions only (Table A4). 
44 With γ = vector of parameters and Φ = cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the standard 
normal distribution. 
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In the second step – the structural equation, I regress the one-month premium on the 
Proposals-to-CA-Ratio  and all other controls X  from the baseline specification45 for the sub-
sample of auctions using OLS, but additionally controlling for each individual observation’s 
probability to be included in the selected sample, its estimated inverse Mills ratio (IMR): 
Structural equation:  Premium 1 Month  =  ϖ  Proposals-to-CA-Ratio  +  β X  + δ  λ 
Because both the IMR  and Tgt Initiation*  are by themselves generated regressors, the 
standard errors in the 2nd stage must be adjusted accordingly. I estimate the Heckman selection 
models with fixed effects and two-step efficient estimates of the parameters, standard errors, 
and covariance matrices. Standard errors are computed applying a bootstrap procedure: from 
the whole sample, I draw, with replacements, one thousand bootstrap samples with the same 
number of observations as in the original sample46. For each bootstrap sample, I estimate the 
Heckman (1979) regression coefficients. This procedure thus generates an empirical sample 
distribution consisting of one thousand estimates for the coefficients and provides the correct 
(bootstrapped) standard errors and t-statistics shown in Table 7. 
Heckman (1979) shows that sample selection bias is a specification error, namely in 
form of an omitted variable bias (the IMR ) representing – in my application – the probability 
to be included in the sample of auctions, and correction for this selection results in both unbi-
ased and consistent estimates of the coefficient on the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio . 
The first column of Table 7 estimates the baseline regression for all observations with 
instrumented regressors (predicted values) Tgt Initiation*  and Auction*  obtained through 
probit regressions (1) and (2) in Table 6. Both coefficients are not statistically significant, but 
indicate the correct sign as predicted by theory. The marginal effect of both instruments is 
larger than the marginal effect of the dummy variables in the baseline regressions, suggesting 
that if endogeneity is controlled for, the impact on premiums might be larger. Inferences about 
all other coefficients, especially for the coefficient for the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio , remain un-
changed, which suggests that endogeneity problems seem to be less severe in this case. 
 
45 Except the dummy variable Auction . 
46 The number of observations drops from 704 to 656 due to the availability of controls for the estimation 
of instrumented regressors in Table 6. 
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Table 7 
Instrumented Variables Regression and Heckman Selection Models 
The following table depicts the results of linear fixed effects regressions (column (1)) of Premium 1 Month 
on the variable of interest, the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio , the predicted regressors (instruments) Tgt Initi-
ation*  and Auction*, and control variables as defined in Section 4.4. Specifications (2)–(5) show the 2nd 
stage results of Heckman (1979) selection models for the subsample of auctions, with the one-month 
premium and acquirer cumulative abnormal deal announcement returns as the dependent variable, re-
spectively. All regressions include fixed effects (as denoted) as well as an intercept but are unreported. 
All standard errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped following the procedure as outlined above. *, **, 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  Premium 1 Month  Acq CAR [–3;+3] 
   Instr. Var.  Heckman Selection Model (with Instrumented Variables) 
 Sample  Full Sample  Auctions Only 
 Independent Variables  (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
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Other Controls  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
          
Tgt Industry × Year FE & Acq Industry FE  Yes       
Tgt Industry FE    Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Acq Industry FE    Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE    Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
          
Observations (selected; non-selected)  656  656 (366; 290)  619 (329; 290) 
Model p-value  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Adjusted R2  0.311       
  
The second and third column present the results of the 2nd stages of the Heckman model, 
without (specification (2)) and with (specification (3)) the instrumented regressor for target 
Chapter 4                                                   Measuring Competition in M&A Negotiations 
237 
initiation. In both cases, the coefficient is negative but not significant, consistent with my prior 
findings. The estimate on the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio  remains positive and highly statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Inferences for the heckman models of acquirer announcement returns 
are practically unchanged. The coefficient on the ratio is negative and significant at the 1% 
level. 
The estimated Inverse Mills Ratio (λ) multiplied with its coefficient is supposed to pick 
up the expected value of the error in the structural equation, conditional on auctioning. The 
coefficient on the IMR (−12.969 and 3.162 in specification (2) and (3), respectively) represents 
the covariance between the errors in the structural and the selection equation under the model 
assumptions. In all cases in Table 7, it never is statistically significant and the bootstrapped t-
statistics for the IMR  are small (and the p-values are large), which means that I cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that the error terms are uncorrelated. This means that the data are con-
sistent with no selection47. 
 
4.6.2 Measuring Pre-Announcement Competition with the Proposals-to-Contacts-Ratio 
 To show that my measure of relative competition does not depend on one narrow, single 
definition, I repeat the main regression for target cumulative abnormal announcement returns 
and bid premiums with a modified variable, the Proposals-to-Contacts-Ratio . This ratio relates 
the number of privately submitted proposals to the number of contacted potential bidders at 
the beginning of the private takeover process. Here, I also control for the level, i.e., number, of 
proposals. As already argued in the introduction, I assume that there is more leeway in report-
ing the number of contacts in SEC merger filings, since the target often does not name all 
contacted bidders with their respective firm names. This is particularly true if there exists a 
large number of contacted parties. Reporting no names makes the target firm less vulnerable, 
but the data might also become less reliable. An additional argument in favor of the Proposals-
to-CA-Ratio  as the main competition measure is that, after screening the filings, I find that in 
some  cases  the  number  of  contacts  refers  to  the  number  of  firms  contacted  by  the  target’s 
 
47 Given that my sample size (656 observations) is sufficiently large and exclusion restrictions are not 
weak. 
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Table 8 
Robustness Test − Measuring Private Takeover Competition with Proposals-to-Contacts-Ratio 
This table depicts the results of linear fixed effects regressions of Target Cumulative Abnormal Returns (regressions (1)–(3)) and Target Share Price Premium 
(regressions (4)–(8)) on the modified variable of interest, the Proposals-to-Contacts-Ratio , which is defined as the ratio between the number of privately submitted 
proposals to the target firm at the end of the private takeover process divided by the number of contacted potential acquirers at the beginning of the private takeover 
process. I further include control variables as defined in Section 4.4. All regressions include Target Industry × Year Fixed Effects , Acquirer Industry Fixed Effects  as 
well as an intercept but are unreported. All standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster correlation. *, **, 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  Target Cumulative Abnormal Returns  Target Share Price Premium 
 Event Window  [–1;+1] [–3;+3] [–5;+5]  1 Day 3 Day 1 Week 1 Month Initiation 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 



















































































































            
Controls  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            
Tgt Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acq Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            
Observations  763 763 763  763 763 763 735 397 
Adjusted R2  0.195 0.178 0.179  0.202 0.190 0.195 0.179 0.221 
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financial advisor, i.e., investment bank, which also containes firms that are not interested in 
buying the target48. This would mechanically lead to an underestimation of the Proposals-to-
Contacts-Ratio , as it would then not accurately capture real demand by potential bidders. 
Nontheless, Table 8 shows the regression results with this alternative competition meas-
ure instead of the Proposals-to-Contacts-Ratio . In all but one specifications, the coefficient is 
positive and statistically highly significant at the 1% level, supporting the notion that higher 
relative pre-announcement competition results in higher returns and premiums for target share-
holders. All other coefficients do not change considerably compared to the estimates obtained 




 This chapter sheds light on the private takeover process and its competition dynamics. 
By extending a representative M&A sample with hand-collected data from credible SEC filings, 
I find that pre-public takeover negotiations can be highly competitive, and that higher compe-
tition among bidders leads to higher takeover premiums. Dynamic negotiations and associated 
bid revisions, fueled by competition, might explain why we commonly observe large deal pre-
miums, despite lower perceived public competition since the late 1980s. 
Notwithstanding its relevance, there is surprisingly litte empirical work focussing on 
pre-public competition and its wealth effects for participating firms, partially also because the 
competitiveness during this private process remained difficult to study due to data availability. 
Commonly used databases only include public bids made for the target. My findings contribute 
to this growing body of research that focuses on this active process shielded from public scru-
tiny. I find that competitive private negotiations stay competitve during the public phase, and 
that rival bids are more likely if announcement returns of the original acquirer are positive. 
Observing this might lure rival bidders. Especially the share price run-up of target firms seems 
 
48 I.e., involves “cheap talk” contacts or sham bids (Boone and Mulherin (2011)). Similarly, some firms 
did not even respond to the deal advisor’s effort to get in touch. 
49 To rule out non-linear effects, I also split the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio  into main quantiles (Table A6). 
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to be different for auctions compared to one-to-one negotiations. A higher number of involved 
parties could increase the likelihood of leaking information to the market, well ahead of official 
bid announcement. In light of this as well as increased negotiation period lengths, I advise 
researchers to utilize the initiation premium when assessing target wealth effects, as put for-
ward by Eaton et al. (2020). 
My findings further suggest that winning bidders incur more negative announcement 
returns if competition for the target is ex-ante high. Given the richness of the private sales 
process and its likely private value component for strategic bidders, I do not claim that this 
reflects a winner’s curse in corporate transactions. The best setting to analyze the existence of 
a winner’s curse would be a pure common value auction, e.g., through studying financial bidder 
auctions. Here, synergies between the merging parties are usually non-existent because of the 
missing operating fit, and post-acquisition value-creating strategies for targets include more 
aggressive use of leverage and higher-powered managerial compensation. Because these strate-
gies are relatively similar across private equity bidders, they are likely to have high common 
components of target valuations (Gorbenko and Malenko (2014, 2019)). I leave this for future 
research. 
My inferences drawn in this chapter are robust to endogeneity between deal initiation, 
the selling procedure, and bid premiums. This is important because takeover auctions, in which 
my suggested competition measure, the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio , exhibits strong variation, are 
not a random subsample of all M&A deals. Applying a Heckman (1979) two-stage selection 
model with instrumented regressors rules out these concerns. After utilizing a propensity score 
matched sample procedure (deferred to the Appendix), I further do not detect a systematical 
difference in premiums paid in auctions versus premiums paid in one-to-one negotiations. Dif-
ferent results obtained by researchers might depend on the definition of what counts as an 
auction. 
Although empirical evidence on the “one best way to sell a company” (Boone and 
Mulherin (2009)) is mixed, the results strongly suggest that high competition among bidders 
raises the publicly announced offer per target share. My results indicate that target boards 
fulfill their fiduciary duties by selecting the highest-bidding acquirer. This is consistent with 
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the findings in Liu and Officer (2020), who show that the behavior of target managers appears 
congruent with shareholder wealth maximization rather than systematic agency problems. 
Research interest in the details of the private phase of merger negotiations has strongly 
increased over the last years. It helps to explain strategic interactions and the decisions of 
participating firms as well as deal outcomes. Analyzing the private takeover process is a fruitful 
avenue for future research. It might be interesting to determine the exact channels of my 
identified relation. Bao and Edmans (2011) and Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012) find 
that investment banks may posses a heterogeneous set of skills in advising M&A deals. E.g., 
deal advisor fixed effects could explain competitive bidding, through efficiently structuring and 
soliciting (high) bids for the target.
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4.9 Appendix   Appendix − Table A1 
Variable Definitions 
Table A1 presents the definitions of all variables used throughout this chapter, including the source. 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Announcement Returns, Target Share Price Premiums, and Deal Competition Measures 
Tgt CAR [–1;+1] 
Three-trading-day cumulative abnormal announcement return (in percentage points) of 
target firm’s stock calculated using the Carhart (1997) model to model normal returns. 
The model parameters are estimated over the period −250 to −23 trading days (prior) 
to offer announcement. Security prices are dividend adjusted day close prices, further 
adjusted for stock splits, cash dividends, rights offerings, and spin-offs (Source: CRSP ). 
Tgt CAR [–3;+3] 
Defined as Tgt CAR [–1;+1] , but instead measured for the seven-trading-day window 
around offer announcement. 
Tgt CAR [–5;+5] 
Defined as Tgt CAR [–1;+1] , but instead measured for the eleven-trading-day window 
around offer announcement. 
Premium 1 Day 
Difference of the announced offer price per share and target’s last sale share price one 
trading day prior to offer announcement, divided by target’s last sale share price one 
trading day prior to offer announcement, and expressed in percentage points (Source: 
S&P Capital IQ ). 
Premium 3 Day 
Defined as Premium 1 Day , but instead measured with target’s last sale share price three 
trading days prior to offer announcement as the premium’s reference. 
Premium 1 Week 
Defined as Premium 1 Day , but instead measured with target’s last sale share price five 
trading days prior to offer announcement as the premium’s reference. 
Premium 1 Month 
Defined as Premium 1 Day , but instead measured with target’s last sale share price 22 
trading days prior to offer announcement as the premium’s reference. 
Premium Initiation 
Defined as Premium 1 Day , but instead measured with target’s last sale share price at the 
deal initiation date as the premium’s reference, following Eaton et al. (2020). 
Acq CAR [–1;+1] 
Defined as Tgt CAR [–1;+1] , but instead measured for the three-trading-day window 
around offer announcement and for acquiring firm’s stock. 
Acq CAR [–3;+3] 
Defined as Tgt CAR [–1;+1] , but instead measured for the seven-trading-day window 
around offer announcement and for acquiring firm’s stock. 
Acq CAR [–5;+5] 
Defined as Tgt CAR [–1;+1] , but instead measured for the eleven-trading-day window 
around offer announcement and for acquiring firm’s stock. 
Deal Completion 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the announced deal was closed successfully within the 
sample period (January 01, 2004 − December 31, 2017), and 0 if cancelled (Source: S&P 
Capital IQ ). 
Competing Bid 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the announced deal receives at least one another bid 
from an acquirer different to the original acquirer before the original announced deal is 
either closed or withdrawn, and 0 otherwise (Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
Number Contacts Number of contacted potential acquirers at the beginning of the private takeover process 
(Source: SEC Merger Filings ). 
Number Signed Confidentiality 
Agreements 
Number of potential acquirers that signed confidentiality (non-disclosure) agreements 
with the target firm (Source: SEC Merger Filings ). 
Number Proposals 
Number of potential acquirers that privately submitted binding written offers (bids) to 
the target firm shortly before the deal is publicly announced, i.e., at the end of the 
private takeover process, with a price proposed to buy target shares (Source: SEC Merger 
Filings ). 
Proposals-to-CA-Ratio Number Proposals  divided by Number Signed Confidentiality Agreements . 
Proposals-to-Contacts-Ratio Number Proposals  divided by Number Contacts . 
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Panel B: Deal Characteristics and Cumulative Abnormal Run-up Returns 
Tgt Initiation Dummy variable that equals 1 if the target initiated the deal, and 0 otherwise (Source: SEC Merger Filings ). 
Auction 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the private sales process is characterized as an auction, 
and 0 otherwise. As in Boone and Mulherin (2008), I classify the private sales process as 
an auction, if the target signs confidentiality agreements with more than one prospective 
acquirer. To the contrary, I classify the sales process as a (1:1) negotiation, if the target 
firm focuses on a single acquirer throughout the whole private takeover phase, i.e., ne-
gotiations are deals with one formal contact, one signed confidentiality agreement, and 
one private (and later public) bid for the target by the original acquirer (Source: SEC 
Merger Filings ). 
Tgt Anti-takeover State 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the target is located in a state with strong anti-takeover 
regulations, and 0 otherwise. I follow the classification in Bebchuk and Ferrell (2002) 
and code the following states as strong anti-takeover states: Idaho (ID), Indiana (IN), 
Maryland (MD), Nevada (NV), Ohio (OH), Pennsylvania (PA), South Dakota (SD), 
Tennessee (TN), and Wisconsin (WI) (Source: Compustat ). 
Acq Industry Count 
Number of firms in the same SIC4 industry as the acquiring firm with a value (i.e., 
market capitalization) greater than the acquiring firm, obtained on the last fiscal year 
end date (of the acquiring firm) prior to offer announcement (Source: Compustat ). 
Tgt Industry Count Defined as Acq Industry Count , but instead measured for target firm’s industry. 
Deal Value USD (bn) value of the transaction, i.e., total transaction value excluding assumed liabil-
ities (Source: Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum ). 
Friendly Dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal attitude is friendly on the announcement day 
of the deal, and 0 otherwise (Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
Cash Only Dummy variable that equals 1 if the payment by the acquirer is made entirely in cash, 
and 0 otherwise (Source: Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum ). 
Tender Offer Dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal is classified as a tender offer, and 0 otherwise 
(Source: SEC Merger Filings ). 
Horizontal Takeover 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if both the acquiring and the target firm are primarily 
assigned to the same industry as defined by all four SIC digits, and 0 otherwise (Source: 
S&P Capital IQ ). 
Relative Size Market Cap [OA–22] Acq Market Cap [OA–22]  divided by Tgt Market Cap [OA–22] . 
Acq Toehold [OA–1] 
Acquiring firm’s holdings in target firm’s stock one trading day prior to offer announce-
ment, measured as a share of total shares outstanding and expressed in percentage points 
(Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
BTF Size Deal Value 
USD (mm) amount of the bidder termination fee divided by Deal Value (also in USD 
mm) and expressed in percentage points (Source: SEC Merger Filings ). 
TTF Size Deal Value 
USD (mm) amount of the target termination fee divided by Deal Value (also in USD 
mm) and expressed in percentage points (Source: SEC Merger Filings ). 
Tgt Run-up CAR [–42;–2] 
Defined as Tgt CAR (Panel A), but instead measured for the 40 trading day window 
(−42;−2) prior to offer announcement. 
Tgt Run-up CAR [–42;–4] 
Defined as Tgt CAR (Panel A), but instead measured for the 38 trading day window 
(−42;−4) prior to offer announcement. 
Tgt Run-up CAR [–42;–6] 
Defined as Tgt CAR (Panel A), but instead measured for the 36 trading day window 
(−42;−6) prior to offer announcement. 
Tgt Run-up CAR [–252;–23] 
Defined as Tgt CAR (Panel A), but instead measured for the 229 trading day window 
(−252;−23) prior to offer announcement. 
Acq Run-up CAR [–42;–2] Defined as Tgt Run-up CAR [–42;–2] , but instead measured for acquiring firm’s stock. 
Acq Run-up CAR [–42;–4] Defined as Tgt Run-up CAR [–42;–4] , but instead measured for acquiring firm’s stock. 
Acq Run-up CAR [–42;–6] Defined as Tgt Run-up CAR [–42;–6] , but instead measured for acquiring firm’s stock. 








Panel C: Acquiring Firm Characteristics 
Acq Market Cap [OA–22] 
Last sale price of acquiring firm’s stock (adjusted for stock splits) multiplied with the 
latest number of shares outstanding, measured 22 trading days prior to offer announce-
ment and expressed in billions of USD (Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
Acq Market-to-Book [OA–22] 
Market-to-book ratio of acquirer’s stock, calculated as Acq Market Cap [OA–22]  divided 
by the latest available value of total common equity (= common stock & additional paid 
in capital + retained earnings + treasury stock & other; all measured in USD billions) 
22 trading days prior to offer announcement (Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
ln Acq 1YR Stock Return 
Volatility [OA–1] 
Natural logarithm of 1 plus the standard deviation of weekly log-normal price returns of 
acquiring firm’s stock over the year preceding the offer announcement, annualized with 
a factor of 52 for the 52 trading weeks in a year and measured one trading day prior to 
offer announcement (Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
Acq Institutional Own Sum [OA–1] 
Sum of institutional holdings in acquiring firm’s stock, measured one trading day prior 
to offer announcement and expressed in percentage points (Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
Panel D: Target Firm Characteristics 
Tgt Market-to-Book [OA–22] Defined as Acq Market-to-Book [OA–22] , but instead measured for target firm’s stock. 
ln Tgt 1YR Stock Return 
Volatility [OA–1] 
Defined as ln Acq 1YR Stock Return Volatility [OA–1] , but instead measured for target 
firm’s stock. 
Tgt Institutional Own Sum [OA–1] 
Defined as Acq Institutional Own Sum [OA–1] , but instead measured for target firm’s 
stock. 
Tgt Institutional Own Herf [OA–1] 
Concentration of institutional ownership in target firms’ stock: measured one trading 
day prior to deal announcement by calculating the sum of the squares of each individual 
institutional investors’ percentage share in target firms’ stock (Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
Tgt Return on Assets Target’s operating income before depreciation divided by total assets, measured at the 
last fiscal year end date prior to offer announcement (Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
Tgt Sales Growth 
Target firm’s sales at the last fiscal year end date prior to offer announcement divided 
by sales second last fiscal year end date prior to offer announcement, minus 1 and ex-
pressed in percentage points (Source: Compustat ).  
Tgt R&D Intensity [OA–22] 
Target’s Research and Development (R&D) expenses scaled by sales, measured at last 
fiscal year end date prior to offer announcement (Source: S&P Capital IQ ). 
Tgt Sales Herfindahl 
Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index of all firms in target’s SIC4 industry. Calcu-
lated as the sum of the squares of each firm’s market share at the last fiscal year end 
prior to offer announcement (Source: Compustat ). 
(Table A1 continued) 












Appendix − Table A2 
Sample Selection 
This table summarizes the selection criteria of the M&A sample with the respective remaining number 
of observations. After applying filters 1–6, 8,466 observations remain. The availability of SEC filings, 
control variables, stock ownership data as well as valid detailed data of the private takeover process in 
the background section of the SEC filings (S-4, 14D-9, and DEFM14A) further restricts the sample to 
the final 780 observations. 
Selection criteria Number of observations 
1. All M&A deals announced between 01/01/2004 and 12/31/2017 475,458 
2. Deal status either “closed” or “withdrawn” 460,243 
3. Acquirer and Target headquartered in the U.S. 98,647 
4. Acquirer and Target publicly listed firms 9,980 
5. Acquirer seeks majority stake and change of control in the Target 8,884 
6. Deal value exceeds USD 1 mm 8,466 
7. Availability of SEC filings, control variables, and ownership data 1,139 
8. Valid detailed data of the private takeover process in the back-
ground section of the SEC EDGAR filings (https://www.sec.gov/ 
edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html), denoted as “back-
ground of the merger/offer” (S-4, 14D-9, and DEFM14A) 
780 
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Appendix − Table A3 
Modular Regression Setup 
Table A3 presents the results of a modular regression setup of linear fixed effects regressions of target firm’s share price premium, Premium 1 Month , on the variable of 
interest, the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio , which is defined as the ratio between the number of privately submitted proposals to the target firm at the end of the private 
takeover process divided by the number of signed confidentiality (non-disclosure) agreements. On a step-by-step basis, I include control variable sets defined in Section 
4.4. Number Signed CAs  is the number of signed confidentiality agreements. All regressions include Target Industry × Year Fixed Effects  as well as an intercept but 
are unreported. Regressions (8)–(12) include Acquirer Industry Fixed Effects . All standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) 
and within-cluster correlation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  Premium 1 Month 
 Sample  Full Sample  Auctions Only 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  (11) (12) 












































































































   
                
Anti-takeover, Ind. C., Run-up  No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Other Deal Characteristics  No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Acquiring Firm Characteristics  No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Target Firm Characteristics  No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
                
Tgt Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Acq Industry FE  No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
                
Observations  732 732 732 704 704 704 704 704 687 687  379 379 
Adjusted R2  0.021 0.021 0.032 0.048 0.129 0.128 0.185 0.187 0.165 0.187  0.142 0.165 
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Appendix − Table A4 
Auction Subsample − Private Takeover Competition, Target Announcement Returns, and Takeover Premiums 
The following table presents the results of linear fixed effects regressions of Target Cumulative Abnormal Returns (regressions (1)–(3)) and Target Share Price Premium 
(regressions (4)–(8)) on the variable of interest, the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio, which is defined as the ratio between the number of privately submitted proposals to the 
target firm at the end of the private takeover process divided by the number of signed confidentiality (non-disclosure) agreements. The models are exactly the same 
as in Table 3, except that the sample in this table is restricted to Auctions  only, which is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the private sales process is characterized 
as an auction, and 0 otherwise (following the definition in Boone and Mulherin (2008)). I further include control variables as defined in Section 4.4. All regressions 
include Target Industry × Year Fixed Effects , Acquirer Industry Fixed Effects  as well as an intercept but are unreported. All standard errors (in parentheses) are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster correlation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  Target Cumulative Abnormal Returns  Target Share Price Premium 
 Event Window  [–1;+1] [–3;+3] [–5;+5]  1 Day 3 Day 1 Week 1 Month Initiation 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
































































































            
Controls  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            
Tgt Industry × Year FE  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acq Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            
Observations  411 411 411  411 411 411 396 184 
Adjusted R2  0.201 0.202 0.195  0.209 0.211 0.227 0.178 0.272 




Appendix − Table A5 
Auction Subsample w/o Tender Offers − Private Takeover Competition, Announcement Returns, Takeover Premiums, and Takeover Outcomes 
The following table presents the results for the subset of auctions excluding tender offers. The regression models are exactly the same as in Table 3, except that the 
sample in this table is restricted to non-tender offer auctions  only (and include the one-month premium in specifications (7)–(10)). I further include control variables 
as defined in Section 4.4. All regressions include fixed effects (as denoted) as well as an intercept but are unreported. In columns (9) and (10), the year of deal resolution 
is taken into account for the fixed effects. All standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and within-cluster correlation. *, **, 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  Tgt CAR [–3;+3]  Premium 1 Week  Premium 1 Month  Acq CAR [–3;+3]  Deal Completion 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10) 










































































































                 
Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
                 
Tgt Industry × Year FE & Acq Industry FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  No No  No No 
Acq Industry × Year FE & Tgt Industry FE  No No  No No  No No  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
                 
Observations  335 335  335 335  324 324  346 346  310 310 
Adjusted R2  0.270 0.276  0.272 0.274  0.197 0.197  0.123 0.123    
Pseudo R2              0.663 0.584 







Appendix − Table A6 
Separating the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio in multiple Quantiles − Takeover Auctions 
This table shows regression results for different quantiles of the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio (PpCA ) for the 
subsample of takeover auctions. Quantiles are listed in ascending order. The benchmark case is the 
respective lowest quantile. I further include control variables as defined in Section 4.4. All regressions 
include Target Industry × Year Fixed Effects , Acquirer Industry Fixed Effects  as well as an intercept 
but are unreported. All standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White 
(1980)) and within-cluster correlation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 Dependent Variable  Tgt CAR [–3;+3]  Premium 1 Month 
 Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
          
 





















































































































          
Controls  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
          
Tgt Industry × Year FE & Acq Ind. FE  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
          
Observations  411 411 411  396 396 396 
Adjusted R2  0.199 0.207 0.198  0.175 0.191 0.175 
 
Chapter 4 (Appendix)                Measuring Competition in M&A Negotiations 
254 
Appendix − Table A7 
Sales Procedure: Difference of Premiums − Propensity Score matched Sample 
Transactions structured as auctions and transactions structured as one-to-one negotiations might differ along some other dimensions correlated with deal premiums. 
Despite the selling procedure being not my main variable of interest, differences, if existent, might explain the self-selection described in Section 4.6. To detect if 
premiums are different for these two sales procedures, I employ a propensity score matched sample. For all observations, I define a treatment and control group that 
are similar along the characteristics of being structured as an auction. The matching attempts to randomize treatment (i.e., auctioning) across the full sample of 
transactions by ensuring that the two groups are comparable on observable covariates that might explain deal premiums. In the first stage, I compute the propensity 
score using the probit regression predicting Auction with controls from the baseline regression. In the second stage, I match treatment and control group based on 
different matching algorithms (nearest two neighbors, caliper matching (0.01 radius), and kernel matching), and estimate the average treatment effect (ATE = 
E ((μ Premium | X , Auction = 1) – (μ Premium | X , Auction = 0)) as reported (Coeff.). Due to matching with common support (balanced, with replacement), the number of 
observations is reduced to 694. The results suggest that auction premiums are slightly higher in most cases, yet the difference is statistically insignificant. 
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Appendix − Figure A1 
Plot of Predicted Probabilities − Competing Bid and Deal Completion 
Figure A1 plots the predicted probabilities of both Competing Bid  and Deal Completion  against the 
Proposals-to-CA-Ratio . The solid blue triangles represent the predicted probability of receiving a com-
peting bid from a different bidder prior to resolution of the original announced bid (CB=1), depending 
on the value of the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio , thus visualizing the regression results obtained in Table 5, 
column (1) (i.e., controlling for all other independent variables with their values held at their sample 
mean). The hollow red triangles depict associated probabilities for the simple logit model with Proposals-
to-CA-Ratio  as the only regressor, i.e., without additional controls. The solid blue and hollow red circles 
represent, respectively, the predicted probabilities of successfully closing the announced deal (DC=1) 










Appendix − Figure A2 
Plot of Predicted Probabilities − Competing Bid and Deal Completion by Acq OA Reaction 
This figure plots the predicted probabilities of both Competing Bid  and Deal Completion  against the 
Proposals-to-CA-Ratio  as shown in Figure A1, but sorted by subsamples (Above  vs. Below Median Acq 
OA Reaction  ). All four plots show the results including controls, i.e., all other independent variables are 
held at their respective sample mean. The solid green (Above Median Acq OA Reaction ) and hollow 
magenta (Below Median Acq OA Reaction ) triangles, depict the predicted probabilities of receiving a 
competing bid from a different bidder prior to resolution of the original announced bid (CB=1), depend-
ing on the values of the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio  (visualizing the regression results obtained in Table 5, 
columns (3) and (4)). The solid green and hollow magenta circles, respectively, represent the predicted 
probabilities of successfully closing the announced deal (DC=1), depending on the values of the Pro-
posals-to-CA-Ratio  (visualizing the regression results obtained in Table 5, columns (9) and (10)). 
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Appendix − Figure A3 
Mean and Median One-Month Target Premiums − Competitive Auctions 
This figure plots the mean and median value of the one-month target premium for all auctions, in which 
all bidders who signed confidentiality agreements also submitted bids for the target, sorted by the total 
number of bids (for which the Proposals-to-CA-Ratio  equals 1). The average across all columns exceeds 
53%, underlining the significant competitive effect (the one-month premium sample average is 37.18%). 
 
 
Appendix − Figure A4 
Mean One-Month Target Premiums sorted by Low vs. High Competition 
Figure A4 plots the mean one-month target premium for low (Proposals-to-CA-Ratio < 1) vs. high 
(Proposals-to-CA-Ratio ≥ 1) competition. At all levels (2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 received bids, respectively), 
highly competitive auctions are associated with significantly higher bid premiums. 
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Appendix − Figure A5 
Key Milestones and Takeover Process Lengths in M&A 
This figure illustrates key milestones during the private and public phase of M&A negotiations. Data are based on a sample of 377 public U.S. deals (2004–2017). 
 




 This thesis addresses strategic interactions between acquiring firms, target firms, and 
market participants during M&A negotiations. I conclude by summarizing the central findings 
of each chapter, assessing limitations of the studies, and suggesting avenues for future research. 
Chapter 1 highlights the role of short sellers and their informational advantage in pend-
ing transactions: they obtain a valuable trading option in M&A deals through their private 
observation of possible stock recalls from beneficial owners, and are thus hypothesized to accept 
lower deal premiums. The main finding is that offered premiums are lower, the higher the 
magnitude of positioned merger arbitrageurs and the more likely a stock recall is. The relation 
is more pronounced, if targets exhibit low insider ownership (i.e., if target stocks are more 
liquid after announcement), if acquirers have high active institutional ownership (i.e., if the 
possible stock recall signal is highly valuable), and if acquirers’ deal advisors’ have high equity 
capital market expertise. Chapter 1 hence extends the literature by adding a “bright side”-
motive to short acquirer stocks besides the commonly known hedging of the long position in 
target stocks. The study further contributes to the general question in the finance literature 
about real effects of financial markets on real investments, as short sellers’ impact on takeover 
prices reflect such a real effect. Since merger arbitrageurs’ short selling of acquirer stocks is 
part of their trading strategy and thus unrelated to information about the fundamental value 
of the acquirer, future studies should consider their magnitude when assessing bidder gains on 
M&A announcements. A limitation of this study is the estimation of the precise value of this 
trading option. Future research could remedy this by using data of daily short sales and more 
detailed ownership. 
 Chapter 2 applies the idea of Shleifer and Vishny’s (1989) entrenchment strategy 
through manager-specific investments by misusing a merger contract clause thought to com-
pensate the target if the acquirer terminates the deal due to reasons under his sphere of control. 
If a CEO is under high turnover pressure and announces a transaction with an excessively 
high, irreversible bidder termination fee, acquiring firm’s shareholders react significantly nega-
tive on announcement. The CEO thereby entrenches herself through the deal by making it 
costly for shareholders to replace her. This effect is stronger, if the CEO and subordinated 
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managers are less aligned with shareholders’ interests, if the board of directors is busy, and if 
the deal is characterized as a diversifying takeover (i.e., more likely of empire-building nature). 
The study shows that in these cases the level of entrenchment, as measured by the E-Index 
developed in Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009), increases stronger in the years following the 
deal compared to otherwise similar deals. Chapter 2 thus motivates members of the board of 
directors to take a close look when negotiating termination fee clauses in M&A contracts. A 
limitation of this study is that it does not take CEO’s talents and experience into account, as 
the theoretical paper by Shleifer and Vishny (1989) suggests. Future research could address 
this, especially for the identified diversifying deals. Another fruitful avenue could be the analysis 
of post-announcement forced CEO turnover probability to verify if the strategy of the CEO to 
counter the disciplinary forces of the market for corporate control really did materialize. 
 Chapter 3 emphasizes the protection of intellectual property during M&A negotiations. 
The relevance of intangible capital has significantly increased over the last decades and explains 
why average market-to-book ratios seem to inflate. Recent research highlights the role of R&D 
in M&A, and finds that the prospects of being acquired by a larger firm increases the incentives 
for smaller firms to innovate (Phillips and Zhdanov (2013)). I contribute to this literature by 
showing that target managers can utilize their bargaining power to negotiate bidder termina-
tion fees, which are paid by the acquirer if he later terminates the deal due to reasons under 
his sphere of control. These fees incentivize the target to reveal private information to the 
acquirer: I find that the relation between my proxy for target’s relative intellectual property 
value and the size of the negotiated bidder termination fee is positive and statistically highly 
significant. Further analyses indicate that the positive relation increases in the degree of tech-
nological proximity and product market rivalry between acquirer and target. The association 
is more pronounced, if the target is a pioneer in its technology sector, operates in the hightech 
or healthcare industry, and mentions trade secrets in its 10-K report prior to announcement. 
This suggests that new innovation, generated through R&D, can be most valuable for firms 
with a similar technology base and firms that are direct product market competitors. Future 
research could relate my proxy for target’s intellectual property value to the selling procedure 
in M&A negotiations: following Hansen (2001), targets trade off the upward potential for higher 
premiums with competitive information cost when deciding on the selling mechanism. I hence 
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expect a positive relation of this proxy with the probability to exclusively negotiate, i.e., one-
to-one with only one prospective acquirer. 
 Chapter 4 sheds light on competition among bidders during private merger negotiations 
and its effect on announcement returns of involved firms. This pre-public phase received height-
ened attention by researchers over the past two years. Data of the private sales process have 
to be parsed from the background section of official merger/tender offer documents provided 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Since textual analysis and machine learn-
ing techniques have only recently been introduced to finance research, this might have contrib-
uted why the research gap of the analysis of private merger negotiations took some time to be 
fully identified. I develop a ratio to measure the degree of competition during private negotia-
tions, and find that this ratio is significantly positively related to target premiums and signif-
icantly negatively related to announcement returns of the winning bidder. Chapter 4 provides 
additional details of the private takeover process: I find that targets’ stock price run-ups in 
anticipation of the takeover seem to increase earlier if the selling procedure is structured as an 
auction rather than an exclusive one-to-one negotiation. This indicates that a higher number 
of involved parties, as is the case in auctions, could increase the likelihood of leaking infor-
mation to the market, well ahead of official bid announcement. By applying a propensity score 
matched sample approach, I do not detect a systematic difference between premiums paid in 
auctions versus premiums paid in one-to-one negotiations. This finding contributes to Boone 
and Mulherin (2008, 2009) that empirical evidence on the “one best way to sell a company” is 
mixed. Future studies could identify how competition is enabled: research shows that invest-
ment banks may posses a heterogeneous set of skills in advising M&A clients (e.g., Bao and 
Edmans (2011) and Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012)). Different deal advisors could be 
specialists for different selling procedures. Analyzing the private takeover process in full detail 
is highly relevant to better understand strategic behavior of firms in M&A. 
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